I finally got around to reading the book by Sadakat Kadri. Heaven on Earth: A Journey through Shari’a Law. On the whole, it is an excellent read. It’s a book I could consider for my History of Islam course, especially if our Program runs a course on Islamic religion as well as “History of Islam.” (That might be a better division than the current course offerings).
There are a few places where I thought Kadri was wrong or left things out. Most of the time, that’s OK, as his choices make sense, although sometimes I thought the approach was too simplistic, given the breadth and depth of the book. What is less clear to me is whether I consider his narrative of the past stunningly integrative—that is, integrating political history and the development of legal thought in a useful way—or going overboard in selecting and reshaping the material to do so. But the general trajectory of his history serves to support ideas that continue to surprise me although I agree with them and teach them: the sunna emerged as a response to legal reasoning, not the other way around—and Islam changed forever in the wake of the Mongol invasion, the context in which Ibn Taymiyya was active. He explains this and other such matters well.
One reason I mention the concept reshaping the material is his treatment of Ibn Taymiyya. With good reason, he regards Ibn Taymiyya as crucial for understanding many aspects of the development of Islamic thought for the past seven centuries, and especially important for the Salafi approach today (he finds Salafi preferable to many similar terms used today such as extremists, Wahhabis, etc.), and to developments in the concept of Jihad, especially against other Muslims. And he paints an easy-to-understand picture detailing exactly how and why Salafi-style Islam (especially since 1979) differs from all previous ideas about jihad and violence against other Muslims, including the imposition of violent shari’a punishments. Again, I am not sure that I would agree on all his main points, but the book provides a reasonable argument and a very clear statement.
Kadri’s approach to the Palestinian/Israeli issue is curious in one sense: he delineates why it is central to much radicalization in contemporary Islam, and especially the role it played in the development of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, but on the whole, this issue gets less space in the book than one might think given his assertion of its centrality. I think Kadri is indeed correct to keep it in perspective, and to emphasize “promoting good and forbidding evil” and other aspects associated with sunni Islam and especially with contemporary counties in which violent, traditionalizing Muslim groups are dominant—by no means all traditionally- Islamic countries. And I think Kadri could have offered even more contextualization of conflicts between Salafis, Muslim Brotherhood, Shia and moderate Sunni Muslims, within issues of bad government, world politics (going back to 1st and 2nd World War and Cold War/Third World issues), and “minority relations,” that is, tensions between groups based on religion, religiosity or ethnicity.
I am grateful to a student who suggested I read this book and comment on it; for me personally, it has raised some questions about how to teach Islamic history, specifically how to integrate the development of legal ideas into a political narrative—something Kadri does quite well—and how I wish to research and write about issues of Islamic law, of 13-14th century Islam, and about contemporary considerations. I am grateful for the encouragement to have read it, and know it will affect some of my thinking on these issues as I go forward.
Seth Ward
I am moderating a talkback discussion on the play 16 Wounded in Jackson WY next week, at Off the Square, Oct. 10. The play will be done “open book” -- they are rehearsing but do not expect to be able to do all the lines from memory yet. I am not sure how much explaining, commenting or moderating I will be doing but presumably the session will have some responses from the actors, and Q&A from the audience.
Students in History and Literature classes should consider coming. The play articulates some important questions regarding a central issue of the Arab/Israeli situation: to what extent is the Holocaust the “father” of the situation in Israel, and what we would call today Palestinian angst, victimhood, and terror its “unnatural son.” Can close family-like relations overturn the innate character of historic family relations? How do we understand victimhood and violence in the Middle East?
The Holocaust and Israeli-Palestinian impasse are two fundamental images that shape our world-view today about evil, about violence, and about forgiveness and love. Although I personally think that Arab-Jewish violence and the continuing, indeed—growing—symbolic power of the Holocaust are at least as much the result of other issues and trends than their cause, these are important elements that shape our world today. And, regardless of what one thinks about the Holocaust, about Palestine or Israel, the play’s exploration of the interpersonal dynamics of what functions as a kind of adoptive family raises important questions for discussion in our world of atraditional family units.
In some ways, the characterization of the Arab violence in the play reminds me of issues raised in numerous recent films. For example, the issues are similar to those raised by both by Palestinians in the prizewinning movie Paradise Now, and by Israelis in Weekend in Tel Aviv (translation of the Hebrew title; its English language release title was For my Father). in my humble opinion, they are raised in other ways—and in the context of even discussing how to make a film about violence—in the Tunisian film The Making Of, le Dernier Film. The answer is quite different from the way that friendship transcends marriage and stands up to extremism in Wedding Song, a film by a Jewish French filmmaker of Tunisian heritage. (I had suggested some of these films for a second program at Off the Square it was not possible to put this program together).
The play is worth seeing.
Seth Ward
Thursday, May 17
Begin travel eastwards to the Sea of Galilee
Nazareth-Annunciation Church-Roman Catholic. Crypt.
Portion of Mass in Spanish
“Carpentry of Joseph” church-Portion of Mass for Ascension Thursday in Arabic
Greek Orthodox Church of Annunciation, Mary Well
Synagogue where Jesus spoke according to Luke, and Church of Greek Catholic tradition
Walking tour of Tzfat – Defenders’ Square, Chernobyler Kloyz, Ashkenazi Ari synagogue, light lunch with Yemeni pancakes, Livnot ulhibanot, descent to 16th century city including mikveh.
Walk through art colony. (Abohab synagogue closed, Elsheikh synagogue—mentioned story of inscription said to have saved it, Caro synagogue, home and cave inaccessible).
Travel through Golan-pass magnetite rock
Har Bental—Ash cone partially wiped away by lava flow, visit Israeli military position and overlook to Syria (Kuneitra) and Mt. Hermon
Katzrin—Yarden and Golan wines
Tour of Kibbutz Ein Gev
St. Peters Fish dinner at Kibbutz Ein Gev (payment on own) / with Guide
Grave of Maimonides
Overnight: Gallery Hotel, Haifa
Here is a review of what we have done so far, I am going to try to post it in a few other areas. Maybe some of you who are experts can help with this.
Tuesday, May 15 [GUIDE/DRIVER]
Meeting with Guide at the airport in Arrivals Hall
Caesarea archeological complex (time permitting): Beach and Crusader area.
Druze dinner at Ussafiya / with Guide discussing Druze religion.
Overnight: Gallery Hotel, Haifa [D]
Late night walking tour to City Hall, government area, Science Museum (old Technion building)
Wednesday, May 16 [GUIDE/DRIVER]
Stella Maris: San Francisco lookout, Church, Napoleonic History
Walk down 400 ft.
Elijah's Cave on Mount Carmel
Walk back to Bus
University of Haifa
Greeting by International Program
Talk on Political Situation by Israel
Tour and meet with students from UPenn and UWisc-Madison
Lunch at Univ. of Haifa
Lohamei HaGetaot – Ghetto Fighters Museum / with local guiding by Tanya: Children’s Memorial and Main House Warsaw Ghetto uprising room
Rosh Hanikrah ocean caves
Rosh Hanikrah-Border visit
Acco: Tour of “Anwar Ahmadiyya Mosque” Jazzar Pasha Mosque—with Sabri
Tour of old Acco seaport's Crusader-era castle
Dinner served at hotel
Overnight: Gallery Hotel, Haifa [B / D]
Carmelit—underground Cable Car
“Ha-Ogen” in Port district.
Walk back to Hadar.
Seth Ward
Religious Studies
University of Wyoming
A student wrote me: “I'm curious to hear your take on this
http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/08/my-take-does-netanyahus-bible-gift-to-obama-mean-war/ “
This is a blog posting by Stephen Prothero in which he suggests, in essense, that a gift Netanyahu gave to Obama is easy enough to read as a request for a green light to kill 75,000 Iranians. I read the blog with interest. After the paragraph in which Prothero suggests that Netanyahu wanted Obama to read the Scroll of Esther as indicating that Israel kill 75,000 Iranians, I could only think about the essay as one-sided—and as reminding me of, say, some gift recipient who overthinks the meaning of a gift which is, in the end, just a gift. I could, perhaps, compare this to (forgive me for the stereotype) a woman who wonders about a gift from a male friend far more than the absent-minded male ever intended. And I think that Prothero does just that at the beginning of the essay, overthinking Netanyahu’s gift, and applying pre-conceived notions to boot.
What is less clear to me is whether the rest of the essay redeems him in my mind. In the end, the conclusion that it would be best to remember the common humanity of all men, is a given, and I think Prothero could do better; it is just as one sided as those—including perhaps Netanyahu himself, who too-quickly identify Ahmadinejad or the Ayatullah with Haman.
Prothero could easily have said 75,800 Iranians; if we are to engage in too-easy consideration of whom Netanyahu wants to see killed, we might as well wonder why his figure does not include the number given in the Scroll of Esther for residents of Shushan who sought to kill Jews and were themselves killed. And we might as well consider the Israeli track record of surgical strikes in Iraq and Syria, in which targets were taken out with precision.
For that matter, the Esther story has the Jews earning the right to fight and kill those who sought to destroy them, albeit only for one day. They had to ask for a second day in Shushan; presumably the city in which Haman organized his plot was the apparent heartland of the anti-Jewish movement. Even if Prothero’s first reading is correct, Netanyahu’s public comments are a lot closer to assertion of the Jewish right to respond to those who are dead-set to kill them, than a threat of or desire for mass killing. I hardly think that Netanyahu was seeking a green light from Obama. Rather--as the Megillah famously says venahafokh hu “and it was turned around” that is, the opposite is the case—Obama was asking Netanyahu to rely on the U.S. and on diplomatic rather than military gestures.
The Rabbi Prothero heard in Jerusalem may have had good intentions—based on his sermon, Prothero suggests Obama should use Purim to see the common humanity of all humans. This is probably correct regarding the Jerusalem Rabbi and Jerusalem Arabs, and of course as a general principle it is always correct. The idea that Obama should look to the common humanity of Iranians and Israelis is based on the Talmudic statement one should drink until one does not distinguish between “Cursed be Haman and Blessed be Mordechai.”
But the situation in Iran was clarified by the elections last Friday. Parliamentary elections appear to have repudiated Ahmadinejad—but favored the political parties more loyal to the Supreme Leader—who has been even more adamant than Ahmadinejad about the destruction of the Jewish state. Perhaps this is because Ayatullah Khamenei is somewhat distanced from political situations: none of his functionaries has to explain his remarks in ways that seem less militaristic as Ahmadinijad’s appointees have sometimes had to do. Regardless, Netanyahu has every right to worry that the Iranians are bluffing when they deny development of nuclear bombs, and not bluffing when they call for the liquidation of the Jewish State, rather than the other way around, and as the Head of Government of Israel, it is his job to do so.
I have often suggested that “Cursed be Haman and Blessed be Mordechai” are already equivalent statements—a traditional argument for this is that gematria (numerical value of the letters) is the same—and it is interesting that it is considered to require drinking to determine that Haman should be cursed just as Mordechai is blessed. In this reading, though, both the Rabbi and Prothero are mistaken: as a default, we recognize the common humanity of all human beings, but it takes the loosening of our ethical stance on this point to see that Haman is indeed cursed for taking revenge on an entire people for the slight suffered from a single individual, and Mordechai is blessed for his resistance.
In the end, Prothero’s essay provides him an opportunity to draw some sermonic material from the Book of Esther, but Netanyahu’s gift of a Scroll is probably not to be “overthought.” And if it is, and Netanyahu is Mordechai, then one might suggest that the scroll does not depict Mordechai confronting the King (only as saving the King early on in the story). Instead, he confronts Esther, telling her that she should accept her responsibility: she should not be passive but must step up to what may well be her destiny—he tells her that if she does not, “you and your father’s house will perish.” This message, and the messages about Jewish self-reliance and recognition that sometimes enemies must be recognized as being enemies, are far more likely meanings to be drawn from Netanyahu’s gift of the Scroll.
Seth Ward
From: Jacob Benson
Sent: Thursday, March 08, 2012 11:39 AM
To: Seth Ward
Subject: Prothero's take on Purim
I'm curious to hear your take on this
http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/08/my-take-does-netanyahus-bible-gift-to-obama-mean-war/ - Jacob BensonON USING QUR’AN TRANSLATIONS:
The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Amana 2004 and others.
University of Wyoming
On Abdullah Yusuf Ali
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdullah_Yusuf_Ali
On omissions and revisions from some recent editions:
http://www.al-islam.org/tahrif/yusufali/index.htm
For the most part I have come to use the Abdullah Yusuf Ali bilingual (Arabic and English) version of the Qur’an in courses which require a Qur’an edition. In addition to a translation, it has commentary and introductions, excurses, sonnets, and a very useful index. Abdullah Yusuf Ali was a lawyer from India in Colonial times (actually where he lived is now in Pakistan) and was trained in Britain and saw himself in some sense very much a part of the British empire; the work is not only directed to Muslims requiring a translation, but also to English readers. As such, Abdullah Yusuf Ali gives Bible parallels, references to British literature, and even some paraphrases of Shakespeare that are unreferenced, as those of his generation would recognize them instantly even if many of my students do not. Although the translation dates to the 1930s, the work appears to continue to be popular in American mosques and often quoted by Muslims.
Students should be aware that there are other highly influential Qur’an translations and commentaries available in English. An important review and critique of these translations was offered by Khaleel Mohammed in Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2005, pp. 58-71, and available online at http://www.meforum.org/717/assessing-english-translations-of-the-quran. Among the translations he reviews, Mohammed favors the translations of Arthur Arberry (1955) and Muhammad Asad (1980), and has important criticisms of many others, including the current editions of the Abdullah Yusuf Ali volume.
There have been some editorial adjustments since the work originally appeared, especially in the commentaries, sometimes but not always marked by (R), and subject to a certain amount of discourse in the Islamic world. Typically the comments and modifications which draw the most debate reflect the Salafi/Wahhabi, anti--Shi’a and anti-Zionist (and antisemitic) views of Saudi Arabian sponsors of the new edition—who made its broad distribution possible.
Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s work was published before the many changes in the Islamic world since World War II, and thus prior to the appearance of seminal works by Al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and for that matter Amina Wadud and many others, who have reshaped the understanding of the Qur’an among Muslims of many different orientations.
Nevertheless, I like the book. Although there are a number of things to watch out for, for users cognizant of its editorial policies and the concerns of the commentary, it still provides a good baseline understanding of the text.
Some students will find ideas in his commentary about Christianity or Judaism to be offensive. Yet some Jewish or Christian students are likely to be offended by most things said by Muslims when arguing that the religions of Judaism and Christianity are wrong, misread the Bible, or changed its contents. Abdullah Yusuf Ali knows Bible well so has almost always the right references (there are really only a few mistakes) but of course these Bible verses are understood within his framework of reference, which is not Christian or Jewish. It is important to remember, too, that this is inherently a work meant not merely to give an English language version of the Qur’an as the translator understands it, but in so doing to argue for Islam, and against Judaism and Christianity—indeed, against Jews and Christians for their misunderstandings and unbelief.
Since there is a lot of commentary, explanation, poetic introductions and so forth, students should remember that the Arabic text is the Qur’an, and only the English texts printed parallel to Arabic texts are the translation: everything else is not.
Students also need to note that Yusuf Ali puts words inside parentheses which do not match up with the Qur’an but reflect the way he believes the Qur’an is usually understood, and he is usually more or less correct, although these translations often are somewhat apologetic or try to interpret the Qur’anic text in the best possible light for English-speaking readers. An egregious example of this, perhaps, is the famous verse which encourages husbands, in certain circumstances, to use various remedies on their wives, including beating. The Arabic word can indeed mean “spank (lightly)” as Abdullah Yusuf Ali translates, but the same word could also be used in “strike (dead).” Authoritative commentators almost always stress that striking one’s wife is not a good idea and must be limited in strength as well as scope. So, the translation reflects the traditional understanding as well as it represents the actual text—but those without Arabic might not realize the potential breadth of meaning of the Arabic terminology. In the classroom, this is easy enough to handle if you have time; more difficult if you need to be extremely brief. The verse in question is usually enumerated 4:34.
With its commentary and cross references this is a good “study Qur’an,” despite the age of the translation, its traditional approach, and its polemical intent. A “Study Qur’an” for university use (paralleling study bibles) would actually be welcome. Yet Study Bibles are often written by people who exercise critical analysis but also have a deep faith-community link with the text—and these persons are rare indeed in the Islamic world.
The biggest problem students usually have is going to be common to any translation: Students unfamiliar with the Qur’an often approach it with the expectation that Scripture is primarily connected narrative. Individual Bible Stories are connected into a long story that has a beginning, middle and end. Even in the Old Testament, this makes works like Leviticus and Deuteronomy, with many legal passages, or the second half of Exodus with its details about construction of the Sanctuary, rather difficult for students to comprehend. Thus even in Bible, narrative may well be secondary to legal sections or to detailed descriptions, not the primary point. Thus even in discussing familiar material such as Bible I need to spend a certain amount of time talking about the purpose of narrative to introduce legal materials, not simply to tell a story of “preparatio evangelae” “Preparation for the Gospel,” to borrow a term from Eusebius, and discuss many more types of literary genres in the Old Testament. For the Qur’an this discussion is much more complicated due to what appears to be the lack of any organizing principle for the book as a whole, or even for the individual chapters, called “suras” in Arabic. I do not have a short list of genres that I use for the Qur’an but it’s important to point out that there are few long narratives, and they relate to the central truths of Islam, not to the Biblical narrative sequence. There’s also legal material, highly poetic representations, preaching and so forth.
It seems to me that the best way to overcome these hurdles is to read and study a fairly long passage within one of the suras placed earlier in the Qur’an, to get a feel for the different genres contained; to read some of the very short suras placed towards the end of the Qur’an, and to take a few topics from the Index and read every relevant verse in its context.
Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s Meaning of the Holy Qur’an is one of a number of popular editions which make it very easy for students unfamiliar with the Qur’an to do this productively. The issues I have discussed in this brief essay of course pertain to just about any edition or translation of the Qur’an English-speaking students are likely to use.
Seth Ward
I like to quote one of my senior colleagues, who would introduce his predictions about anything in the Middle East by noting that if he was wrong, no one would remember—just one more wrong prediction—but in the unlikley case he was right people would celebrate his insight.
Yesterday in my Modern Middle East class we listened to Egyptian President Mubarak’s speech. I also showed an article from an Israeli newspaper, HaAretz, which predicted that Mubarak would resign and go to Sharm el-Sheikh.
This appears now to be correct: Mubarak just resigned and is said to have left for Sharm. (Of course, there had been reports that he had been in Sharm already—but more denials of these reports stating he remained in Cairo.) The article predicted that Mubarak would leave for Germany after that. I cannot find this article translated on the English version of HaAretz.
Despite Mubarak’s statements about constitutional changes he had begun, the Vice President’s announcement this morning appears to confirm that the military has taken charge of government. The military has, as far as I can tell, not made any statements about how they will or will not continue constitutional reform leading to open, free and fair elections of a new (civilian) President and Parliament responsible to the people of Egypt.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/sharm-el-sheikh-egypt-mubarak_n_821913.html#s238655&title=Sharm_elSheikh has a report about the Sharm al-Shaykh resort.
Yesterday I opined that there was no good outcome for the US, in the sense that Egyptians might blame the US regardless of the outcome. It appears that at least some Egyptians are grateful to the US Administration for quiet but constant pressure on Mubarak, and the Egyptian Army seems to have strong links with the US.
Yesterday we noted Mubarak’s reference to “foreign” elements pressuring Egypt—I heard this as his response to pressure from the international community, and perhaps I was right about that as well. Although, most of the “talking heads” noted that the Mubarak administration was trying to pin the blame on the demonstrations themselves on foreign elements. This of course is the “old way”—blame outsiders. The new approach in Egypt seems to be taking and accepting responsibility rather than blaming others; to paraphrase Thom Friedman “UP with Egypt” rather than “down with the US.”
We’ll see what develops.
Seth Ward
Among the I inquiries I receive fairly frequently are requests to comment on lists of Qur’an verses which articulate a strident and violent antagonism to Christians and Jews. These same verses are also quoted often enough by the extremists themselves, those who perpetrate acts of terror and murder against non-Muslims and for that matter against secular Muslims or Muslims who espouse a different approach to Islam than their own--and especially by those who plan, encourage, and fund such acts. Moreover, they are cited by those who maintain they are not extremists, but whose selection of verses nevertheless does not moderate such motifs in the Islamic world. You can easily find most of these Qur’anic texts. I recommend readers check them out, especially if you can compare multiple translations (available in many websites), and Qur’an commentaries. It is also important to read a few verses on either side to get the context.
The business of quoting verses from the Qur’an to prove a point already believed to be true is easy in this case: there are many verses which support views we would characterize as extremist, and promising the sword and a violent end to unbelievers, including Christians and Jews. And, it is correct that Islamic legal authoroities generally consider the “Sword Verse” (9:5) to abrograte all other verses to the extent that they contradict it.
But of course it is not clear how useful the simplistic citation of verses is. Perhaps it is ironic that the extremists who cite them approvingly, and the anti-Islamic activists who cite them as proving the essense of Islam, come to share the same interpretation of the Qur’an. But whereas for religious persons, God is capable of acting or may be indeed the only true Actor, nevertheless Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and by extension, Bible, New Testament and Qur’an are not agents: only God (for those who are religious) and Man are actors in history. We may say that God commands or speaks in these texts, but in all cases, the Divine Word is interpreted and put into effect by human beings, who participate to a greater or lesser extent within various traditions of how these verses are to be understood. And those traditions are malleable—our history of interpretation and choices made by interpreters and teachers shape the way the verses are understood. To put this as simply as possible: “Islam teaches” is not completely accurate; indeed, it is “shorthand” for a process in which the verses and teachings are always selected, understood and interpreted by humans.
To illustrate, consider that Christians generally believe that the Son of God is the Prince of Peace and quote verses to show the peaceful nature of Christianity. But most Christians also consider what they see as “the moral law of the Old Testament” to be part of the canon, as is a “Sword Verse” in the New Testament, and the book of Revelations—not exactly peaceful materials.
And modern Jewish extremists – fewer in raw numbers and in percentages than the Muslim extremists to be sure – sometimes rule that Arabs are Amalek or Palestinian Arabs, and for that matter any non-Jews in the State of Israel are like the Seven Nations—and thus must be utterly destroyed. If they do not do so, according to some Jews, it is merely such principles as recognition of the flawed international power scene that prevents treating them the way that halacha requires.
The reasons that most Jews and most Christians do not think this way and that too many Muslims do—even if a small but significant percentage–-has to do with such things as choices made regarding pilosophy, enlightenment, the universalist tendencies in Jewish and Christian traditions by those who shaped religious opinion such as Maimonides, Aquinas, Jacob Emden, the Maskilim, Rabbi Kook and John Paul II; and on the Islamic side, by the processes which have brought ideas promoted by the Wahhabis, the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, and the Islamic Revolution more currency among Islamic activists than the more liberal and universalists interpretations that are actually favored by a majority of Muslims.
We ignore the extremist views in the Qur’an at our peril of course: these have been and continue to be powerful texts that shape Islamic thought. But we do ourselves no favor to simply adopt a one-sided assessment of the essential nature of a religious tradition rather than understanding it in context. This thinking is too close to that of the Islamic extremists themselves, and ignores the role of modern developments in shaping a complex set of responses to modernity by Muslims.
Seth Ward