This is an analysis of the University of Wyoming Israel Election Survey conducted December 2012-January 2013, regarding the 2013 elections for Israel’s Parliament, the Knesset.

The Israeli voter votes for a single slate of candidates for the Knesset (often called a “party list”) from among multiple slates proposed by various parties. Mandates for Knesset seats are distributed to these slates based on the proportion of the total vote; an introduction to the system and links for further information and essays were included material made available to those who took the survey, found in http://www.uwyo.edu/sward/israeli.elections.htm.

Thanks to everyone who took the survey. A preliminary report was published the day before the elections. This update takes into account a few surveys that came in after that time, with analysis. The complete results are given in the Appendix, with a few additional explanatory comments.   

Size of the survey and a few other introductory parameters.

There were 73 returns, and some of these were incomplete. This was not a scientific survey, so the results may be instructive or suggestive, but not conclusive.

The survey was constructed using the University of Wyoming Survey Tool. It remained open past the date at which analysis was begun for technical reasons. Minor divergence may result because some analyses were done before the receipt of the final response, or due to minor differences in the way the Survey program handled data and results from analysis in Microsoft Excel. Sometimes these differences are due to the different ways of handling skipped questions, irrelevant or incomplete responses, or certain types of survey questions, including questions for which respondents could choose from a list but also write in a different choice.

The participants were largely from North America, but there were participants from Germany, UK, Israel and China, and US participants who had completed high school in Turkey or in Africa. Not surprisingly, a large percentage of respondents appear to be connected with Colorado and Wyoming (usually indicated by high school or university affiliation). As noted below, only one reported having completed high school in Israel. Part of the significance of this endeavor is the non-Israeli response. In the summer and fall 2012, electoral preferences of non-US voters around the world were reported for the US presidential elections (along endless surveys of those likely to vote).  But there were relatively few surveys of persons unlikely to vote in the Israeli election process.

This survey was designed primarily as a teaching tool, and perhaps the best justification for it came not from the formal results but from comments received informally, explaining that it helped understand the process or some of the issues. Some of the questions were shaped in such a way as to make it easier to “score” the results to determine the degree to which predictions about Knesset and Government match the actual results.  

My Prediction based on the survey

It was possible to make an arbitrary prediction the day before the election based on survey results,  compiled not “scientifically” but “mathematically:” indices were assigned to various results, some of the lowest results dropped, the remaining ones added, divided and combined until reaching a result that could result in 120 members of Knesset. This approach took into account the predictions as well as the preferences of our survey respondents, but was independent of other surveys. Here is the list circulated in advance of the election—and the actual results.

How this was done: 

Some scores were eliminated: parties not receiving more than 10% in the individual vote, or more than 15% in the “vote for three parties” were excluded from the individual vote results; parties that received less than 15% in vote for three were excluded from the three party vote results. Similar limitations were imposed on the other categories.

% Individual party vote times 3

+ % vote for three parties result

+ Number predicting five largest parties

+ ½ % the vote for PM, assigned to the PM’s party

+ 1/3 % believing parties will be in the coalition.

Results divided by 6 and rounded to produce 120. (more than 0.33 rounded up, otherwise rounded down).

Actual “Votes” by preference (percentages)

Respondents were asked to vote for one list only, and in a separate question, asked to consider which lists they would vote for if they could chose three lists. In this chart, the total responses by percentage for this question are divided by three.

A few respondents voted for “none of the above” in the “vote for one” question. Fewer responded to the question about voting for three parties, but almost all in fact voted for three parties; when actual percent voting was factored in (96%, 296%), there are minor changes in the result. For example, Likud-Beitenu would receive 17% of votes actually cast.

The top seven parties on the list should come as no surprise. There was a lot of support for Meretz in this survey. Tzippi Livni and Kadima fared much better than in the actual Israeli electorate. Survey respondents were less attracted to Likud, Ha-Bayit Hayehudi and the religious parties than the Israeli electorate.

It may however be something of a surprise that Likud, HaBayit Hayehudi and Tzippi Livni all fared much better in “vote for one list” than in the question which asked respondents to consider which lists they would vote for if they could chose three lists. Striking examples of the reverse were Labor, Hadash, Kadima and Am Shalem. In other words: The Labor party did better as a “second choice” than as a first choice, beating Likud-Yisrael Beitenu. For Likud-Beitenu, Ha-Bayit Ha-Yehudi, Tzippi Livni, and Meretz, apparently those who did not vote for them as their “sole” vote would not generally consider them as a “second choice” if they could vote for three parties.

Prime Minister:

Israelis voted directly for Prime Minister only in three elections, but the survey had a question about voting for the Prime Minister. Netanyahu collected 31% of the vote of this group.  If the center/left parties united, they would have won, with almost half (about 47%) of the vote. Add votes for Avigdor Lieberman and Aryeh Elad, and at 35% the right wing is still far behind.

What coalition will emerge? How long will it take?

According to the results, over half the respondents predicted Likud-Yisrael Beteynu, and Shas would be in the coalition. 41% predicted HaBayit Hayehudi, About a third each predicted United Torah Judaism, Kadima, Ha-Tenuah-Tzippi Livni, and Labor would be coalition partners. Fewer than a quarter predicted Yesh Atid will be part of the government.

In the narrative response, the overwhelming sentiment was that the next government will favor security issues, right wing / nationalist and similar concerns. Most assumed that at least one Haredi party would be included. A few assumed that a centrist or left wing party would be included; one respondent said “as a fig leaf.” Only one respondent suggested that Yair Lapid would certainly take part in the next government.

The average prediction was that the coalition would include about 70 mandates. In the preliminary report Labor or Yesh Atid were suggested in order to round out 69 mandates. 

The average prediction was that the coalition would be accepted by the Knesset 25 days after the election, which I am “rounding out” to Sunday, February 17.

Notable results

a.      Netanyahu was widely expected to win of course: when respondents projected who they thought would be the next PM, they overwhelmingly selected Netanyahu.

b.      But in this survey, the single-party vote and especially the three-party vote did not particularly favor Netanyahu. In general, this survey was further to the left than the actual Israeli vote—and the religious parties were not well represented.

c.      Am Shalem did better in this survey than in the election; perhaps reflecting Haim Amsalem’s outreach to English speakers.

d.      There was little response in this survey from the Arab sector—probably an inevitable result of the distribution of this survey.

e.      Respondents were more realistic about who will actually be the largest parties: few thought Meretz would number among them.  Likud, Shas and Labor (!) got the most predictions. About half as many thought Tzippi Livni, Habayit Hayehudi and Kadima would get the next number of votes (in that order).

f.       The left/center leaning is not particularly surprising, although the strong showing of Labor is. Labor seems to be a solid “second or third choice.” If electors could vote for three parties, Labor polled just a little more than Likud and more than Meretz, both of which polled higher than Labor in the traditional “single party” vote.

g.      Another surprise, to me, is that Am Shalem polled identical numbers to Kadima in the “vote for three parties” question.  Am Shalem played no significant role in predictions for largest parties or coalition partners, but this could mean it is a party worth watching. (More likely though, given the fact that it did not gain enough votes to enter the Knesset, it could be the end of Rabbi Amsalem’s Knesset career).  In the actual results, Am Shalem’s results were not far from Kadima’s either, although of course Kadima had more than 2% of the votes and Am Shalem did not.

What issues are most important?

Social issues topped security in the list of responses, with State of Palestine and economic issues coming not far behind. Religious Divisions were next. All these were noted by over a quarter of respondents. Fewer noted Iran or education. Although “social issues” topped this list, only 17% noted Israeli Arabs and only 5% noted Haredim.  

My survey did not include “Peace” as one of the named issues—but this was the most frequently mentioned word in the “other” responses.  

Many respondents reflected on their votes—in some cases at great length. Their views are are reproduced at the beginning of the appendix.  Respondent comments make it clear that leadership, personal views about various leaders, personal political placement (left/center, right), security, relations with the Palestinians, and social and religious divisions inside Israel are important considerations. The considerations which loomed large in the narrative descriptions were not necessarily those in choices from the list; in particular, economic and social issues were much less frequently mentioned explicitly in the narratives.  Despite great concern over Iran, it was not particularly high in the choices (20%), and played even less of a role in the narrative descriptions given by respondents.

Respondents

Few respondents reported growing up in Israel or being citizens. A few mentioned they were eligible to vote but would not be voting. Most respondents completed high school in the USA. One was born in another Middle Eastern country, and several completed high school in UK and Germany. South America, Africa and China were also represented.

About one third each were students, teachers (including professors, researchers, university faculty and others); or other (a rabbi, lawyers, professionals, etc.).

Significance

The study was hardly scientific. This survey provided respondents with a venue in which to express their political opinions—much as was provided in late summer and fall 2012 around the world with the proliferation of polling about the American Presidential campaign. I believe that asking both about preference and prediction, and inclusion of a question about voting for three parties, countered at least to a certain extent the bias inherent in some such surveys, in which people do not always articulate the breadth of their views, or “pick winners” rather than vote conscience—although there is no way to confirm this conclusion at this time. Most important, the many students who took this survey got a glimpse of the complexity of the process. Responses by and large showed choices were made carefully – many took the time to lay out articulate statements about their choices.

Yesh Atid was probably unfamiliar to the largely non-Israeli respondents; both Tzippi Livni and Kadima were familiar “brands” that did better among this group than in the Israeli electorate. This is a left-leaning crowd, as seen by support for Meretz and lack of support for Netanyahu.

Israeli election results included a tremendous showing for Yesh Atid—not at all mirrored in this survey, or in most Israeli surveys either. Otherwise, though, except for Meretz and other understandable differences, the results of this survey were not as far off from the Israeli electorate as I thought (or most people would have thought) when I processed them the day before the election. At least among those who responded to this survey, there was great awareness of Israeli politics, and enthusiasm about expressing opinions about parties, candidates and issues.

Seth Ward

Appendix: Why they voted as they did: selections from respondent comments

(the rest of the survey questions and responses are below).

Leadership

I'd like to see Israel have new leadership who are concerned with the welfare of all of its people and not just the powerful.

Strong leadership that understands Israel's right to exist is not up for discussion.

experienced leadership, strong security policy, & focus on economy.

Israel has need for strong leadership, committed to a non-apologetic stance on her right to exist.

A good leader must be a wise leader.

How to find a suitable big fish in such a tiny pot?

Left/Center Values

Progressive left-liberal values.

left orientation.

Centrist.

I'm a leftist in Israeli terms :-)

progressive centrist.

Only the left has a vision for justice and democracy in Eretz Israel.

Center-left views.

left wing votes.

Right

I want a stronger, far right Israel.

Jewish /Zionist Identity

I want to keep Israel alive and Jewish

I want most of all for Israel to be as secure as possible and I want it to remain a safe place for Jews to live.

A progressive, yet Zionist Israel that is prosperous, secure, and at peace with its neighbors

Tzippi Livni

Selected Tzipi Livni 'cause she is level headed and pragramatic.

Ideologically, I'd vote for Hatnua, but I don't trust Livni.  I indicate support for Am Shalem because the issues raised -- re; the secular-dati divide -- are key to peace, security, and prosperity.

I trust Tzipi Livni.  I hope that religious issues can be set aside from politics and real progress can be made.

Yachimovich

Yachimovich has a history of anti-war and two-state politics, and her background in journalism gives her a perspective on subaltern groups in Israel and Palestine that most of the current Knesset seems to love ignoring.

Labor party pays more attention on peace process

Yesh Atid and others (including Hadash!)

At first look my selections may not make the most sense, but they all relate to the biggest problems facing Israel. Before Israel can effectively discuss a peace process, largely and accurately regarded as the most significant issue at stake in the country's future, it must resolve its own demographic, economic, and societal issues. The party with the best approach and the greatest recognition of these issues is Yair Lapid's Yesh Atid, explaining my selection of this new party. Yesh Atid is also composed largely of those new to politics, something necessary to break through Israel's deep political divisions and redirect the focus of government. As with most political systems, the best solutions involve moderation and compromise. Hatnua was founded based on this concept of moderation, and stands the best chance of effectively approaching many issues in Israel and displays, out of the largest parties, the most willingness to compromise with various groups within Israel following the collapse of Kadima as an effective party. After resolving Israel's current demographic and economic issues, lies the behemoth of the Arab-Israeli political process. While I support a two state solution, Israel must also recognize that it isn't just a nation of the Jewish people anymore. To not do so would blatantly ignore current demographic trends and endanger Israel's future. For that reason, I also support Hadash as a party working to bridge the divide between Jews and Arabs within Israel, and as a party that recognizes that Israel, while meant to be Jewish in its founding, is not Jewish in reality, and never fully will be.

Justice, Fairness, Civil rights, Social Divisions

The State of Israel must continue to pursue the path of equality of opportunity, civil rights and liberties, fairness, justice and security.

I think that those topics are the most important topics for a western democracy.

Support individual freedom, pro Israeli Arabs, and settlers

I vote for parties that support social justice and peace

Israel must work on its societal values and ongoing rifts between  tribal  communities.

Note: the party list did not include all the ones I was looking for. Israel needs a realist willing to stake out controversial, right-leaning on peace, independent economical, and co-optive haredi social  positions in order to maximize ability to reach a balanced compromise.

I based my selections on what I see as Israel's biggest problem: division - both internal and external. The secular and haredi division (putting it very simplistically) and, of course, the Conflict. I think it falls to Israel to devise a two-state solution without negotiations, outline it, and present it to the UN for vote. It would force Fatah and Hamas to state their real intention (destroy Israel) for all the world to see or accept the state. Then, if violence continues, open war can be declared between nation-states. I don't think that would be great, but it would shut down a lot of some of the criticism because it would give the Palestinians what they ostensibly want while placing Israel on par, nation to nation, allowing for more leeway in military operations. The parties I selected and people I selected I think are best positioned to accomplish that task. Also, a similar division is appearing in Israeli society. A conversation must develop regarding what to do with a growing haredi population and the resentment and frustrations of the secular population.

Israel is in crisis because of religious divisions. Peace with its neighbors, or some sort of working relationship is crucial to advance within and without.

I believe that since Israel has been quite stable (economically) over the past few years, the focus should be on minority rights (both ethnic and religious) and foreign policy, including an open debate about a Palestinian State.

Security, Islam, Peace

Islam and Muslims are the biggest threat to the state of Israel

The security of Israel is of the utmost importance if Israel is to remain a country.

Pirates because I like pirates, security because Israel does not have kind neighbors. [This comment is more telling than it seems at first glance; the respondent was a young student who took some questions seriously—and “goofed off” on the others. Given the flippancy of many of the other answers of this respondent, the reference to Israel’s neighbors reflects a concern serious enough to overcome the comic or non-serious answers.] 

I would want the prime minister and the party in power to be moving toward a solution with the Palestinian territories as their top priority

I favor a two-state solution, if possible (given Arabs' virulent hatred of Jews).  I favor a democratic Jewish state in secure borders, with religious freedom and equal treatment of all Jews, including sharing of burdens and work.

I am primarily concerned with bringing about a two-state solution, whereby there would be a Palestinian State alongside Israel, which would be a Jewish State but with full equality for its Arab citizens.  Secondarily, I would strongly support weakening the Orthodox stranglehold on Israeli religious and personal life so that non-Orthodox rabbis, communities and individuals would enjoy equal rights as well.  It would be wonderful if there were a center-left coalition government with Livni as PM (although I realize that is highly unlikely.)

PM Netanyahu = continuity of service and clarity of position on issues, tho' stop the settlements where unjustified. Hatikva = hope for security and prosperity. Proper leadership ensures security, addresses economic issues, and should be able to galvanize itself against Iranian aggression

Survey questions and responses as of January 31 2013

The survey was left open until today for technical reasons. Some of the analyses in this report were done shortly before the closing of the survey, with only very minor changes to the numbers returned. The results below were examined on January 31, 2013

1.      Vote for ONE party list for the 19th Knesset. The list names are displayed in random order.        

(

The list names were displayed to respondents in random order; here they are displayed from largest to smallest vote, as is the case with most of the following tabulations).                                                                                   

1.      Whom would you vote for?               

The 11 “other” votes were: 2 for Zahava Gal-On (and another vote for Meretz, as noted) and 1 each for the other parties represented.

2.      Voting for more than one party list invalidates a ballot, but suppose you *could* vote for three parties for the 19th Knesset. Which would they be? (Select the party list you voted for above if you'd include it among the three). The list names are displayed in random order.    

Note: Average is based on maximum of 300%, that is, three parties mentioned. Percentages add up to 296%

3.      Which types of concerns are most important to you in your vote for Knesset and Prime Minister? The list displays in random order.                 

Only four responses to “other” in this question. Significantly, the Survey did not include “peace” as a choice, but two (4% of total) chose it as “other.”

Peace process leading to a two state peace agreement

Peace

Arabs

Women's religious rights and freedoms

4.      In your own words, please explain your choices above (for party lists, Prime Minister, issues).   

(results given above).

5.      Now we turn to results, without necessarily referring to your own vote. Which five parties do you think will have the largest delegations in the new Knesset? List names are displayed in random order.     

The actual five largest lists in the Knesset are: Likud-Yisrael Beitenu, Yesh Atid, Israel Labor Party, Habayit Hayehudi, and Shas.

6.      How large do you think the largest delegation will be?         

Response Average                           32.8

Note: The accuracy of this prediction is gratifying but perhaps misleading, as it includes several responses of 00 and one 99. With these removed, the average is 35.6. Here are the other responses:

7.      Next Prime Minister?      

The responses for “Other” were “?” and a period of time rather than a candidate name.

8.      How many days will elapse from January 22 until the Knesset confirms a Prime Minister, Ministers, and governing coalition? (Choosing '0' or '50' means you think a new   government will not be confirmed by the 49th day after January 22, 2013).     

Response Average  22.63

The Survey Tool gives 22.63 as Response Average. But, eliminating responses of “0,” the average is 23.8. One respondent entered “5;” strictly speaking, this is impossible in practice as the election results have to be certified before the President can ask someone to attempt to form a government. Election results are generally certified a week following the elections.

9.      How large do you think the coalition will be? Enter a number of Knesset Mandates from 61 (the minimum) to 120 (a unity government encompassing the entire Knesset).

The survey returned 69.76 as the average.

11. Select up to FIVE parties you believe will be in the government coalition. The list names are displayed in random order.  

12. In your own words, what groups will be part of the Government, and what do you think will be the most important considerations for forming it?          

Likud-Beiteinu will head a coalition created by recruiting Haredi parties. L-B's sole consideration will be creating a coalition, the Haredi parties will be focused on maintaining ultra-Orthodox hegemony.

Right-wing nationalist and Orthodox religious parties.

centrist zionist parties, power for religious parties to support yeshivot etc., social issues

It will be a lot like the current government, meaning a right wing government

Right, Left, Religious and Secular groups in order to promote a unity government.

Centrality

I thing that right wing groups will be part of the new government.

It will be a primarily rightist government with one centre-left party for balance, which will receive one or two most senior Government posts in return.

nationalist parties 

Stability should be considered for the coalition

The fact that there are not Arabs...

Right-winged, religious

Strong nationalism will win out

Largely a right-wing coalition with Yesh Atid as a fig-leaf for national unity.

Right, Religious, Moderates

The coalition needs to represent the diverse views of Israel's population.

I think security and religious issues will dominate, including the issue of settlements, so I think those groups who can fundamentally agree on at least two of those issues will form the Government.

The center left will prefer opposition to maintain its legitimacy, so a far right government will form.

A) the ones with the biggest war chest B) political self-interest

power mongering

I think that there will be a significant leftist presence in the government, but I think with growing fears of Iran, Egypt, and a Palestinian uprising, the more conservative parties will dominate.

I believe the 5 largest Jewish parties in Israel will comprise the governing coalition, on the basis of core ideology, with right-leaning parties having the edge in numbers and electoral representation

Current worries over Iran, Gaza and the Arab Spring have put security at the top of Israel's list of concerns. Thus, hardline parties, like that of Likud Yisrael Beitenu and the Jewish Home (Habayit Hayehudi), will likely have the most success. However, with these new fears and a general shift to the right in Israel, a rejection reaction will occur, and largely already has when looking at the recent protests over housing, social issues and the military draft of haredim. As a result, a coalition of moderate parties will form to challenge the ruling right wing coalition, forcing extreme right wing parties like Otzma Leyisrael to accept a compromise and join the ruling coalition. The most important considerations will involve security (Iran, Hamas, the Arab Spring) concessions to Palestine, or lack thereof, and the economic issues plaguing certain sectors of the Israeli population.

Keep Israel safe against all threats from the Muslim world

Likud because relations with other countries in the Middle East

Security. The Haredim will secure their privileges. Settlements will continue to grow and proliferate.

Likud will probably remain.

The most important considerations, unfortunately, seem to be the almost apartheid agenda held by the right wing of government. The most important considerations will be expansion, until power changes hands in a big way.

The large parties will remain part of the coalition. Voting results will show a more polarized and right-wing government.

I think that Likud and the religious parties are likely to control the government, in alliance with either more right-wing parties or else Labor. The main consideration will be whose votes can Netanyahu count on and what concessions need to be made by Likud.

Groups who've prevailed in the past when security was top issue: Labor, Likud. Resurgence of wide-spread anti-semitism in region; radical Islam infiltration; usurpation of resources trying to keep all citizens safe. Worldwide apathy and indifference re: willingness to work, get a job, be productive.

labor party 

relations with arabs

ultra-orthodox; right-wing; settlers

Social Issues

13. Now for some demographic information. First, something about your nationality or nationality.

For Israelis, please indicate whether you are actually voting in the Israeli election, or potentially able to vote.   

One each for China, Colombia, Germany, UK.  This survey tool returned a response of [no answer entered] for all other respondents.

14. Please enter your age.                 

Current average: 38.98. One response was 0; removing it, the average is 39.95.

15. What is your profession? If you are currently in a college or university degree program, seeking an undergraduate or graduate degree, what school do you attend and which degree are you seeking?        

Responses fall into three groups:

Teacher

University

College professor

Professor

Lecturer

Historian

Professor

Professor

University faculty

Researcher

Academic

Professor Emerita

Teacher, clerk

Shanghai university

Student at university of Düsseldorf

Researcher / doctoral candidate

Undergraduate Student. University of Wyoming, B.A. in Religious Studies minor in Psychology.

I am a student at the University of Wyoming studying International Relations

I'm currently an undergraduate at Harvard University pursuing a degree in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations (Modern Middle Eastern Studies) or International Development.

Student

Student

[student]

Student

Student

In High School

Writer (poet, literary translator, book reviewer).

Medical Dr

Fundraiser

Rabbi

Self employed

Lawyer

Attorney

Work in a non-profit organization

Technical field

I don't attend a university

Retired lawyer.

Self-employed.

homemaker

Commercial Architecture

Urban planner

Writer/office assistant

16. In which state (or country, if not within the U.S.) did you attend high school?          

USA respondents:

Non US respondents

Based on the context, “Iran” is a “joke” response. Based on other answers in this person’s response, this respondent is a high school student in Colorado, and should be added to respondents answering “Colorado” to this question.

Israeli Elections

Seth Ward

University of Wyoming

This essay is edited and updated from an essay I wrote for the elections to the 18^th Knesset, Feb. 10 2009. Voting for the 19^th Knesset is scheduled for January 22, 2013.

 The Israeli System

The Israeli electoral system is so different from the U.S. system that many Americans have no idea about just how it works, and how the system shapes the meaning of Israeli elections. The Parliamentary system is used in elections throughout the Middle East (and much of the rest of the world), and proportional voting for lists is also common, so understanding this electoral system can be a key to understanding the systems used in other countries.

The Israeli system considers the entire country a single district. Voters do not vote directly for the Executive Branch, or even vote directly for representatives to serve in the Knesset (Israel’s Legislature). Instead, they vote for lists of candidates for the Knesset, and Knesset seats (sometimes called "mandates") are awarded to individuals on the lists, based on the percentage of the vote for party lists getting more than 2% of the popular vote, as will be explained in more detail below. The Executive Branch (called "the government") is formed by the leader of a Knesset faction who can assemble a Coalition and a Cabinet that can be confirmed by majority Knesset vote. The electoral lists are generally supplied by individual political parties, so they may be called “party lists,” but various factions can unite to form a common list, or secede from parties to form their own list and so forth.

Actually, in some cases Israelis are in effect voting for individuals. For example, in the current election, Tzippi Livni established her own personal list, and attracted a number of prominent figures to join her. Perhaps the most famous example of this was Sammy Flatto-Sharon, who sought parliamentary immunity to avoid extradition in 1977, and won enough votes to be elected.

Most important though, voters may be voting for the individual in the top slot on the lists of the major parties—the party’s candidate for Prime Minister. In early stages of the 2009 election, three individuals had emerged as likely candidates to become Prime Minister: Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, and Tzippi Livni. At this point (December 2012), most polls show current Prime Minister Netanyahu with a substantial lead over the other candidates, but several other persons in top slots are often mentioned as possible candidates for PM. Those who vote for the smaller parties also may be voting because of the top person on the party list, too, who is most likely to get a government ministry if the party joins the government.

While it’s not likely, if enough Israelis vote for parties that could block Netanyahu’s bid to remain Prime Minister, it is possible that the leader of a list with a relatively small number of Knesset mandates could be asked to form the government.

The Knesset has 120 members; if only two lists were vying in the election and one received 60% of the votes and the other 40%, the top 72 from the one list and the top 48 from the other would be seated in the Knesset. In practice, there are usually many more lists vying for election (34 lists were presented to the Knesset by the deadline), and usually none gets more than 25%-30%. Polls for the election do not assume any party will get more than about 30 seats—25% of the Knesset—although they also assume that 60-75% of the Knesset seats will be from the top five lists.

The voter makes only one choice, a vote for one list, not the large number of candidates in US elections. At the polling place, he or she receives an envelope, goes into a private booth, selects a slip of paper with the symbol of a list and puts it in the ballot envelope. Then the voter steps out of the booth and inserts the envelope into the ballot box. If there is more than one slip of paper in the envelope, it invalidates the ballot.

Often parties will form joint lists. Quite a few such joint lists are understandable combinations of parties, but some joint lists represent smaller parties running together mainly to secure Knesset seats, because in the current Israeli system, 2% of actual votes are required in order for a list to gain representation. Thus in the 17^th Knesset, three of the smallest lists to be successful were multiparty lists, which combined for 15 seats—more than 10% of Knesset seats. Meretz and Yahad were similar politically, and their combined list vote tally in 2006 was 118,000—which meant the first 5 on their combined list were seated in the Knesset. But the 2% cutoff was 62,000 votes, so if Meretz and Yahad had run separately and each received exactly half of their joint actual total, neither would have had any representation. In the 2009 elections, the Green Party (environmentalists) and Meimad (a liberal religious party), had a joint list—perhaps an unlikely alliance—and they were not successful in their bid to earn seats in the Knesset. This alliance though is a good example of why such alliances occur. Had this party entered the Knesset, it is quite possible that they might have been part of the Government coalition regardless of who became Prime Minister, in which case the leader of Meimad might well have been a Minister and the environmental platform would been included in the coalition agreement. In the current election, the most talked about combined list is Likud/Yisrael Beitenu, in which Netanyahu and Avigdor Leiberman are joining forces, easily expected to win the largest number of mandates.

Joint lists might alternate one candidate from each faction, or if one faction is small, one candidate from the smaller faction after each three or four from the larger faction. Lists are manipulated also for electoral visibility: most Zionist parties have Arabs and especially Druze Arabs in “realistic” slots—in other words, if the list is expected to win 15-20 seats, slot 10 is fairly sure, slot 15 is realistic, slot 30 is unrealistic. So too, a party can manipulate the number of women in realistic slots. Some parties have had “primaries” to organize their lists. As in US elections, the voting patterns of party loyalists have not always been seen as producing effective results for the general election.

The President (Hebrew “Nasi”) of the State of Israel is a largely ceremonial position. The President is elected by the Knesset for a five year term. The President receives ambassadors presenting their credentials, can issue pardons, and in certain circumstances can dissolve Parliament, and can use the prestige of his office in various ways to promote peace or other Israeli interests. But his major political role is that, after the election, the President meets with the parties, and proposes as Prime Minister the Member of Knesset who, in his judgment, is most likely to succeed in forming a coalition and presenting a slate of Ministers to the Knesset. This is not always the leader of the largest party list: In the current Knesset (2009 election), it was Netanyahu, the leader of the second largest delegation. 

The Hebrew title for Prime MInister, Rosh Memshalah, actually translates to “Head of the Government,”  which may be understood as “Head of the Executive Branch.” The Prime Minister desgnate has three weeks to cement a coalition and propose a slate Ministers and Deputy Ministers, including himself or herself as Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defense, Foreign Minister, and other ministers and deputy ministers. The Prime Minister must be a Member of Knesset, most of the others usually are but do not have to be. The slate represents a coalition of various parties totaling at least one more than half the 120 members of the Knesset: the coalition needs at least 61 votes. This vote confirms the cabinet officers all at once, not individual by individual as in the US Executive branch.

Small parties often have great power here: they can exact a heavy price in coalition agreements in order to push a coalition past 60 votes. A very small party can bargain both that their leader become a Minister and that the coalition adopt certain legislation, in return for even as few as two or three seats counting towards the needed 61 votes.

In some cases, the first person asked cannot put together a coalition, or cannot put together a coalition in the amount of time allotted, in which case more time may be offered, another person might be asked to form a government, or new elections might be called.

Since the Government coalition has a majority, they should have enough votes to pass everything they propose, and to defeat everything they oppose. In practice this means that all important decisions are taken within the Government coalition—usually at the level of the Ministers, or by the parties they represent, and those outside the government or outside the coalition parties have very limited power. 

The prime minister may well attempt to put together a Government in which his or her party holds more seats than any other faction in the government, and to limit the number of ministers from outside his party to fewer than those from within his party. If the largest party has 31 or more seats, it can have a majority within the Government: 31 out of 61 mandates, the narrowest of majorities in the 120-seat Knesset. This scenario may be more likely if a party holds, say, 35 seats in a coalition of 65. The January 2013 election might make it possible for the Likud-Yisrael Beitenu combined list to do this, although not enough for the Likud faction alone to have more than 31 mandates or an absolute majority within the government. While coalitions in which one party dominated were more common in the early days of the state, this was impossible in the 18^th Knesset, for example: the largest delegation was 28.

Sometimes, however, the Prime Minister Designate will propose a broad “Unity” coalition, bringing together diverse political entities. What this means is that the PM’s party does not dominate the Government, and a minority portion of the unity coalition may more easily assemble enough votes to cripple the coalition, or to topple the government.

For several elections (1996, 1999, and 2001), there was direct election of the Prime Minister. In other words, the Israeli voter had two slips of paper, one with the symbol of a Knesset List, and one with the name of a candidate for Prime Minister. Some Israeli analysts who had called for the direct election of Prime Minister believed that this system would never work without increasing the degree of independence and power of Knesset members, for example by making some or all Knesset members directly responsible to smaller electoral districts, such as is the case in the United States, and a higher threshold for election to the Knesset. This, however, did not happen, and Israel went back to a single-vote system.

If the Government cannot muster a majority on an important issue, the Prime Minister resigns and there is an attempt to form a new government. The Prime Minister may resign for other reasons. A Member of Knesset can also propose a Vote of No Confidence in the Government. The resignation of the Prime Minister requires confirmation of a new government by the Knesset: there is no automatic succession as there is in the case of the American Presidency. The old government continues as a "caretaker" until the new government is formed. Sometimes the new government in such situations looks a lot like the previous government, with small tweaks if necessary to maintain a majority. If a new government can be formed, the Knesset is not dissolved.

The Knesset must be dissolved and stand for reelection four years after it was elected. In the current situation, the Knesset could have served four and a half years, as Israeli law provides that the term of a Knesset elected after a Knesset dissolved itself extends to the Jewish month of Heshvan (October/November) following four years from voting. But elections for a new Knesset are more often than not called before the end of the full term. In the present case, Prime Minister Netanyahu called for elections in January rather than October 2013 to seek a mandate, to avoid a protracted election cycle, and to avoid compromises or agreements that might not be forthcoming and perhaps lessen his chances at reelection.

Wikipedia usually is a good source for Israel election results, for example for the last two elections http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_legislative_election,_2006 and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_legislative_election,_2009

But the Knesset Website is the best and most authoritative source. Voting for the curent (18^th)Knesset is here: http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_res18.htm and the list of candidates submitted for election to the 19^th Knesset is here: http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections19/eng/list/ListIndex_eng.aspx (as of this writing, only the Hebrew List Index has the complete lists).

 Other systems

Above it was suggested that understanding the Israeli system will help understand other Middle Eastern systems, so before returning to the potential significance of the Israeli elections, a few notes on some other electoral systems in the Middle East. It should be noted though that whatever the electoral system, the electoral mandate is compromised or non-existent if the government does not submit to the electorate in an inevitable, timely fashion, or if the process or schedule precludes a fair contest.

The Palestinian parliamentary elections reflected some of the ideas of the Israeli reformers mentioned above: they were ½ (66 members) proportional for the entire electorate, on the Israeli model, and ½ (66 members) proportional elections in smaller districts, some electing just one representative, and some electing up to five. Some of the small-district elections had required seats for religious minorities, e.g. Christian or Samaritan. The Palestinian Authority did not adopt the direct election of the Prime Minister, but the Palestinians directly elect the President, who has much more of a political role than in the Israeli system. But in actual practice it is not constitutional roles but armaments and personal loyalty that have determined much about who does and does not exercise political power in the Palestinian areas. The winner of the Parliamentary elections in 2006, Hamas, nominated the Prime Minister, but after Hamas and Fatah fought in 2007, Mahmoud Abbas dismissed the Government and appointed a new Prime Minister. Moreover, the terms of President and Parliament expired long ago without new elections. Fatah holds power in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. Salam Fayad's government in the West Bank has made great strides, but it is clear that the political realities trump the electoral results and conpromise the emergence of desired government and civic institutions.

The Iraqis vote by lists, and there are a large number of them. In provincial elections, Iraqis could vote for an entire list, or single out members of the lists for individual votes. These lists are to set up so that 25% of the persons on them are women, and an Iraqi Supreme Court decision has further provided that the women should be seated so that after two males seated a woman is seated. The Open List system was adopted by almost all parties for the national Parliamentary elections in 2010. There have been a number of decisions that have changed important aspects of the voting. Iraq has not yet achieved a stable system, but given the situation that gave rise to its Constitution, I think it's best to emphasise the positive electoral achievements.

Iranians vote for Parliament and for the President, and have local elections, including direct election of Mayors. But, the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council vet the candidates and control the process, and the Supreme Leader's power seems to have been supported by the most recent Parliamentary results. On paper, you might say, there is at least the structure of a government responsable to the people with institutions that safeguard national values and regular voting--and indeed, the government is probably more responsive to the political will of the people than was the case under the Shah! Which is not saying much, moreover it was a much more open society in those days. Given the strife that erupted after the Ahmadinejad's reelection, there will be a lot of pressure on all sides. The next election is June 14, 2013, and will include Presidential as well as City and Village councils.

As of this writing, Egyptian debates about the political system have taken to the streets to protest the new constitution, and it remains to be seen whether the popular expression on the Egyptian street will result in broader representation in the legislature and executive. My guess is that the quick passage of the new constitution was designed to ensure the Muslim Brotherhood’s grip on the Egyptian government. and make government less responsive to responsible to minorities, to women, and to secularists. The Brotherhood may have a tighter grip on Egypt than Mubarak did. If protesters continue to press for more inclusive government, or unite and elect their candidates to Parliament, things may change--but I would not count on this in the short or intermediate term.   

Since the Ta'if agreement brought an end to years of civil war starting in 1975, Lebanon’s legislature is evenly divided between “Muslims” and “Christians” although it should be stressed that these are political and community labels, rather than religious ones. Lebanon continues to require the President to be a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister to be a Sunni Muslim. Nevertheless, the Shiite (and extremist) movement Hizbullah has enormous power, and appears to have been responsible for the selection of the current PM.

Turkey has a strong democratic tradition; even when the army has seized power, they have restored civilian, democratic process. The party currently in power, AKP, has been quite succesful though in neutralizing journalism, the army, and other potential sources of threats to its control--and in winning ever larger segments of the electorate.

What's important here? The most important consideration is not how the Parliament and President are elected, but the degree to which the election creates political power responsible to the broad electorate. The will of the People can never be seen as monolithic--so the democratic system has to institutionalize effective representation of those who do not form the governing majority--whether they are political, religious, ethnic, linguistic, gender or other groups, maintain civic institutions and promote an educated and informed electorate, and robust civil debate.Ultimately, we should ask such things as: Does the electorate control such things as the monopoly on legitimate use of force, usually considered a prerogative of government? Does the government ignore the electorate's mandate or favor majorities at the expense of minorities who then have no recourse? Elections should reflect political strength of various ideas in a society, facilitate a robust political discourse about these ideas, and allow for the exercise of power legitimately--and be prepared to face the people on schedule and to cede power to the next elected government. An interruption or cancellation of the transfer of that power within regular intervals, as a result of the expression of popular will, is inconceivable. 

Many observers of the Israeli scene assert that Israel is the "only democracy in the Middle East." Since the rise of a nascent Iraqi democracy after the fall of Saddam Hussein and especially since the "Arab Spring" (and one could even say since 1979 in Iran), the nature of democratic expression in the region is changing. But the players are not particularly committed to checks and balances, protection of minorities, peaceful change in government, inevitable reckoning by the electorate, and other cornerstones of democracy. I am not particularly hopeful for the benefits expected from the removal of tyrants and dictators in a few Arab countries in the short term. In Iran, in Egypt and elsewhere, we have seen people insist that the government serve the people and be responsible to them, rather than the other way around--but change is slow, and in this region there is every reason to suppose that new regimes arising after the Arab Spring and Syrian civil war will be no better--and perhaps worse--than the dictators they replaced. The solution is not simply replacing military dictators by elected regimes, but by the long and steady development of the institutions of a democratic, civil society, and succesful resistance when these institutions or the Press are being compromised. Also needed: development of open, responsible but robust discussion in political debate and journalism; an educated electorate; solving the question of inclusion of minority communities; and governments committed to general economic and social advancement of the governed more than their own political, ideological, religious or personal advancement (and, I should add, popular movements strong enough to demand this when governments do not live up to this expectation, as we are seeing these days in the Middle East). All these things take time: there is no "magic bullet" shortcut to end corruption, create civic infrastructure, and end illiteracy. 

In the MIddle East, we should probably add also that it will take time and popular will to reverse and eradicate the poison of antisemitism (clothed in "Antizionism"), the results of religious coercion and the youth bubble, and the long history of disenfranchisement (or lagging enfranchisement)--of Palestinian Arabs, of women, of minority religions or nationalities, and other diversity groups throughout the region. And, that versions of many of the problems I've outlined exist in Israeli society, albeit within a robust, effective democratic system.  

But let's return to Israel.

On the Israeli elections, 2013.

Netanyahu’s “Likud” and Avigdor Lieberman’s “Yisrael Beitenu” are strongly allied. Reviewing all the polls, this list seems slated to gain the largest number of seats in the Knesset, although not enough to make it impossible to block them from forming a government. In Israeli politics, elections generally have to do with attitudes towards security and peace. Issues stressed tend to be how much can be offered for peace with Palestinian Arabs, and whether or not, or exactly how, a Palestinian state should come about.

In this election though, social and economic issues may play a larger role than usual. A generation ago, Israel was a much less stratified economy and the gap between poor and rich was not as large as today. Labor, especially under the leadership of Shelly Yachimovich, is identified with social issues. Leadership also may be an issue. Tzippi Livni created a “movement” (tnu’ah) around herself; whatever else can be said for it, her ability to attract major names to her list may well indicate dissatisfaction with many of the others vying for leadership roles in Israeli governance. Nevertheless, Benjamin Netanyahu will most likely form the government. It will probably be fairly “narrow,” but that could easily change with the specifics of the election.

While most of the analysis is going to be about Likud-Yisrael Beteinu, Labor, Kadima and Livni, in addition there are several other types of parties. An important segment of the political debate has to do with religious parties, representing very different sectors of the Jewish religious community. Some are "National Religious"--fully engaged in the Israeli civic stream--sending their children to government religious schools, serving in the army and involved in all sectors of society. Others reflect "Haredi" (often translated "Ultra-Orthodox") streams, many of whom segregate themselves from Israeli society in various ways--an independent school system, no Army service, even maintaining separate transportation and busses in some cases. The question of Haredi national service is one of the issues that led to early elections. Arab representation is another such issue: Many Zionist parties have Arab and Druze participation, and there will probably be some 6-12 Arabs and Druzes elected on "Zionist" lists, as well as Members of Knesset elected from Arab or Arab-Jewish “non-Zionist” parties—although recent reports suggest that Israeli Arab participation in Israeli elections is declining. The next Government of Israel will most likely include a party or parties representing National Religious and/or Haredi. Some commentators have suggested that if the Arab parties participate in a succesful effort to block a Likud-led government, they will demand representation in the Government as a reward.  

Although many Israeli jurists feel the 2% threshold is not enough to prevent small, one-issue groups from winning Knesset representation, such groups have won in the past, and sometimes won big: the 17^th Knesset had 7 members from a party formed to support Pensioners’ rights, more than enough to have surpassed most plans for a higher threshhold. One-issue parties are represented in the current election, for example, the list called “The Pirates” which calls for protection for pirated software. As in the United States, small contingents with strong commitments to single issues can have immense political clout. So far, attempts to raise the threshold do not have much support in the Knesset.

The likely electoral results suggest that the Prime Minister designate will appeal to sectors of the Religious parties that can be attracted to belong to his or her coalition, as his pretty much always been the case. Internet chatter talks about some of the Arab parties not only being part of the group able to “block” Netanyahu, but demanding a place in the coalition if successful. These and other parties with a small number of highly defined goals will shape the policies of the new coalition, and in some cases be credited or blamed as the reason why the Government is not proceeding on some of the goals of the larger parties.

Significance

What kinds of things should students of the Modern Middle East watch for in this process?

In 2009, the recent operation against Hamas – Oferet Yetzuka usually translated “Cast Lead,” shaped the entire electoral process and its results were judged in its light. It’s not yet clear to me whether Amud Anan will similarly reshape the current process. Hamas’ victory celebrations are not surprising, of course: celebrating even the most ineffective attack on Israel as a victory is typical Middle Eastern practice, and celebrations can go on even when militarily the result was defeat or destruction of Arab military resources. In 1973, for example, Israeli forces were surprised by Egypt and Syria, but came back quickly to encircle the Egyptian army, and threatened Damascus and Cairo. The 1973 conflict made it possible for Sadat to come to Jerusalem seeking peace. If only the military results and diplomatic change-around would be taken into account, this might be called “losing the conflict to defeat Israel and suing for peace”—but Arab countries see 1973 as a victory and Israel sees it as a disappointment.

I do not think Amud Anan will be considered enough of a disappointment to endanger Likud; in fact it may strengthen Netanyahu. But, I do not think Israelis will vote solely on the basis of relations with Hamas and Fatah, and social and economic issues will have at least some hearing. It seems to me that Israel’s security long term will be most secure when Palestinian Arabs view the extremists in their midst not as brave freedom fighters who stood up to Israel, but as misguided militants whose promises were empty and whose resistance led only to massive death and destruction. In this sense, as for example, strikingly in 1996 (Netanyahu’s first term as Prime Minister), Fatah and Hamas may still be the most important factors in Israeli elections.

Seth Ward

Lecturer in Islam and Judaism (Assoc. Acad. Prof.)

Religious Studies Program, University of Wyoming

http://uwyo.edu/sward

http://uwyo.edu/sward/blog

I wrote this back in June, 2004, responding to an inquiry passed along by Prof. Khaleel Mohammad (San Diego State University) to some of his colleagues. The inquiry was from an Imam who characterized himself as not being an Anti-Semite, or being anti-Jewish, and was discussed on line by Prof. Mohammad and some of our colleagues. My statement below was edited from my responses to various paragraphs in the discussion. I saved the original format of responses to paragraphs, and a file that was only my contribution to the discussion (reproduced below). I can no longer reconstruct exactly who wrote what in the longer discussion, (other than my own responses, which I highlighted), as the email trail that generated the document is no longer readily available. I think it is inappropriate to publish verbatim (even to a blog) a text in which the overwhelming percentage of the words are not mine, even if doing so might make some of my points just a little more clear or provide more exact references for them. So I have reviewed the longer format but made only a few minor edits today, mostly punctuation or fixing verb tenses (Nov. 30, 2012).

It is possible that the author who claims not to be an anti-Semite, or “anti-Jew” means exactly what he says he means: he does not feel he is “anti-Jew” as such. He feels he is not against the Jewish people, or against individual Jews, it is just that he opposes some of the things he believes they have done which he believes are hateful. It is important, however, not to go beyond specific acts of specific Jews; making unfounded generalizations would be the same as assuming all Arabs are mukhribun “terrorists” because of the acts of a few.  And he should be aware that many of those Jews or others he feels are “Anti-Muslim” would make the same kind of statement he makes: they are not “against Islam,” it is just that they oppose some of the things done by persons who claim to be Muslims, who claim that what they do is done in the name of Islam.

The term “Anti-Semite” (German: antisemitismus) was coined by Wilhelm Marr about 130 years ago, in Germany, and has to do with a political movement which was in fact very much anti-Jewish. At that time there were few Arabs or any other Semitic-speaking people in Europe and the question of whether Arabs are Semites is totally irrelevant to the term “Anti-Semitism.” It is most appropriate to use this term to refer to German or European anti-Jewish movements; any other use is an extension. In English, the term has come to mean opposition to Jews and Judaism, especially certain types of political and ideological opposition to Jews and Judaism, and it is often used to refer to specific patterns of hatred of Jews outside the original context.

Prof. Muhammad’s comparison with “American” is very apt. “Anti-American” is understood by everyone in the world to mean “opposing the USA” or opposing some aspect of this, not “Anti-western hemisphere.”

Using the term Anti-Semite confuses the issue for precisely the reason indicated by the Imam when it is assumed to have anything to do with Semitic peoples or languages.

Regardless of whether the term is appropriate, some Arabs and many other Muslims have adopted and disseminated literature and viewpoints which are clearly associated with the political and ideological movement of Anti-Semitism, such as a tract usually called the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and various other libels and akdhāb associated with the Nazis or with their supporters. Thus it is unfortunately quite valid to talk of the circulation of anti-Semitic ideas and literature in the Arab and Islamic world.

In the Second World War, in fact, the Arab world, by and large, sided with the Nazis and their anti-Semitic propaganda.  The most obvious cases are that of the British-appointed Mufti of Jerusalem Al-Hajj Al-Amin Al-Husseini, and of the Iraqi regime of Rashid Ali. The Nazi position stood for wanton disregard for the sanctity of human life, wholesale murder of powerless people who could not be considered attacking it in any way, and a goal of world domination by an ethnic people, not by justice and loyalty to God. Regardless of any political opposition to the British or the Zionist movement, it should be impossible to justify support for Nazism—even the appearance of support for this Godless movement—with submission to God’s will.

Connecting Jews with pigs was a favorite of the Nazis. Nevertheless, one would think that the Qur’an’s reference to the conversion of Jews into pigs and apes was to an event which happened in the past. I am not sure whether the Qur’an is to be taken literally regarding people turning into animals. But if so, the meaning would imply that the Jews today are in fact descended from those who were loyal to God, not those who rebelled. (I do not think it acceptable that those who disbelieved in God were quickly able to evolve from apes into people, more quickly than those who believed. And I think one must accept the ẓāhir “evident meaning” about their human status, and the ẓāhir in this case is that the Jews to whom they refer are humans.)

I cannot find any evidence that “The Jews in general” hate Muslims and Arabs. Many Jews reject positions which are maintained by Muslims, and oppose what they see as Arab attempts to kill and destroy their brethren. (And are they not right to consider chants like itbaḥ al-yahud “kill the Jews” or qatilhum waqtulhum “Fight them and kill them” as threats?). The Qur’an is considered by many Muslim scholars to be applicable to all mankind. (Yes, I am aware that some legal scholars forbid the study of the Qur’an from those who do not accept it as divine). The Qur’an clearly allows defense against those who come to kill one. 

The idea that the Jews are continuously plotting against all Muslims and Christians in our current political world is ludicrous. This idea has much to do with ḥadith and with anti-Jewish Christian material, and nothing to do with politics. There were individual Jewish individuals who, as individuals, urged various actions—some urged invading Iraq and some opposed it vociferously. There were prominent Iraqis in exile who also urged the US to invade Iraq. One of the best-known was a Shi’ite, and influenced US Iraq policy no less and probably much more than any Jews—are we to cite “the Shi’ites” for causing the invasion of an Islamic country traditionally ruled by Sunnis? 

The “War Crimes” argument is not only very weak, it also points up the great divide between the practice of submission to God’s will or specifically, the idea of taqw­ā “piety” or “fear” of God. It seems to me that the proper Muslim approach to any action of ikhrāb “wanton destruction” especially that which leads to the death of innocents is to denounce it and stay far away from it, and the proper way of reacting to one who has accepted that what he did was wrong is to forgive. Ariel Sharon accepted the verdict the Israeli panel which found he acted improperly by not preventing Christian access to refugee camps in Lebanon; his current acts should be judged by their own worth, not by blaming him for acts committed long ago. Moreover, this argument could never be used by a Muslim to support ikhrāb. 

Part of this argument is based on the assumption that “American might” is focused on destroying the Islamic world. This assumption is problematic indeed. “American might” could just as easily be said as being used to build up the Arab/Muslim world, not to destroy it. In Afghanistan and Iraq, American troops and the American government have worked hard for government which is responsible to the people, and to God. I am quite aware that these are not necessarily governments which impose features associated with traditional Muslim society. But then, killing innocents, raping women, stealing wealth from both rich and poor, dealing in prohibited substances, and destroying the fabric of society cannot be considered “ruling according to God’s will” even if those who do these awful things face the Qibla and pray five times a day! (As for the Taliban and Al-Qa’ida’s supposed involvement in drug schemes: some Muslim authorities would put dealing with opiates such as heroin in the same category as dealing in alcohol, and regardless of any ruling about opiates themselves, the nature of drug-dealing today leaves no doubt that promoting this trade and living from its income is un-Islamic). How many Muslims would decry such entities as un-Islamic!   No, while US forces took the lead in attacking Iraq and Afghanistan, US has also enriched many Arab and Islamic countries, is a major supporter of Egypt, and has proven a fertile ground for the expansion of Islam. The US rightly is worried about those who attack it, and supports those whose policies are in line with its own. But it is not clear by any means that it is opposed to any country or countries simply because they are traditionally Muslim.

The notion of an Anti-Arab and Anti-Islamic bias in the American media is deeply believed by many Muslims, and it may well be possible to support it by carefully crafted studies. But it is just as easy to come to different conclusions; other studies show that important sectors of the American media are pro-Arab, at least in the sense that these media outlets invariably find Muslim or Arab points of view to counter points of view associated with supporters of Israel or of US involvement in Iraq, but do not always do the reverse. Arguments about media partisanship are easy to make, difficult to support, and, in my experience, most have to do with the acts or policies of those who claim to be believers, not with the beliefs themselves.

June 2004

Seth Ward

University of Wyoming

The news from Israel suggests that tensions are escalating. I think there is reason to be disturbed about cross-border shelling in Golan. The worry has been that the Asad regime has kept the border largely quiet—and it is not clear whether the leadership of anti-Asad forces can or will do the same. Egypt has taught us that it is not good enough to have a government committed to “border quiet by force” rather than working to maintain good relations with the neighbor. Good fences make good neighbors as long as the fence is up and the head-of-household is firmly in charge.

The Gaza situation appears to be an escalation as well, although I suspect that the anti-Israel rocket fire reflects a more complicated mix of supply from Iran (Israel hit the supply lines recently), as well as the strength or even existence of external pressure Hamas (e.g. from Egypt) to reign in their own militias and other militias operating in Gaza.

While Arab League resistance to the rising Jewish community goes back to the latter days of the British Mandate for Palestine (i.e. it predates any sovereign state of Israel), and predates the Free Officers’ Coup that seized control of Egypt in in 1952, (to my mind) blaming all of Egypt’s problems on the existence of Israel was a tool of oppression by the regime that was overthrown last year. Nevertheless, the fall of Mubarak was not viewed in Egypt as an opportunity to question the Mubarak regime’s negative approach to Israel among Egyptians, while maintaining the peace along the border, but the opposite:  to maintain the negative approach to Israel while questioning peace along the border.

The situation vis-à-vis Israel is moreover not unique; Jews represent diversity of religion, religiosity, ethnicity, language, and culture within the region—and in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, Turkey, Tunisia and elsewhere every day, domestic and regional tensions reflect sunni vs. Shii, religious vs. secular, Muslim vs. Copt, Kurdish nationalism, western vs. traditional and much more. One of the results of the 21^st century in the Middle East – probably starting with the invasion of Iraq—is that the strongmen and tough fences have tumbled, and we see that the “solutions” to the underlying tensions were often artificial indeed. It seems to me that any approach to struggles anywhere in this region (as everywhere else, domestic and international, for that matter) needs to consider how better to deal with diversity, and create approaches which are more likely to limit violence and promote positive cultural and national identities with appropriate and honorable roles for all.

This weekend we recalled Kristallnacht. The violence that was generated then was energized by an ideology that ascribed all problems to the Jews, and an infrastructure that made it easy to organize. It’s easy to see a parallel in the conflation of a significant date, anger over an assassination,  and a worsening situation in Germany (caused in part of course because the Nazi “economic recovery program” was more interested in removing Jews and other undesirables from the economy and reversing the humiliation of the Great War (World War I), than real economic and social progress. In this case, the significant date is the beginning of the Islamic New Year, this year Nov. 14. I do not think anything will happen—in part because I do not think the Muslim world looks at the beginning of the Islamic hijra year as a date that has the kind of meaning and symbolism that, say, September 11^th has. But yes, I am worried today about the apparent escalation along Israel’s southwest and northeast borders.

Seth Ward

Religious Studies Program, University of Wyoming

http://uwyo.edu/sward

The other day I was asked about Bernard Lewis, the noted historian of the Middle East. Lewis is a meticulous scholar, insightful essayist and consummate stylist. Nevertheless he is often berated, perhaps because the late Edward Said was critical of him—essentially for not being an Arab.

The specific question I was asked concerned a purported prediction Lewis is said to have made about a possible Iranian attack. Lewis supposedly suggested in the Wall Street Journal that the Iranians might choose August 22, 2006, for a major attack. Actually this date was suggested by Iranian President Ahmadinejad for his response to US demands for a halt in nuclear activities. Lewis suggested that a possible response was an attack on Israel. I do not think Lewis actually predicted that Iran would necessarily chose that day for an attack on Israel, which in any case never materialized.

Here is what he said, according to Internet sources (e.g., in the Wikipedia article on Bernard Lewis):

What is the significance of Aug. 22? This year, Aug. 22 corresponds, in the Islamic calendar, to the 27th day of the month of Rajab of the year 1427. This, by tradition, is the night when many Muslims commemorate the night flight of the prophet Muhammad on the winged horse Buraq, first to "the farthest mosque," usually identified with Jerusalem, and then to heaven and back^{[Quran 17:1]}. This might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and if necessary of the world. It is far from certain that Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events precisely for Aug. 22. But it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.

The main point of Lewis’ discussion was not predicting that the Iranian response to the US would be an attack on Israel, but to remind readers that the Iranian leadership is highly ideological, and therefore cannot be assumed to use the same kind of rationale we in the West might--for example, they might not be deterred by mutual assured destruction (as presumably the Soviets were; there are reports that during the Cuban missile crisis both Kruschev and Kennedy were worried that Castro also was too ideological, and thus not deterred by rational considerations).

Lewis also was convinced that Iran had been developing a nuclear bomb at least since the time of the first Iraq campaign.

Whether or not Iranians are susceptible at all to considerations of mutual destruction or economic devastation from sanctions, or other economic, military or political calculations, there should be no doubt that the supreme leadership is highly ideological. In other words, Lewis may or may not be right when he suggests the leadership is completely impervious to such considerations, but he is absolutely correct that their ideology is highly resistant to them. They frequently remind us, for example, that the West values life while they value death and martyrdom, and have the depth of commitment to their values that the West is perceived to lack. They may or may not attack, but we ignore their ideology at our own peril.

As  for August 22, Lewis was off the mark on specifics.  It is the final day of the Persian month Mordad (which is Solar, not based on the Islamic calendar), and may just have represented the last day of the month. Most calculated Islamic calendars show that this day was the 28^th day of Rajab, not the 27^th day. 27 Rajab is indeed the day of Isra and Mi'raj throughout the Islamic world. celebrated in Iran, although as far as I can tell it is more frequently considered to be Laylat al-Mab’ath “ the day of mission” i.e., the day Muhammad was called to divine service. (Most Sunnis would probably suggest the Prophet Muhammad's mission began with the Night of Power, when the revelation of the Qur'an began when the angel Gabriel met him at the cave of Hira, usually associated with the 27th of Ramadan). This is an interesting case in which both Sunnis and Shias mark the same date but give it different names and connotations.

Finally, while I also think that Ahmadinejad and the religious leadership might well consider timing a nuclear attack to a religious holiday, and that Lewis was right to remind readers that that might be their response to international pressure, I also do not think that the historical record suggests they are overly committed to choosing dates with religious significance for military actions.

Bernard Lewis is one of the most influential writers about the Middle East and a careful scholar. He is also outspoken and has a political position. I do not think even he himself considered August 22 2006 as particularly likely for attack. What he was talking about is that we take a big risk if we assume that the rationale of the Iranian leadership is similar to that of the leadership of most Western democracies. This remains a big risk to the United States, to Israel, to Arab states, and for that matter to the entire world.

Seth Ward

This piece was written Sept. 14 2012 in response to a posting by Don Ellis: http://peaceandconflictpolitics.com/2012/09/14/procon-one-state-or-two-states/

This is itself a copy of a posting at Procon:  http://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000632

Don invited comments and if you have any comments to this post, you should probably post them here AND copy them on Don’s blog as well.

I edited my comments for clarity and also for the present context, in which I am not re-posting the Procon item.

This is a response to brief arguments, pro and con, responding to the “Two State Solution,” signed by Moshe Ya’alon (con) and Ziad Asali (pro), and unsigned pro and con arguments about the One State Solution.

One problem with the approach of all these statements is that there appears (to me at least) to be a false binary here. In a very important way, the Pro and Con excerpts can be harmonized by readers wishing to do so, just by saying that many of those involved, if not most, agree about the likely eventual emergence of an independent state called “Palestine” alongside Israel. The author of the “con” argument, Yaalon, would appear to agree as well, as long as this State was prepared to recognize Israel as a Jewish State, and to live in peace and harmony.

In fact, the “two state solution,” as usually articulated, includes “the peace and harmony” idea, and it might be said that this argument for or against the “two states” boils down not to whether there should be a State of Palestine, but whether the issues raised by the “con” side can be solved at all, and if so whether the “two state solution” can solve them.

In my humble opinion, the nomenclature may be part of the problem rather than part of the solution of the problem: I think some of those who support the “two state solution” really think in exactly those terms: the creation of a Palestinian State will provide the actual solution to the “Palestine Question.” Many readers familiar with the history of Political Zionism will recognize a kind of parallel with Herzl’s thinking about sovereignty as the simple solution to Antisemitism.  On the other hand, many who accept the emergence of an Arab State—indeed, welcome it as not only inevitable but ideal—actually endorse a “two state result” rather than a “two state solution.”

I think there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the mere creation or existence of a sovereign state, even a democratic one, does not alone solve all the problems it was meant to solve. One must only look at such entities as the Weimar Republic, or post-colonial/post-imperial states in Asia and Africa and for that matter in the Former Soviet Union, or to Southern Sudan—itself a highly significant partition of Sudan, a largely Muslim state. Certainly one can adduce Israel as an example: it did not entirely provide the solution of the Jewish Problem and anti-Semitism, as envisioned by Herzl. The “Two State Result” or some other nomenclature which implies that a “solution” is not automatically implied strikes me as the better approach.

As for the false binary: it’s false because this debate is between slogans or broad ideas–not really an “up or down” between specific propositions. My colleague Menachem Kellner used to talk about the great distinction between “belief in” and “belief that,” and this debate often seems to me to have the problems attendant to the “belief in” paradigm: people “believe in” a “two state solution” but problems arise when they have to express their belief that this or that specific element will have a specific result. 

To conclude: I am not sure that the arguments pro and con for “a two state solution” or “a one state solution” are really to the point. They express belief in a concept, or binary choices about one or another very specific plan, with flaws always raised by the other side.

Since there have been many years of discussing all sorts of “two-state” solutions and plans, perhaps this suggests that a “two state result” may well be the outcome–rather than the solution–and confusing outcome with solution may indeed be part of the problem.

Seth Ward

I am moderating a talkback discussion on the play 16 Wounded in Jackson WY next week, at Off the Square, Oct. 10. The play will be done “open book” -- they are rehearsing but do not expect to be able to do all the lines from memory yet. I am not sure how much explaining, commenting or moderating I will be doing but presumably the session will have some responses from the actors, and Q&A from the audience.

Students in History and Literature classes should consider coming. The play articulates some important questions regarding a central issue of the Arab/Israeli situation: to what extent is the Holocaust the “father” of the situation in Israel, and what we would call today Palestinian angst, victimhood, and terror its “unnatural son.”  Can close family-like relations overturn the innate character of historic family relations? How do we understand victimhood and violence in the Middle East?

The Holocaust and Israeli-Palestinian impasse are two fundamental images that shape our world-view today about evil, about violence, and about forgiveness and love. Although I personally think that Arab-Jewish violence and the continuing, indeed—growing—symbolic power of the Holocaust are at least as much the result of other issues and trends than their cause, these are important elements that shape our world today. And, regardless of what one thinks about the Holocaust, about Palestine or Israel, the play’s exploration of the interpersonal dynamics of what functions as a kind of adoptive family raises important questions for discussion in our world of atraditional family units.

In some ways, the characterization of the Arab violence in the play reminds me of issues raised in numerous recent films. For example, the issues are similar to those raised by both by Palestinians in the prizewinning movie Paradise Now, and by Israelis in Weekend in Tel Aviv (translation of the Hebrew title; its English language release title was  For my Father). in my humble opinion, they are raised in other ways—and in the context of even discussing how to make a film about violence—in the Tunisian film The Making Of, le Dernier Film.  The answer is quite different from the way that friendship transcends marriage and stands up to extremism in Wedding Song, a film by a Jewish French filmmaker of Tunisian heritage. (I had suggested some of these films for a second program at Off the Square it was not possible to put this program together).

The play is worth seeing.

Seth Ward

A student wrote me: “I'm curious to hear your take on this
http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/08/my-take-does-netanyahus-bible-gift-to-obama-mean-war/ “

This is a blog posting by Stephen Prothero in which he suggests, in essense, that a gift Netanyahu gave to Obama is easy enough to read as a request for a green light to kill 75,000 Iranians. I read the blog with interest. After the paragraph in which Prothero suggests that Netanyahu wanted Obama to read the Scroll of Esther as indicating that Israel kill 75,000 Iranians, I could only think about the essay as one-sided—and as reminding me of, say, some gift recipient who overthinks the meaning of a gift which is, in the end, just a gift. I could, perhaps, compare this to (forgive me for the stereotype) a woman who wonders about a gift from a male friend far more than the absent-minded male ever intended. And I think that Prothero does just that at the beginning of the essay, overthinking Netanyahu’s gift, and applying pre-conceived notions to boot.  

What is less clear to me is whether the rest of the essay redeems him in my mind. In the end, the conclusion that it would be best to remember the common humanity of all men, is a given, and I think Prothero could do better; it is just as one sided as those—including perhaps Netanyahu himself, who too-quickly identify Ahmadinejad or the Ayatullah with Haman.

Prothero could easily have said 75,800 Iranians; if we are to engage in too-easy consideration of whom Netanyahu wants to see killed, we might as well wonder why his figure does not include the number given in the Scroll of Esther for residents of Shushan who sought to kill Jews and were themselves killed. And we might as well consider the Israeli track record of surgical strikes in Iraq and Syria, in which targets were taken out with precision.

For that matter, the Esther story has the Jews earning the right to fight and kill those who sought to destroy them, albeit only for one day. They had to ask for a second day in Shushan; presumably the city in which Haman organized his plot was the apparent heartland of the anti-Jewish movement.  Even if Prothero’s first reading is correct, Netanyahu’s public comments are a lot closer to assertion of the Jewish right to respond to those who are dead-set to kill them, than a threat of or desire for mass killing. I hardly think that Netanyahu was seeking a green light from Obama. Rather--as the Megillah famously says venahafokh hu “and it was turned around” that is, the opposite is the case—Obama was asking Netanyahu to rely on the U.S. and on diplomatic rather than military gestures.

The Rabbi Prothero heard in Jerusalem may have had good intentions—based on his sermon, Prothero suggests Obama should use Purim to see the common humanity of all humans. This is probably correct regarding the Jerusalem Rabbi and Jerusalem Arabs, and of course as a general principle it is always correct.  The idea that Obama should look to the common humanity of Iranians and Israelis is based on the Talmudic statement one should drink until one does not distinguish between “Cursed be Haman and Blessed be Mordechai.”

But the situation in Iran was clarified by the elections last Friday. Parliamentary elections appear to have repudiated Ahmadinejad—but favored the political parties more loyal to the Supreme Leader—who has been even more adamant than Ahmadinejad about the destruction of the Jewish state. Perhaps this is because Ayatullah Khamenei is somewhat distanced from political situations: none of his functionaries has to explain his remarks in ways that seem less militaristic as Ahmadinijad’s appointees have sometimes had to do. Regardless, Netanyahu has every right to worry that the Iranians are bluffing when they deny development of nuclear bombs, and not bluffing when they call for the liquidation of the Jewish State, rather than the other way around, and as the Head of Government of Israel, it is his job to do so.

I have often suggested that “Cursed be Haman and Blessed be Mordechai” are already equivalent statements—a traditional argument for this is that gematria (numerical value of the letters) is the same—and it is interesting that it is considered to require drinking to determine that Haman should be cursed just as Mordechai is blessed. In this reading, though, both the Rabbi and Prothero are mistaken: as a default, we recognize the common humanity of all human beings, but it takes the loosening of our ethical stance on this point to see that Haman is indeed cursed for taking revenge on an entire people for the slight suffered from a single individual, and Mordechai is blessed for his resistance.

In the end, Prothero’s essay provides him an opportunity to draw some sermonic material from the Book of Esther, but Netanyahu’s gift of a Scroll is probably not to be “overthought.” And if it is, and Netanyahu is Mordechai, then one might suggest that the scroll does not depict Mordechai confronting the King (only as saving the King early on in the story). Instead, he confronts Esther, telling her that she should accept her responsibility: she should not be passive but must step up to what may well be her destiny—he tells her that if she does not, “you and your father’s house will perish.” This message, and the messages about Jewish self-reliance and recognition that sometimes enemies must be recognized as being enemies, are far more likely meanings to be drawn from Netanyahu’s gift of the Scroll.

Seth Ward

From: Jacob Benson
Sent: Thursday, March 08, 2012 11:39 AM
To: Seth Ward
Subject: Prothero's take on Purim

I'm curious to hear your take on this