I wrote this back in June, 2004, responding to an inquiry passed along by Prof. Khaleel Mohammad (San Diego State University) to some of his colleagues. The inquiry was from an Imam who characterized himself as not being an Anti-Semite, or being anti-Jewish, and was discussed on line by Prof. Mohammad and some of our colleagues. My statement below was edited from my responses to various paragraphs in the discussion. I saved the original format of responses to paragraphs, and a file that was only my contribution to the discussion (reproduced below). I can no longer reconstruct exactly who wrote what in the longer discussion, (other than my own responses, which I highlighted), as the email trail that generated the document is no longer readily available. I think it is inappropriate to publish verbatim (even to a blog) a text in which the overwhelming percentage of the words are not mine, even if doing so might make some of my points just a little more clear or provide more exact references for them. So I have reviewed the longer format but made only a few minor edits today, mostly punctuation or fixing verb tenses (Nov. 30, 2012).

It is possible that the author who claims not to be an anti-Semite, or “anti-Jew” means exactly what he says he means: he does not feel he is “anti-Jew” as such. He feels he is not against the Jewish people, or against individual Jews, it is just that he opposes some of the things he believes they have done which he believes are hateful. It is important, however, not to go beyond specific acts of specific Jews; making unfounded generalizations would be the same as assuming all Arabs are mukhribun “terrorists” because of the acts of a few.  And he should be aware that many of those Jews or others he feels are “Anti-Muslim” would make the same kind of statement he makes: they are not “against Islam,” it is just that they oppose some of the things done by persons who claim to be Muslims, who claim that what they do is done in the name of Islam.

The term “Anti-Semite” (German: antisemitismus) was coined by Wilhelm Marr about 130 years ago, in Germany, and has to do with a political movement which was in fact very much anti-Jewish. At that time there were few Arabs or any other Semitic-speaking people in Europe and the question of whether Arabs are Semites is totally irrelevant to the term “Anti-Semitism.” It is most appropriate to use this term to refer to German or European anti-Jewish movements; any other use is an extension. In English, the term has come to mean opposition to Jews and Judaism, especially certain types of political and ideological opposition to Jews and Judaism, and it is often used to refer to specific patterns of hatred of Jews outside the original context.

Prof. Muhammad’s comparison with “American” is very apt. “Anti-American” is understood by everyone in the world to mean “opposing the USA” or opposing some aspect of this, not “Anti-western hemisphere.”

Using the term Anti-Semite confuses the issue for precisely the reason indicated by the Imam when it is assumed to have anything to do with Semitic peoples or languages.

Regardless of whether the term is appropriate, some Arabs and many other Muslims have adopted and disseminated literature and viewpoints which are clearly associated with the political and ideological movement of Anti-Semitism, such as a tract usually called the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and various other libels and akdhāb associated with the Nazis or with their supporters. Thus it is unfortunately quite valid to talk of the circulation of anti-Semitic ideas and literature in the Arab and Islamic world.

In the Second World War, in fact, the Arab world, by and large, sided with the Nazis and their anti-Semitic propaganda.  The most obvious cases are that of the British-appointed Mufti of Jerusalem Al-Hajj Al-Amin Al-Husseini, and of the Iraqi regime of Rashid Ali. The Nazi position stood for wanton disregard for the sanctity of human life, wholesale murder of powerless people who could not be considered attacking it in any way, and a goal of world domination by an ethnic people, not by justice and loyalty to God. Regardless of any political opposition to the British or the Zionist movement, it should be impossible to justify support for Nazism—even the appearance of support for this Godless movement—with submission to God’s will.

  

Connecting Jews with pigs was a favorite of the Nazis. Nevertheless, one would think that the Qur’an’s reference to the conversion of Jews into pigs and apes was to an event which happened in the past. I am not sure whether the Qur’an is to be taken literally regarding people turning into animals. But if so, the meaning would imply that the Jews today are in fact descended from those who were loyal to God, not those who rebelled. (I do not think it acceptable that those who disbelieved in God were quickly able to evolve from apes into people, more quickly than those who believed. And I think one must accept the ẓāhir “evident meaning” about their human status, and the ẓāhir in this case is that the Jews to whom they refer are humans.)

 

I cannot find any evidence that “The Jews in general” hate Muslims and Arabs. Many Jews reject positions which are maintained by Muslims, and oppose what they see as Arab attempts to kill and destroy their brethren. (And are they not right to consider chants like itbaḥ al-yahud “kill the Jews” or qatilhum waqtulhum “Fight them and kill them” as threats?). The Qur’an is considered by many Muslim scholars to be applicable to all mankind. (Yes, I am aware that some legal scholars forbid the study of the Qur’an from those who do not accept it as divine). The Qur’an clearly allows defense against those who come to kill one. 

The idea that the Jews are continuously plotting against all Muslims and Christians in our current political world is ludicrous. This idea has much to do with ḥadith and with anti-Jewish Christian material, and nothing to do with politics. There were individual Jewish individuals who, as individuals, urged various actions—some urged invading Iraq and some opposed it vociferously. There were prominent Iraqis in exile who also urged the US to invade Iraq. One of the best-known was a Shi’ite, and influenced US Iraq policy no less and probably much more than any Jews—are we to cite “the Shi’ites” for causing the invasion of an Islamic country traditionally ruled by Sunnis? 

The “War Crimes” argument is not only very weak, it also points up the great divide between the practice of submission to God’s will or specifically, the idea of taqw­ā “piety” or “fear” of God. It seems to me that the proper Muslim approach to any action of ikhrāb “wanton destruction” especially that which leads to the death of innocents is to denounce it and stay far away from it, and the proper way of reacting to one who has accepted that what he did was wrong is to forgive. Ariel Sharon accepted the verdict the Israeli panel which found he acted improperly by not preventing Christian access to refugee camps in Lebanon; his current acts should be judged by their own worth, not by blaming him for acts committed long ago. Moreover, this argument could never be used by a Muslim to support ikhrāb. 

Part of this argument is based on the assumption that “American might” is focused on destroying the Islamic world. This assumption is problematic indeed. “American might” could just as easily be said as being used to build up the Arab/Muslim world, not to destroy it. In Afghanistan and Iraq, American troops and the American government have worked hard for government which is responsible to the people, and to God. I am quite aware that these are not necessarily governments which impose features associated with traditional Muslim society. But then, killing innocents, raping women, stealing wealth from both rich and poor, dealing in prohibited substances, and destroying the fabric of society cannot be considered “ruling according to God’s will” even if those who do these awful things face the Qibla and pray five times a day! (As for the Taliban and Al-Qa’ida’s supposed involvement in drug schemes: some Muslim authorities would put dealing with opiates such as heroin in the same category as dealing in alcohol, and regardless of any ruling about opiates themselves, the nature of drug-dealing today leaves no doubt that promoting this trade and living from its income is un-Islamic). How many Muslims would decry such entities as un-Islamic!   No, while US forces took the lead in attacking Iraq and Afghanistan, US has also enriched many Arab and Islamic countries, is a major supporter of Egypt, and has proven a fertile ground for the expansion of Islam. The US rightly is worried about those who attack it, and supports those whose policies are in line with its own. But it is not clear by any means that it is opposed to any country or countries simply because they are traditionally Muslim.

The notion of an Anti-Arab and Anti-Islamic bias in the American media is deeply believed by many Muslims, and it may well be possible to support it by carefully crafted studies. But it is just as easy to come to different conclusions; other studies show that important sectors of the American media are pro-Arab, at least in the sense that these media outlets invariably find Muslim or Arab points of view to counter points of view associated with supporters of Israel or of US involvement in Iraq, but do not always do the reverse. Arguments about media partisanship are easy to make, difficult to support, and, in my experience, most have to do with the acts or policies of those who claim to be believers, not with the beliefs themselves.

June 2004

Seth Ward

University of Wyoming

The other day I was asked about Bernard Lewis, the noted historian of the Middle East. Lewis is a meticulous scholar, insightful essayist and consummate stylist. Nevertheless he is often berated, perhaps because the late Edward Said was critical of him—essentially for not being an Arab.

The specific question I was asked concerned a purported prediction Lewis is said to have made about a possible Iranian attack. Lewis supposedly suggested in the Wall Street Journal that the Iranians might choose August 22, 2006, for a major attack. Actually this date was suggested by Iranian President Ahmadinejad for his response to US demands for a halt in nuclear activities. Lewis suggested that a possible response was an attack on Israel. I do not think Lewis actually predicted that Iran would necessarily chose that day for an attack on Israel, which in any case never materialized.

Here is what he said, according to Internet sources (e.g., in the Wikipedia article on Bernard Lewis):

What is the significance of Aug. 22? This year, Aug. 22 corresponds, in the Islamic calendar, to the 27th day of the month of Rajab of the year 1427. This, by tradition, is the night when many Muslims commemorate the night flight of the prophet Muhammad on the winged horse Buraq, first to "the farthest mosque," usually identified with Jerusalem, and then to heaven and back^{[Quran 17:1]}. This might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and if necessary of the world. It is far from certain that Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events precisely for Aug. 22. But it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.

The main point of Lewis’ discussion was not predicting that the Iranian response to the US would be an attack on Israel, but to remind readers that the Iranian leadership is highly ideological, and therefore cannot be assumed to use the same kind of rationale we in the West might--for example, they might not be deterred by mutual assured destruction (as presumably the Soviets were; there are reports that during the Cuban missile crisis both Kruschev and Kennedy were worried that Castro also was too ideological, and thus not deterred by rational considerations).

Lewis also was convinced that Iran had been developing a nuclear bomb at least since the time of the first Iraq campaign.

Whether or not Iranians are susceptible at all to considerations of mutual destruction or economic devastation from sanctions, or other economic, military or political calculations, there should be no doubt that the supreme leadership is highly ideological. In other words, Lewis may or may not be right when he suggests the leadership is completely impervious to such considerations, but he is absolutely correct that their ideology is highly resistant to them. They frequently remind us, for example, that the West values life while they value death and martyrdom, and have the depth of commitment to their values that the West is perceived to lack. They may or may not attack, but we ignore their ideology at our own peril.

As  for August 22, Lewis was off the mark on specifics.  It is the final day of the Persian month Mordad (which is Solar, not based on the Islamic calendar), and may just have represented the last day of the month. Most calculated Islamic calendars show that this day was the 28^th day of Rajab, not the 27^th day. 27 Rajab is indeed the day of Isra and Mi'raj throughout the Islamic world. celebrated in Iran, although as far as I can tell it is more frequently considered to be Laylat al-Mab’ath “ the day of mission” i.e., the day Muhammad was called to divine service. (Most Sunnis would probably suggest the Prophet Muhammad's mission began with the Night of Power, when the revelation of the Qur'an began when the angel Gabriel met him at the cave of Hira, usually associated with the 27th of Ramadan). This is an interesting case in which both Sunnis and Shias mark the same date but give it different names and connotations.

Finally, while I also think that Ahmadinejad and the religious leadership might well consider timing a nuclear attack to a religious holiday, and that Lewis was right to remind readers that that might be their response to international pressure, I also do not think that the historical record suggests they are overly committed to choosing dates with religious significance for military actions.

Bernard Lewis is one of the most influential writers about the Middle East and a careful scholar. He is also outspoken and has a political position. I do not think even he himself considered August 22 2006 as particularly likely for attack. What he was talking about is that we take a big risk if we assume that the rationale of the Iranian leadership is similar to that of the leadership of most Western democracies. This remains a big risk to the United States, to Israel, to Arab states, and for that matter to the entire world.

Seth Ward

Four years ago, I gave a talk about Muslims and Jews, and the ramifications of their voting patterns for Democrats and Republicans. I spoke at what was, I believe, the ill-fated but valuable entity already called CCCE (and once called Community Education). And I continue to include charting trends in these communities in my professional purview.

 

I did not really have any reason to cover the Mormon vote in 2008.

 

George W. Bush had courted the Muslim vote, and in 2000 and 2004, the Muslim community took this into account (as they did, especially after the attack on the World Trade Center and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, US policies towards the Islamic world). In 2008, the Muslim vote  for the Democratic party reflected reactions to George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq, and recognition of Obama’s personal history—Obama spent time growing up in Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority country, and his grandfather was a Muslim, for at least part of his life. It’s noteworthy that the latter fact was more important than considering the candidate’s grandfather, father or indeed himself as an apostate—and I do not think many American voters who are Muslims hold the misguided notion that Obama is himself Muslim, despite the startling percentage of Americans (in some surveys, over 10%) who treat this claim seriously.

 

I am writing this in part because my attention was drawn to one of the most important and fundamental surveys of religion and voting, the report of the Pew Memorial Trust. Although the way the Pew survey was done, there was little likelihood they would get sufficient data to make projections about Muslim, Jewish and Mormon voters, and they focused on the changing role of religion in the US electorate, but mostly white, African-American, and Hispanics who identify as Christians of various types, or as "nones"--persons with no religious affiliation. But, it is certainly possible to look into the Muslim, Jewish and Mormon communities and discuss the trends and their significance.

 

It’s not clear how important these votes will be, but it is noteworthy that while Muslims and Jews are a small portion of the electorate, they are reasonably well represented in enough “swing states” that they could easily claim significance in winning the election. Muslims are certainly a large enough percentage of voters to make an electoral difference in the swing state of Virginia. Other swing states such as Florida, Colorado and Ohio have enough Muslims that their vote could be said to make a difference if they tended towards one party or another and the results were close. Mormons are probably enough of a force in Nevada, possibly in Colorado. The Jewish vote could be decisive in Florida and Nevada, and probably in Ohio and Colorado.

 

Pew’s charting of ethnic/racial distinctions are clearly important, as are the “religiosity” items such attendance at religious services and other practices.  Indeed, these kinds of things show up as important distinctions in many studies of Jewish and Muslim communities.

 

I have not seen much material about Muslim choices in the current race, although some are nervous about Romney’s strong language regarding Iran, Libya, Israel and elsewhere in the Middle East. I need to track this more carefully.

 

Jewish Republicans are far more vocal than ever before, although it is hard to determine if the percentage is highly distinct from the usual 25%. Jews who attend the synagogue multiple times per week (not per month!) tend to track more highly for Romney—generally this correlates with certain segments of the Orthodox and especially Ultra-Orthodox communities. The AJC (American Jewish Committee) did a survey on Sept. 27 that projected 65% for Obama and 24% for Romney. Undecideds were asked for their preferences as of the date—and apparently most were able to say they were leaning one way or another; rounding these numbers and adding them in it’s about 71% for Obama and 27% for Romney. (Disclosure: I made up these last numbers: the report I saw did not do this addition).

 

The most striking differential is that Orthodox Jews, usually considered about 10% of the overall Jewish population (in this sample the percentage was 8.3%, favored Romney over Obama 54% to 40%, while the other categories are pretty close to the overall average. The gender gap is present among Jewish respondents 69/19% women vs. 61/29% men. The survey asked whether respondents approved of the way Obama is handling various issues; the most striking approval rates to me were to the question about whether he was handling the abortion issue well. Clearly National Security, Israel and Iran are important issues for these voters. In some cases, the level of support or approval for Obama differed from the overall level of his support.

 

Muslims largely supported Clinton, but also George Bush and George W Bush. They voted for Obama in large numbers in 2008. This time around, there appears to be disappointment with Obama: at home, there is still profiling and some of the provisions of the PATRIOT act that the Muslim community dislikes were renewed; overseas, many are dissatisfied by the nature of US involvement in Muslim countries, drone attacks, and so forth. I do not think there is a great amount of sympathy for Romney, though, so it is not surprising to me that the necessity to vote emerges more than support of (or opposition to) one or the other candidate–in my very unscientific survey of website statements about this issue. 

 

Mormons typically support the Republican party, and this year support for Romney, a Mormon, exceeds the level of Mormon support for the ticket in 2008.

 

Is there any significance to this all?

 

In terms of who is elected—the Mormon, Jewish and Muslim voting blocks could be influential in a few states, such as Virginia, Florida, Ohio,  Colorado and Nevada. Given the closeness of the election, any of these states could be viewed as the deciding state.

 

Many perceive a widening gulf between Republicans and Democrats in general in the United States, and this is mirrored in the gulf between the politics of Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews. Orthodox Jews tend also to be more conservative on a number of social issues. Israel and various other foreign policy issues remain of broad interest to the Jewish electorate; although Republican policies towards Israel seem in my humble opinion to reflect the kinds of approaches more closely associated with Christian Zionism and Neoconservatives (and Jewish neo-cons are not primarily Orthodox), these approaches resonate well in the Orthodox Jewish community. It should be noted that Jewish republicans are by no means overwhelmingly Orthodox—the percentage of the Orthodox community supporting the Republicans is much higher than it is among Conservative, Reform, and other affiliated or non-affiliated Jews, but the Orthodox form a small percentage of the overall community.

 

Looking over several surveys, it seems that the greatest issue in the Muslim community today is getting out the vote. Many Muslims find both major parties to have problematic and attractive aspects when compared to their opponents, and American Muslims do not seem to have the history of supporting the one or the other party, as is typical of Jews and Mormons.

 

Mormons typically support Republican candidates, and have a substantial infrastructure to support voting. It seems to me that Mormons mobilizing the vote could have a substantial impact in Nevada, and a smaller yet not insignificant impact in Colorado.

 

To the extent that I can determine from reviewing surveys and reportage, Jews still support the Democratic Party much more often than the Republican Party. But, Jews appear to resemble the general American community more and more in terms of how religiosity and similar considerations affect their voting preferences; a detailed statistical analysis might show that, when allowances are made for some of these concerns, Jewish demography—largely urban, less religious etc.—is such that when held constant for some of these considerations, Jewish voting preferences are even less distinct from the general electorate. Even on Israel, Jews may appear to interpret candidates’ positions in such a way that they match their party loyalties.

 

Any change in the Mormon voting orientation is less likely to come to the fore in the current election. And Muslims appear to be investing energy in getting more involved in the political process.

 

Seth Ward

I discovered recently that some of my articles and essays archived on my computer are either unreadable in the current computer environment or were completely compromised. Here are links from the Wayback Machine on archive.org. Please remember that these items were filed in the 1990s and that the du.edu email address listed on them is no longer in service: use sward@uwyo.edu 

Papers, Publications and Essays

By: Dr. Seth Ward

Sepharadim, Converso Descendants, Crypto-Jews

·  Review of a cookbook based on recipes developed from ingredients mentioned in Inquisition records

·  Crypto-Judaism in the U.S. Southwest

·  Profiles of Converso Descendants in the U.S. Southwest

·  Profiles of Converso Descendants in the U.S. Southwest: Lecture in Los Angeles, August 1999

·  Sephardim and Crypto-Jews: A Definition of Terms

·  Sepharad: A brief history of the term.

Lively opinion on Jewish Topics

·  Quranic sources on The Chosen People and Holy Land

·  The Jewish Street

·  Hebrew Literacy

Papers and addresses on other Jewish issues

·  Luther and the Jews

·  Does Judaism have a Catechism?

·  Are Hamantaschen like communion wafers or Christmas Cookies? Inpraxation and a Jewish Typology for food

·  The Jewish Year: The zero-date of the Era

·  Tisha Beav: In what year was the Temple Destroyed (Or: What does the year 5761 mean?)

·  Passover

National Narratives and History

·  On the Holocaust in North Africa, Sephardim and the Islamic World

·  The Battles of Kosovo as National Narrative

New Testament and Jewish Sources

·  The Presentation of Jesus: Jewish Perspectives on Luke 2:22f.

Selected additional documents for teaching, introductory lectures; course syllabi

·  Follow links from Home Page

The UW Religious Studies club sent me an announcement about a discussion responding to a discussion on The New York Times 'Room for Debate' Op-Ed page on their website to whether Islam is an obstacle to democracy: http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/10/04/is-islam-an-obstacle-to-democracy/?ref=opinion.

Tariq Ramadan’s comment is important—and the page of responses are mostly to his article. The way it is set up, some people might miss Ramadan’s piece. I did not read all of them, but most of the short pieces in response were disappointing to me (my personal opinion). Omid Safi was the best of them. His comments about dealing with religious and ethnic minorities are well-put, and something to watch for. I think he overstates the degree to which anti-Muslim sentiment is intrinsic to American and Israeli societies, rather than a result of actual attacks. But his call to fellow Muslims to create societies that live up to their expectations is articulate, passionate and honest.  

Tariq Ramadan does not dismiss the very real considerations that have made Muslims angry at America, although to my mind, one key ingredient goes un-emphasized by him: the role of leadership in channeling anger in this way. What he does say is important: he addresses Arab/Muslim societies, and says it is time to stop blaming others, and time to act as the empowered agents they actually are.  Ramadan also reminds American readers about the deep divisions between different strands within today’s Islamic world.

Until the Arab street understands that complaining about the US is not the answer to their problems, there will be no democracy, no self-rule by the people. This is no easy street. Ramadan has something important to say, and in my humble opinion, too few of the respondents got this right.

Seth Ward

I finally got around to reading the book by Sadakat Kadri. Heaven on Earth: A Journey through Shari’a Law. On the whole, it is an excellent read. It’s a book I could consider for my History of Islam course, especially if our Program runs a course on Islamic religion as well as “History of Islam.” (That might be a better division than the current course offerings).

 

There are a few places where I thought Kadri was wrong or left things out. Most of the time, that’s OK, as his choices make sense, although sometimes I thought the approach was too simplistic, given the breadth and depth of the book. What is less clear to me is whether I consider his narrative of the past stunningly integrative—that is, integrating political history and the development of legal thought in a useful way—or going overboard in selecting and reshaping the material to do so. But the general trajectory of his history serves to support ideas that continue to surprise me although I agree with them and teach them: the sunna emerged as a response to legal reasoning, not the other way around—and Islam changed forever in the wake of the Mongol invasion, the context in which Ibn Taymiyya was active. He explains this and other such matters well.

 

One reason I mention the concept reshaping the material is his treatment of Ibn Taymiyya. With good reason, he regards Ibn Taymiyya as crucial for understanding many aspects of the development of Islamic thought for the past seven centuries, and especially important for the Salafi approach today (he finds Salafi preferable to many similar terms used today such as extremists, Wahhabis, etc.), and to developments in the concept of Jihad, especially against other Muslims. And he paints an easy-to-understand picture detailing exactly how and why Salafi-style Islam (especially since 1979) differs from all previous ideas about jihad and violence against other Muslims, including the imposition of violent shari’a punishments. Again, I am not sure that I would agree on all his main points, but the book provides a reasonable argument and a very clear statement.

 

Kadri’s approach to the Palestinian/Israeli issue is curious in one sense: he delineates why it is central to much radicalization in contemporary Islam, and especially the role it played in the development of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, but on the whole, this issue gets less space in the book than one might think given his assertion of its centrality. I think Kadri is indeed correct to keep it in perspective, and to emphasize “promoting good and forbidding evil” and other aspects associated with sunni Islam and especially with contemporary counties in which violent, traditionalizing Muslim groups are dominant—by no means all traditionally- Islamic countries. And I think Kadri could have offered even more contextualization of conflicts between Salafis, Muslim Brotherhood, Shia and moderate Sunni Muslims, within issues of bad government, world politics (going back to 1^st and 2^nd World War and Cold War/Third World issues), and “minority relations,” that is, tensions between groups based on religion, religiosity or ethnicity.  

 

I am grateful to a student who suggested I read this book and comment on it; for me personally, it has raised some questions about how to teach Islamic history, specifically how to integrate the development of legal ideas into a political narrative—something Kadri does quite well—and how I wish to research and write about issues of Islamic law, of 13-14^th century Islam, and about contemporary considerations. I am grateful for the encouragement to have read it, and know it will affect some of my thinking on these issues as I go forward.

 

Seth Ward

ON USING QUR’AN TRANSLATIONS:

The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an,  Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Amana 2004 and others.

Seth Ward

University of Wyoming

 

 

On Abdullah Yusuf Ali

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdullah_Yusuf_Ali

 

On omissions and revisions from some recent editions:

http://www.al-islam.org/tahrif/yusufali/index.htm

 

 

For the most part I have come to use the Abdullah Yusuf Ali bilingual (Arabic and English) version of the Qur’an in courses which require a Qur’an edition. In addition to a translation, it has commentary and introductions, excurses, sonnets, and a very useful index. Abdullah Yusuf Ali was a lawyer from India in Colonial times (actually where he lived is now in Pakistan) and was trained in Britain and saw himself in some sense very much a part of the British empire; the work is not only directed to Muslims requiring a translation, but also to English readers. As such, Abdullah Yusuf Ali gives Bible parallels, references to British literature, and even some paraphrases of Shakespeare that are unreferenced, as those of his generation would recognize them instantly even if many of my students do not.  Although the translation dates to the 1930s, the work appears to continue to be popular in American mosques and often quoted by Muslims. 

 

Students should be aware that there are other highly influential Qur’an translations and commentaries available in English. An important review and critique of these translations was offered by Khaleel Mohammed in Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2005, pp. 58-71, and available online at http://www.meforum.org/717/assessing-english-translations-of-the-quran. Among the translations he reviews, Mohammed favors the translations of Arthur Arberry (1955) and Muhammad Asad (1980), and has important criticisms of many others, including the current editions of the Abdullah Yusuf Ali volume.

 

There have been some editorial adjustments since the work originally appeared, especially in the commentaries, sometimes but not always marked by (R), and subject to a certain amount of discourse in the Islamic world. Typically the comments and modifications which draw the most debate reflect the Salafi/Wahhabi, anti--Shi’a and anti-Zionist (and antisemitic) views of Saudi Arabian sponsors of the new edition—who made its broad distribution possible.

 

Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s work was published before the many changes in the Islamic world since World War II, and thus prior to the appearance of seminal works by Al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and for that matter Amina Wadud and many others, who have reshaped the understanding of the Qur’an among Muslims of many different orientations.

 

Nevertheless, I like the book.  Although there are a number of things to watch out for, for users cognizant of its editorial policies and the concerns of the commentary, it still provides a good baseline understanding of the text.

 

Some students will find ideas in his commentary about Christianity or Judaism to be offensive. Yet some Jewish or Christian students are likely to be offended by most things said by Muslims when arguing that the religions of Judaism and Christianity are wrong, misread the Bible, or changed its contents. Abdullah Yusuf Ali knows Bible well so has almost always the right references (there are really only a few mistakes) but of course these Bible verses are understood within his framework of reference, which is not Christian or Jewish. It is important to remember, too, that this is inherently a work meant not merely to give an English language version of the Qur’an as the translator understands it, but in so doing to argue for Islam, and against Judaism and Christianity—indeed, against Jews and Christians for their misunderstandings and unbelief.

 

Since there is a lot of commentary, explanation, poetic introductions and so forth, students should remember that the Arabic text is the Qur’an, and only the English texts printed parallel to Arabic texts are the translation: everything else is not.

 

Students also need to note that Yusuf Ali puts words inside parentheses which do not match up with the Qur’an but reflect the way he believes the Qur’an is usually understood, and he is usually more or less correct, although these translations often are somewhat apologetic or try to interpret the Qur’anic text in the best possible light for English-speaking readers. An egregious example of this, perhaps, is the famous verse which encourages husbands, in certain circumstances, to use various remedies on their wives, including beating. The Arabic word can indeed mean “spank (lightly)” as Abdullah Yusuf Ali translates, but the same word could also be used in “strike (dead).” Authoritative commentators almost always stress that striking one’s wife is not a good idea and must be limited in strength as well as scope. So, the translation reflects the traditional understanding as well as it represents the actual text—but those without Arabic might not realize the potential breadth of meaning of the Arabic terminology. In the classroom, this is easy enough to handle if you have time; more difficult if you need to be extremely brief. The verse in question is usually enumerated 4:34.

 

With its commentary and cross references this is a good “study Qur’an,” despite the age of the translation, its traditional approach, and its polemical intent. A “Study Qur’an” for university use  (paralleling study bibles) would actually be welcome. Yet Study Bibles are often written by people who exercise critical analysis but also have a deep faith-community link with the text—and these persons are rare indeed in the Islamic world.

 

The biggest problem students usually have is going to be common to any translation: Students unfamiliar with the Qur’an often approach it with the expectation that Scripture is primarily connected narrative. Individual Bible Stories are connected into a long story that has a beginning, middle and end. Even in the Old Testament, this makes works like Leviticus and Deuteronomy, with many legal passages, or the second half of Exodus with its details about construction of the Sanctuary, rather difficult for students to comprehend. Thus even in Bible, narrative may well be secondary to legal sections or to detailed descriptions, not the primary point. Thus even in discussing familiar material such as Bible I need to spend a certain amount of time talking about the purpose of narrative to introduce legal materials, not simply to tell a story of “preparatio evangelae” “Preparation for the Gospel,” to borrow a term from Eusebius,  and discuss many more types of literary genres in the Old Testament. For the Qur’an this discussion is much more complicated due to what appears to be the lack of any organizing principle for the book as a whole, or even for the individual chapters, called “suras” in Arabic. I do not have a short list of genres that I use for the Qur’an but it’s important to point out that there are few long narratives, and they relate to the central truths of Islam, not to the Biblical narrative sequence. There’s also legal material, highly poetic representations, preaching and so forth.

 

It seems to me that the best way to overcome these hurdles is to read and study a fairly long passage within one of the suras placed earlier in the Qur’an, to get a feel for the different genres contained; to read some of the very short suras placed towards the end of the Qur’an, and to take a few topics from the Index and read every relevant verse in its context.

 

Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s Meaning of the Holy Qur’an is one of a number of popular editions which make it very easy for students unfamiliar with the Qur’an to do this productively. The issues I have discussed in this brief essay of course pertain to just about any edition or translation of the Qur’an English-speaking students are likely to use.

 

Seth Ward

sward@uwyo.edu

Among the I inquiries I receive fairly frequently are requests to comment on lists of Qur’an verses which articulate a strident and violent antagonism to Christians and Jews. These same verses are also quoted often enough by the extremists themselves, those who perpetrate acts of terror and murder against non-Muslims and for that matter against secular Muslims or Muslims who espouse a different approach to Islam than their own--and especially by those who plan, encourage, and fund such acts. Moreover, they are cited by those who maintain they are not extremists, but whose selection of verses nevertheless does not moderate such motifs in the Islamic world. You can easily find most of these Qur’anic texts. I recommend readers check them out, especially if you can compare multiple translations (available in many websites), and Qur’an commentaries. It is also important to read a few verses on either side to get the context.  

The business of quoting verses from the Qur’an to prove a point already believed to be true is easy in this case: there are many verses which support views we would characterize as extremist, and promising the sword and a violent end to unbelievers, including Christians and Jews. And, it is correct that Islamic legal authoroities generally consider the “Sword Verse” (9:5) to abrograte all other verses to the extent that they contradict it.  

But of course it is not clear how useful the simplistic citation of verses is. Perhaps it is ironic that the extremists who cite them approvingly, and the anti-Islamic activists who cite them as proving the essense of Islam, come to share the same interpretation of the Qur’an. But whereas for religious persons, God is capable of acting or may be indeed the only true Actor, nevertheless Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and by extension, Bible, New Testament and Qur’an are not agents: only God (for those who are religious) and Man are actors in history. We may say that God commands or speaks in these texts, but in all cases, the Divine Word is interpreted and put into effect by human beings, who participate to a greater or lesser extent within various traditions of how these verses are to be understood. And those traditions are malleable—our history of interpretation and choices made by interpreters and teachers shape the way the verses are understood. To put this as simply as possible: “Islam teaches” is not completely accurate; indeed, it is “shorthand” for a process in which the verses and teachings are always selected, understood and interpreted by humans.

To illustrate, consider that Christians generally believe that the Son of God is the Prince of Peace and quote verses to show the peaceful nature of Christianity. But most Christians also consider what they see as “the moral law of the Old Testament” to be part of the canon, as is a “Sword Verse” in the New Testament, and the book of Revelations—not exactly peaceful materials.

And modern Jewish extremists – fewer in raw numbers and in percentages than the Muslim extremists to be sure – sometimes rule that Arabs are Amalek or Palestinian Arabs, and for that matter any non-Jews in the State of Israel are like the Seven Nations—and thus must be utterly destroyed. If they do not do so, according to some Jews, it is merely such principles as recognition of the flawed international power scene that prevents treating them the way that halacha requires.

The reasons that most Jews and most Christians do not think this way and that too many Muslims do—even if a small but significant percentage–-has to do with such things as choices made regarding pilosophy, enlightenment, the universalist tendencies in Jewish and Christian traditions by those who shaped religious opinion such as Maimonides, Aquinas, Jacob Emden, the Maskilim, Rabbi Kook and John Paul II; and on the Islamic side, by the processes which have brought ideas promoted by the Wahhabis, the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, and the Islamic Revolution more currency among Islamic activists than the more liberal and universalists interpretations that are actually favored by a majority of Muslims.

We ignore the extremist views in the Qur’an at our peril of course: these have been and continue to be powerful texts that shape Islamic thought. But we do ourselves no favor to simply adopt a one-sided assessment of the essential nature of a religious tradition rather than understanding it in context. This thinking is too close to that of the Islamic extremists themselves, and ignores the role of modern developments in shaping a complex set of responses to modernity by Muslims.

Seth Ward

FW: Religion Today. The "Mosque" near Ground Zero: Thinking it Through

Response to an inquiry regarding Green Mosques and Synagogues:

 

Many synagogues are worried about the environment and similar issues, and many Jewish communities include environmental issues in their ritual calendar by discussing the divine imperative about not destroying trees (and by extension, wasting any resource), especialy when the relevant passage is read in the synagogue, and by an environmental approach incorporated in "seders" for 15^th of Shevat (“Tu Bishevat”), a date about halfway between Winter Solstice and Spring equinox (late January, early February) that was used to mark the beginning of the year for certain types of agricultural purposes and temple offerings related to trees.

 

COEJL would be the place to look for Synagogues going Green

http://www.coejl.org/~coejlor/ebulletin/31.php

 

Here is an initiative from Baltimore:

http://www.bjen.org/greening.html

 

If you are interested in the spadework, you can probably get Google or another computer search enginge to search synagogue bulletins for more “greening” info, or contact these and similar organizations.

 

I’ve heard about a number of Muslim organizations that are green oriented. I had not heard about “Green Ramadan” before looking into this: it is mentioned in a news release from January of this year at http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1262372189305&pagename=Zone-English-News/NWELayout

This article delineates efforts in the Washington DC area and in Illinois.

 

The “Green Ramadan” idea ought to resonate well among those who are favorably disposed, seeing the role of green as an Islamic color. Of course those who are not favorably disposed could easily reject this as being unfavorable to Islam… Reading through the articles that come up from a Google Search, I found both Islamic groups that encourage it, and say Islam has taught it all along, and those who think it is counter to Islam or an attempt to impose Western ideals. It is true that to the extent that Google can mark what is most popular, the anti-environmentalist position came up at the top—in the context though of comments made by Syed Hussein Nasr, as reported in Cross Currents, that I would characterize on the whole as emphasizing human stewardship rather than dominance (to use religious terminology sometimes used in religious discussions that reflect Genesis).

http://www.crosscurrents.org/islamecology.htm

 

Shared work on environmental issues are among the goals of a movement to “twin” mosques and synagogues. I see a lot of reports about such cooperation, but have tried to determine the degree to which there is real cooperation or just talk of cooperation.

 

What I cannot do is estimate the relative importance of the Green movement in the context of all the other issues facing the various Jewish and Islamic communities of the US today, the extent to which environmental issues are actually being addressed within either community, or the actual extent of cooperation between Muslim and Jewish communities resulting from environmental issues.

 

I have written a paper about Tu Bishevat which talks a little about environmentalism. In the process of editing and reediting it, I suspect that I do not have a really good copy of any version of the paper to share with you but I would be happy to discuss my findings if you are interested.

 

Please do not hesitate to contact me for any further info.

 

Seth Ward 

 

 

 

 

Dear Seth,
Do you know of any synagogues or mosques that are “going green”?
Paul