This is an analysis of the University of Wyoming Israel Election Survey conducted December 2012-January 2013, regarding the 2013 elections for Israel’s Parliament, the Knesset.

The Israeli voter votes for a single slate of candidates for the Knesset (often called a “party list”) from among multiple slates proposed by various parties. Mandates for Knesset seats are distributed to these slates based on the proportion of the total vote; an introduction to the system and links for further information and essays were included material made available to those who took the survey, found in http://www.uwyo.edu/sward/israeli.elections.htm.

Thanks to everyone who took the survey. A preliminary report was published the day before the elections. This update takes into account a few surveys that came in after that time, with analysis. The complete results are given in the Appendix, with a few additional explanatory comments.   

Size of the survey and a few other introductory parameters.

There were 73 returns, and some of these were incomplete. This was not a scientific survey, so the results may be instructive or suggestive, but not conclusive.

The survey was constructed using the University of Wyoming Survey Tool. It remained open past the date at which analysis was begun for technical reasons. Minor divergence may result because some analyses were done before the receipt of the final response, or due to minor differences in the way the Survey program handled data and results from analysis in Microsoft Excel. Sometimes these differences are due to the different ways of handling skipped questions, irrelevant or incomplete responses, or certain types of survey questions, including questions for which respondents could choose from a list but also write in a different choice.

The participants were largely from North America, but there were participants from Germany, UK, Israel and China, and US participants who had completed high school in Turkey or in Africa. Not surprisingly, a large percentage of respondents appear to be connected with Colorado and Wyoming (usually indicated by high school or university affiliation). As noted below, only one reported having completed high school in Israel. Part of the significance of this endeavor is the non-Israeli response. In the summer and fall 2012, electoral preferences of non-US voters around the world were reported for the US presidential elections (along endless surveys of those likely to vote).  But there were relatively few surveys of persons unlikely to vote in the Israeli election process.

This survey was designed primarily as a teaching tool, and perhaps the best justification for it came not from the formal results but from comments received informally, explaining that it helped understand the process or some of the issues. Some of the questions were shaped in such a way as to make it easier to “score” the results to determine the degree to which predictions about Knesset and Government match the actual results.  

My Prediction based on the survey

It was possible to make an arbitrary prediction the day before the election based on survey results,  compiled not “scientifically” but “mathematically:” indices were assigned to various results, some of the lowest results dropped, the remaining ones added, divided and combined until reaching a result that could result in 120 members of Knesset. This approach took into account the predictions as well as the preferences of our survey respondents, but was independent of other surveys. Here is the list circulated in advance of the election—and the actual results.

How this was done: 

Some scores were eliminated: parties not receiving more than 10% in the individual vote, or more than 15% in the “vote for three parties” were excluded from the individual vote results; parties that received less than 15% in vote for three were excluded from the three party vote results. Similar limitations were imposed on the other categories.

% Individual party vote times 3

+ % vote for three parties result

+ Number predicting five largest parties

+ ½ % the vote for PM, assigned to the PM’s party

+ 1/3 % believing parties will be in the coalition.

Results divided by 6 and rounded to produce 120. (more than 0.33 rounded up, otherwise rounded down).

Actual “Votes” by preference (percentages)

Respondents were asked to vote for one list only, and in a separate question, asked to consider which lists they would vote for if they could chose three lists. In this chart, the total responses by percentage for this question are divided by three.

A few respondents voted for “none of the above” in the “vote for one” question. Fewer responded to the question about voting for three parties, but almost all in fact voted for three parties; when actual percent voting was factored in (96%, 296%), there are minor changes in the result. For example, Likud-Beitenu would receive 17% of votes actually cast.

The top seven parties on the list should come as no surprise. There was a lot of support for Meretz in this survey. Tzippi Livni and Kadima fared much better than in the actual Israeli electorate. Survey respondents were less attracted to Likud, Ha-Bayit Hayehudi and the religious parties than the Israeli electorate.

It may however be something of a surprise that Likud, HaBayit Hayehudi and Tzippi Livni all fared much better in “vote for one list” than in the question which asked respondents to consider which lists they would vote for if they could chose three lists. Striking examples of the reverse were Labor, Hadash, Kadima and Am Shalem. In other words: The Labor party did better as a “second choice” than as a first choice, beating Likud-Yisrael Beitenu. For Likud-Beitenu, Ha-Bayit Ha-Yehudi, Tzippi Livni, and Meretz, apparently those who did not vote for them as their “sole” vote would not generally consider them as a “second choice” if they could vote for three parties.

Prime Minister:

Israelis voted directly for Prime Minister only in three elections, but the survey had a question about voting for the Prime Minister. Netanyahu collected 31% of the vote of this group.  If the center/left parties united, they would have won, with almost half (about 47%) of the vote. Add votes for Avigdor Lieberman and Aryeh Elad, and at 35% the right wing is still far behind.

What coalition will emerge? How long will it take?

According to the results, over half the respondents predicted Likud-Yisrael Beteynu, and Shas would be in the coalition. 41% predicted HaBayit Hayehudi, About a third each predicted United Torah Judaism, Kadima, Ha-Tenuah-Tzippi Livni, and Labor would be coalition partners. Fewer than a quarter predicted Yesh Atid will be part of the government.

In the narrative response, the overwhelming sentiment was that the next government will favor security issues, right wing / nationalist and similar concerns. Most assumed that at least one Haredi party would be included. A few assumed that a centrist or left wing party would be included; one respondent said “as a fig leaf.” Only one respondent suggested that Yair Lapid would certainly take part in the next government.

The average prediction was that the coalition would include about 70 mandates. In the preliminary report Labor or Yesh Atid were suggested in order to round out 69 mandates. 

The average prediction was that the coalition would be accepted by the Knesset 25 days after the election, which I am “rounding out” to Sunday, February 17.

Notable results

a.      Netanyahu was widely expected to win of course: when respondents projected who they thought would be the next PM, they overwhelmingly selected Netanyahu.

b.      But in this survey, the single-party vote and especially the three-party vote did not particularly favor Netanyahu. In general, this survey was further to the left than the actual Israeli vote—and the religious parties were not well represented.

c.      Am Shalem did better in this survey than in the election; perhaps reflecting Haim Amsalem’s outreach to English speakers.

d.      There was little response in this survey from the Arab sector—probably an inevitable result of the distribution of this survey.

e.      Respondents were more realistic about who will actually be the largest parties: few thought Meretz would number among them.  Likud, Shas and Labor (!) got the most predictions. About half as many thought Tzippi Livni, Habayit Hayehudi and Kadima would get the next number of votes (in that order).

f.       The left/center leaning is not particularly surprising, although the strong showing of Labor is. Labor seems to be a solid “second or third choice.” If electors could vote for three parties, Labor polled just a little more than Likud and more than Meretz, both of which polled higher than Labor in the traditional “single party” vote.

g.      Another surprise, to me, is that Am Shalem polled identical numbers to Kadima in the “vote for three parties” question.  Am Shalem played no significant role in predictions for largest parties or coalition partners, but this could mean it is a party worth watching. (More likely though, given the fact that it did not gain enough votes to enter the Knesset, it could be the end of Rabbi Amsalem’s Knesset career).  In the actual results, Am Shalem’s results were not far from Kadima’s either, although of course Kadima had more than 2% of the votes and Am Shalem did not.

What issues are most important?

Social issues topped security in the list of responses, with State of Palestine and economic issues coming not far behind. Religious Divisions were next. All these were noted by over a quarter of respondents. Fewer noted Iran or education. Although “social issues” topped this list, only 17% noted Israeli Arabs and only 5% noted Haredim.  

My survey did not include “Peace” as one of the named issues—but this was the most frequently mentioned word in the “other” responses.  

Many respondents reflected on their votes—in some cases at great length. Their views are are reproduced at the beginning of the appendix.  Respondent comments make it clear that leadership, personal views about various leaders, personal political placement (left/center, right), security, relations with the Palestinians, and social and religious divisions inside Israel are important considerations. The considerations which loomed large in the narrative descriptions were not necessarily those in choices from the list; in particular, economic and social issues were much less frequently mentioned explicitly in the narratives.  Despite great concern over Iran, it was not particularly high in the choices (20%), and played even less of a role in the narrative descriptions given by respondents.

Respondents

Few respondents reported growing up in Israel or being citizens. A few mentioned they were eligible to vote but would not be voting. Most respondents completed high school in the USA. One was born in another Middle Eastern country, and several completed high school in UK and Germany. South America, Africa and China were also represented.

About one third each were students, teachers (including professors, researchers, university faculty and others); or other (a rabbi, lawyers, professionals, etc.).

Significance

The study was hardly scientific. This survey provided respondents with a venue in which to express their political opinions—much as was provided in late summer and fall 2012 around the world with the proliferation of polling about the American Presidential campaign. I believe that asking both about preference and prediction, and inclusion of a question about voting for three parties, countered at least to a certain extent the bias inherent in some such surveys, in which people do not always articulate the breadth of their views, or “pick winners” rather than vote conscience—although there is no way to confirm this conclusion at this time. Most important, the many students who took this survey got a glimpse of the complexity of the process. Responses by and large showed choices were made carefully – many took the time to lay out articulate statements about their choices.

Yesh Atid was probably unfamiliar to the largely non-Israeli respondents; both Tzippi Livni and Kadima were familiar “brands” that did better among this group than in the Israeli electorate. This is a left-leaning crowd, as seen by support for Meretz and lack of support for Netanyahu.

Israeli election results included a tremendous showing for Yesh Atid—not at all mirrored in this survey, or in most Israeli surveys either. Otherwise, though, except for Meretz and other understandable differences, the results of this survey were not as far off from the Israeli electorate as I thought (or most people would have thought) when I processed them the day before the election. At least among those who responded to this survey, there was great awareness of Israeli politics, and enthusiasm about expressing opinions about parties, candidates and issues.

Seth Ward

Appendix: Why they voted as they did: selections from respondent comments

(the rest of the survey questions and responses are below).

Leadership

I'd like to see Israel have new leadership who are concerned with the welfare of all of its people and not just the powerful.

Strong leadership that understands Israel's right to exist is not up for discussion.

experienced leadership, strong security policy, & focus on economy.

Israel has need for strong leadership, committed to a non-apologetic stance on her right to exist.

A good leader must be a wise leader.

How to find a suitable big fish in such a tiny pot?

Left/Center Values

Progressive left-liberal values.

left orientation.

Centrist.

I'm a leftist in Israeli terms :-)

progressive centrist.

Only the left has a vision for justice and democracy in Eretz Israel.

Center-left views.

left wing votes.

Right

I want a stronger, far right Israel.

Jewish /Zionist Identity

I want to keep Israel alive and Jewish

I want most of all for Israel to be as secure as possible and I want it to remain a safe place for Jews to live.

A progressive, yet Zionist Israel that is prosperous, secure, and at peace with its neighbors

Tzippi Livni

Selected Tzipi Livni 'cause she is level headed and pragramatic.

Ideologically, I'd vote for Hatnua, but I don't trust Livni.  I indicate support for Am Shalem because the issues raised -- re; the secular-dati divide -- are key to peace, security, and prosperity.

I trust Tzipi Livni.  I hope that religious issues can be set aside from politics and real progress can be made.

Yachimovich

Yachimovich has a history of anti-war and two-state politics, and her background in journalism gives her a perspective on subaltern groups in Israel and Palestine that most of the current Knesset seems to love ignoring.

Labor party pays more attention on peace process

Yesh Atid and others (including Hadash!)

At first look my selections may not make the most sense, but they all relate to the biggest problems facing Israel. Before Israel can effectively discuss a peace process, largely and accurately regarded as the most significant issue at stake in the country's future, it must resolve its own demographic, economic, and societal issues. The party with the best approach and the greatest recognition of these issues is Yair Lapid's Yesh Atid, explaining my selection of this new party. Yesh Atid is also composed largely of those new to politics, something necessary to break through Israel's deep political divisions and redirect the focus of government. As with most political systems, the best solutions involve moderation and compromise. Hatnua was founded based on this concept of moderation, and stands the best chance of effectively approaching many issues in Israel and displays, out of the largest parties, the most willingness to compromise with various groups within Israel following the collapse of Kadima as an effective party. After resolving Israel's current demographic and economic issues, lies the behemoth of the Arab-Israeli political process. While I support a two state solution, Israel must also recognize that it isn't just a nation of the Jewish people anymore. To not do so would blatantly ignore current demographic trends and endanger Israel's future. For that reason, I also support Hadash as a party working to bridge the divide between Jews and Arabs within Israel, and as a party that recognizes that Israel, while meant to be Jewish in its founding, is not Jewish in reality, and never fully will be.

Justice, Fairness, Civil rights, Social Divisions

The State of Israel must continue to pursue the path of equality of opportunity, civil rights and liberties, fairness, justice and security.

I think that those topics are the most important topics for a western democracy.

Support individual freedom, pro Israeli Arabs, and settlers

I vote for parties that support social justice and peace

Israel must work on its societal values and ongoing rifts between  tribal  communities.

Note: the party list did not include all the ones I was looking for. Israel needs a realist willing to stake out controversial, right-leaning on peace, independent economical, and co-optive haredi social  positions in order to maximize ability to reach a balanced compromise.

I based my selections on what I see as Israel's biggest problem: division - both internal and external. The secular and haredi division (putting it very simplistically) and, of course, the Conflict. I think it falls to Israel to devise a two-state solution without negotiations, outline it, and present it to the UN for vote. It would force Fatah and Hamas to state their real intention (destroy Israel) for all the world to see or accept the state. Then, if violence continues, open war can be declared between nation-states. I don't think that would be great, but it would shut down a lot of some of the criticism because it would give the Palestinians what they ostensibly want while placing Israel on par, nation to nation, allowing for more leeway in military operations. The parties I selected and people I selected I think are best positioned to accomplish that task. Also, a similar division is appearing in Israeli society. A conversation must develop regarding what to do with a growing haredi population and the resentment and frustrations of the secular population.

Israel is in crisis because of religious divisions. Peace with its neighbors, or some sort of working relationship is crucial to advance within and without.

I believe that since Israel has been quite stable (economically) over the past few years, the focus should be on minority rights (both ethnic and religious) and foreign policy, including an open debate about a Palestinian State.

Security, Islam, Peace

Islam and Muslims are the biggest threat to the state of Israel

The security of Israel is of the utmost importance if Israel is to remain a country.

Pirates because I like pirates, security because Israel does not have kind neighbors. [This comment is more telling than it seems at first glance; the respondent was a young student who took some questions seriously—and “goofed off” on the others. Given the flippancy of many of the other answers of this respondent, the reference to Israel’s neighbors reflects a concern serious enough to overcome the comic or non-serious answers.] 

I would want the prime minister and the party in power to be moving toward a solution with the Palestinian territories as their top priority

I favor a two-state solution, if possible (given Arabs' virulent hatred of Jews).  I favor a democratic Jewish state in secure borders, with religious freedom and equal treatment of all Jews, including sharing of burdens and work.

I am primarily concerned with bringing about a two-state solution, whereby there would be a Palestinian State alongside Israel, which would be a Jewish State but with full equality for its Arab citizens.  Secondarily, I would strongly support weakening the Orthodox stranglehold on Israeli religious and personal life so that non-Orthodox rabbis, communities and individuals would enjoy equal rights as well.  It would be wonderful if there were a center-left coalition government with Livni as PM (although I realize that is highly unlikely.)

PM Netanyahu = continuity of service and clarity of position on issues, tho' stop the settlements where unjustified. Hatikva = hope for security and prosperity. Proper leadership ensures security, addresses economic issues, and should be able to galvanize itself against Iranian aggression

Survey questions and responses as of January 31 2013

The survey was left open until today for technical reasons. Some of the analyses in this report were done shortly before the closing of the survey, with only very minor changes to the numbers returned. The results below were examined on January 31, 2013

1.      Vote for ONE party list for the 19th Knesset. The list names are displayed in random order.        

(

The list names were displayed to respondents in random order; here they are displayed from largest to smallest vote, as is the case with most of the following tabulations).                                                                                   

1.      Whom would you vote for?               

The 11 “other” votes were: 2 for Zahava Gal-On (and another vote for Meretz, as noted) and 1 each for the other parties represented.

2.      Voting for more than one party list invalidates a ballot, but suppose you *could* vote for three parties for the 19th Knesset. Which would they be? (Select the party list you voted for above if you'd include it among the three). The list names are displayed in random order.    

Note: Average is based on maximum of 300%, that is, three parties mentioned. Percentages add up to 296%

3.      Which types of concerns are most important to you in your vote for Knesset and Prime Minister? The list displays in random order.                 

Only four responses to “other” in this question. Significantly, the Survey did not include “peace” as a choice, but two (4% of total) chose it as “other.”

Peace process leading to a two state peace agreement

Peace

Arabs

Women's religious rights and freedoms

4.      In your own words, please explain your choices above (for party lists, Prime Minister, issues).   

(results given above).

5.      Now we turn to results, without necessarily referring to your own vote. Which five parties do you think will have the largest delegations in the new Knesset? List names are displayed in random order.     

The actual five largest lists in the Knesset are: Likud-Yisrael Beitenu, Yesh Atid, Israel Labor Party, Habayit Hayehudi, and Shas.

6.      How large do you think the largest delegation will be?         

Response Average                           32.8

Note: The accuracy of this prediction is gratifying but perhaps misleading, as it includes several responses of 00 and one 99. With these removed, the average is 35.6. Here are the other responses:

7.      Next Prime Minister?      

The responses for “Other” were “?” and a period of time rather than a candidate name.

8.      How many days will elapse from January 22 until the Knesset confirms a Prime Minister, Ministers, and governing coalition? (Choosing '0' or '50' means you think a new   government will not be confirmed by the 49th day after January 22, 2013).     

Response Average  22.63

The Survey Tool gives 22.63 as Response Average. But, eliminating responses of “0,” the average is 23.8. One respondent entered “5;” strictly speaking, this is impossible in practice as the election results have to be certified before the President can ask someone to attempt to form a government. Election results are generally certified a week following the elections.

9.      How large do you think the coalition will be? Enter a number of Knesset Mandates from 61 (the minimum) to 120 (a unity government encompassing the entire Knesset).

The survey returned 69.76 as the average.

11. Select up to FIVE parties you believe will be in the government coalition. The list names are displayed in random order.  

12. In your own words, what groups will be part of the Government, and what do you think will be the most important considerations for forming it?          

Likud-Beiteinu will head a coalition created by recruiting Haredi parties. L-B's sole consideration will be creating a coalition, the Haredi parties will be focused on maintaining ultra-Orthodox hegemony.

Right-wing nationalist and Orthodox religious parties.

centrist zionist parties, power for religious parties to support yeshivot etc., social issues

It will be a lot like the current government, meaning a right wing government

Right, Left, Religious and Secular groups in order to promote a unity government.

Centrality

I thing that right wing groups will be part of the new government.

It will be a primarily rightist government with one centre-left party for balance, which will receive one or two most senior Government posts in return.

nationalist parties 

Stability should be considered for the coalition

The fact that there are not Arabs...

Right-winged, religious

Strong nationalism will win out

Largely a right-wing coalition with Yesh Atid as a fig-leaf for national unity.

Right, Religious, Moderates

The coalition needs to represent the diverse views of Israel's population.

I think security and religious issues will dominate, including the issue of settlements, so I think those groups who can fundamentally agree on at least two of those issues will form the Government.

The center left will prefer opposition to maintain its legitimacy, so a far right government will form.

A) the ones with the biggest war chest B) political self-interest

power mongering

I think that there will be a significant leftist presence in the government, but I think with growing fears of Iran, Egypt, and a Palestinian uprising, the more conservative parties will dominate.

I believe the 5 largest Jewish parties in Israel will comprise the governing coalition, on the basis of core ideology, with right-leaning parties having the edge in numbers and electoral representation

Current worries over Iran, Gaza and the Arab Spring have put security at the top of Israel's list of concerns. Thus, hardline parties, like that of Likud Yisrael Beitenu and the Jewish Home (Habayit Hayehudi), will likely have the most success. However, with these new fears and a general shift to the right in Israel, a rejection reaction will occur, and largely already has when looking at the recent protests over housing, social issues and the military draft of haredim. As a result, a coalition of moderate parties will form to challenge the ruling right wing coalition, forcing extreme right wing parties like Otzma Leyisrael to accept a compromise and join the ruling coalition. The most important considerations will involve security (Iran, Hamas, the Arab Spring) concessions to Palestine, or lack thereof, and the economic issues plaguing certain sectors of the Israeli population.

Keep Israel safe against all threats from the Muslim world

Likud because relations with other countries in the Middle East

Security. The Haredim will secure their privileges. Settlements will continue to grow and proliferate.

Likud will probably remain.

The most important considerations, unfortunately, seem to be the almost apartheid agenda held by the right wing of government. The most important considerations will be expansion, until power changes hands in a big way.

The large parties will remain part of the coalition. Voting results will show a more polarized and right-wing government.

I think that Likud and the religious parties are likely to control the government, in alliance with either more right-wing parties or else Labor. The main consideration will be whose votes can Netanyahu count on and what concessions need to be made by Likud.

Groups who've prevailed in the past when security was top issue: Labor, Likud. Resurgence of wide-spread anti-semitism in region; radical Islam infiltration; usurpation of resources trying to keep all citizens safe. Worldwide apathy and indifference re: willingness to work, get a job, be productive.

labor party 

relations with arabs

ultra-orthodox; right-wing; settlers

Social Issues

13. Now for some demographic information. First, something about your nationality or nationality.

For Israelis, please indicate whether you are actually voting in the Israeli election, or potentially able to vote.   

One each for China, Colombia, Germany, UK.  This survey tool returned a response of [no answer entered] for all other respondents.

14. Please enter your age.                 

Current average: 38.98. One response was 0; removing it, the average is 39.95.

15. What is your profession? If you are currently in a college or university degree program, seeking an undergraduate or graduate degree, what school do you attend and which degree are you seeking?        

Responses fall into three groups:

Teacher

University

College professor

Professor

Lecturer

Historian

Professor

Professor

University faculty

Researcher

Academic

Professor Emerita

Teacher, clerk

Shanghai university

Student at university of Düsseldorf

Researcher / doctoral candidate

Undergraduate Student. University of Wyoming, B.A. in Religious Studies minor in Psychology.

I am a student at the University of Wyoming studying International Relations

I'm currently an undergraduate at Harvard University pursuing a degree in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations (Modern Middle Eastern Studies) or International Development.

Student

Student

[student]

Student

Student

In High School

Writer (poet, literary translator, book reviewer).

Medical Dr

Fundraiser

Rabbi

Self employed

Lawyer

Attorney

Work in a non-profit organization

Technical field

I don't attend a university

Retired lawyer.

Self-employed.

homemaker

Commercial Architecture

Urban planner

Writer/office assistant

16. In which state (or country, if not within the U.S.) did you attend high school?          

USA respondents:

Non US respondents

Based on the context, “Iran” is a “joke” response. Based on other answers in this person’s response, this respondent is a high school student in Colorado, and should be added to respondents answering “Colorado” to this question.

University of Wyoming Israel Election Survey results

Seth Ward, University of Wyoming

January 30, 2013

University of Wyoming Israel Election Survey results so far (as of January 21 2013).

If you have not yet taken the survey, please follow this link:  

https://survey.uwyo.edu/TakeSurvey.aspx?SurveyID=m6KM9om2I

1.        The most arbitrary result: survey results compiled to predict Knesset representation. This was not done “scientifically” but “mathematically” in the sense that indices were assigned to various results, and the indices added, divided and combined until reaching a result that could result in 120 members of Knesset.

How this was done: 

% Individual party vote times 3

+ % vote for three parties result

+ Number predicting five largest parties

+ ½ % the vote for PM, assigned to the PM’s party

+ 1/3 % believing parties will be in the coalition.

Results divided by 6 and rounded to produce 120. (more than 0.33 rounded up, otherwise rounded down).

Some scores were eliminated: parties not receiving more than 10% in the individual vote, or more than 15% in the “vote for three parties” were excluded from the individual vote results; parties that received less than 15% in vote for three were were excluded from the three party vote results. Similar limitations were imposed on the other categories.

2.       Prime Minister: Netanyahu collected 32% of the vote of this group.  If the center/left parties united, they would have won, with almost half (about 47%) of the vote. Add votes for Avigdor Lieberman and Aryeh Elad, and at 35% the right wing is still far behind.

3.       What coalition will emerge? According to the results so far, it could include HaBayit Hayehudi, Likud-Yisrael Beteynu, Kadima, Shas, and UTJ. According to the projection above, this would be 58 MKs. The average projection for the size of the coalition is about 69. The next  largest votes were for Tzippi Livni; in this projection that would yield 72 mandates. Or,  Yesh Atid or Labor, with equal numbers of respondents predicting they will be part of the government, resulting in 69 or 67 mandates voting for the government, closer to the survey’s prediction.

4.       Any notable results?

a.       Netanyahu is widely expected to win of course.

b.      But in this survey, the single-party vote is heavily left wing, and the three-party vote is left/moderate, with, for example, Meretz doing about the same as Likud/Beitenu.  In fact, only Labor, Likud and Meretz got more than 25% in the “vote for three” question. In the calculations for MKs above, some results were excluded; using only the parties that were included in this calculation, % Individual party vote times 3 + % vote for three parties results in three times the raw inedixe for left wing parties.
This is hardly representative of the Israeli electorate!

c.       Respondents were more realistic about who will actually be the largest parties: few thought Meretz would number among them.  Likud, Shas—and Labor (!) got the most predictions. Tzippi Livni, Habayit Hayehudi and Kadima got the next number of votes (in that order) but all around half the numbers of those predicting Likud, Shas and Labor to be among the largest three parties.

d.      The left/center leaning is not particularly surprising, although the strong showing of Labor is. Labor seems to be a solid “second or third choice” 10% voted for Likud—but 32% would have included it if they could vote for three parties: same as Likud and more than Meretz, both of which polled higher in the traditional “single party “ vote.

e.      Another surprise, to me, is that Am Shalem polled identical numbers to Kadima in the “vote for three parties” question.  Am Shalem played no significant role in predictions for largest parties or coalition partners, but this could mean it is a party worth watching.

5.       What issues are most important.

My survey did not include “Peace” as one of the named issues—but this was the most frequently mentioned word in the “other” responses. Security and Social issues topped the list of responses, with economic issues coming not far behind. Ten points behind Security came State of Palestine and Religious Divisions. Israeli Arabs and Haredim--two  sectors of Israeli society who generally do not serve in the Army—had radically different levels: only 5% signified Haredim as an issue, but 17% noted Israeli Arabs. 

6.       Respondents

Only one respondent reported growing up in Israel. Most respondents completed high school in the USA. Two were from other Middle Eastern countries, and several completed high school in South America, UK, Germany, or Africa. About equal numbers were students; teachers (including professors, researchers, university faculty and others); or other (a rabbi, lawyers, professionals, etc.).

I’ll keep this survey open until well after the elections, and I’ll rethink the results of this survey based on additional responses returned.   (Survey results show time submitted, so it will be possible to make adjustments to read the results after the Elections).

Seth Ward

Vote for your choice in the Israeli Elections!

Invitation to a survey at 

 https://survey.uwyo.edu/TakeSurvey.aspx?SurveyID=m6KM9om2I 

What do you think will happen in the Israeli Elections?

In the US elections in 2012, not only were US citizens polled over and over about their choices, but it seems that similar polls were conducted around the world. I have not seen many such polls, however, for the Israeli elections.

So here is your chance: Please vote in this survey about your choices for the upcoming Israeli election, on January 22 2013. Vote for or against Netanyahu, Labor, religious or secular or Arab parties, or for one of the small single-issue lists!

Here's the survey link: https://survey.uwyo.edu/TakeSurvey.aspx?SurveyID=m6KM9om2I 

There is no introduction inside the survey itself. The material below serves as the introduction, and has some guidance for those who want to know more about the Israeli electoral system and parties, and about the Survey. If you are familiar with Israeli elections, you can go straight to the Survey. 

 On the Israeli elections, system, and parties: 

There are many essays about the Israeli elections readily available on line. The Knesset website is the official elections website, with, for example, the complete directory of party lists at http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections19/eng/list/ListIndex_eng.aspx . Everything is available in English, Arabic and Hebrew.

I have written an essay about the elections: http://sethward.posterous.com/israeli-elections. A brief guide to the main party lists on Wikipedia is: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_legislative_election,_2013#Participating_parties

Here is a website with a good, short summary of the political positions. http://tin.tv/site/article/%D7%91%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%92/your-guide-to-the-2013-israeli-election  

I was surprised at how few websites actually list the main points of each party in a succinct way. Both according to my memory, and to the results of websearchers (such as Google), there seem to have been more “platform” oriented websites for the 2009 elections, and more listings oriented more towards the “politicking” for the current elections. (However interesting this conclusion may be, remember it is an unscientific observation!).  

The survey

First, the survey asks for your vote—who you would vote for. Don’t simply “vote for the likely winner”—the survey has a group of questions for that purpose later on.

Second, this survey has some additional voting questions: A “Straw Poll” or beauty contest: if you could vote in direct election of Prime Minister, how would you vote? And, Israel’s government will be formed by a coalition, not a single party, so if you could vote for multiple parties, which would they be? (The survey asks you to pick three). Remember, this is your vote for what you want, not necessarily for who will win!

Third, the survey is interested in your thoughts about what will actually transpire as a result of the vote, with questions about who will likely form a government, the size of the coalition, and its largest members.

There are spaces for brief narrative explanations of your choices, and some demographics at the end.

The tool used to create the survey randomized the list order. This may make the poll slightly more “scientific” although, regrettably, it’s more difficult to find the party list you wish to vote for.

The survey may send you a confirmation after you complete it, and it’s designed to report your choices anonymously to me. 

[Update: so far, it's sending the respondent confirmation to ME, not to the survey participant. Although I set it up to be anonymous AND to send YOU an email confirmation, I am not sure it actually has this capacity.] 

Background and Reporting

This survey reflects considerations developed in a classroom teaching and exercises in my “Modern Middle East” classes at the University of Wyoming in previous years.  In my classes, I offered a small prize for the best prediction, written up as a short essay. I designed this survey in part to allow for machine scoring of a larger number of responses rather than reviewing a relatively small number of classroom essays. Scoring for the predictive part of the responses is based on the number of days before the election the survey was submitted, and the accuracy of predictions for prime minister, largest parties, coalition partners, size of coalition (Knesset mandates), and date of confirmation. Of course, I will also report the results of the actual “voting” section of the survey—I will send the results to anyone interested, and post them on http://sethward.posterous.com.   

Unfortunately, no prize is being offered for this survey.

Please complete the survey before the elections. But, note that the survey will technically remain open after January 22, 2013, until the next government is formed (or until mid-March if no government is confirmed). 

PLEASE take the survey yourself. PLEASE also circulate the survey as widely as possible, and feel free to post or distribute a link to this page (not to the survey itself, as it has no introduction page): on Facebook or Twitter, to classes, clubs, Hillels, groups, organizations, synagogues churches or other religious or social organizations, etc.  

I welcome your thoughts about the survey: sward@uwyo.edu. Or you can post comments on this document at my blog site. (If you are not reading it on my blog website, it 's at http://sethward.posterous.com/vote-for-your-choice-in-the-israeli-elections)  

 Here’s the survey link again, https://survey.uwyo.edu/TakeSurvey.aspx?SurveyID=m6KM9om2I 

Many thanks.

Seth Ward

University of Wyoming. 

Israeli Elections

Seth Ward

University of Wyoming

This essay is edited and updated from an essay I wrote for the elections to the 18^th Knesset, Feb. 10 2009. Voting for the 19^th Knesset is scheduled for January 22, 2013.

 The Israeli System

The Israeli electoral system is so different from the U.S. system that many Americans have no idea about just how it works, and how the system shapes the meaning of Israeli elections. The Parliamentary system is used in elections throughout the Middle East (and much of the rest of the world), and proportional voting for lists is also common, so understanding this electoral system can be a key to understanding the systems used in other countries.

The Israeli system considers the entire country a single district. Voters do not vote directly for the Executive Branch, or even vote directly for representatives to serve in the Knesset (Israel’s Legislature). Instead, they vote for lists of candidates for the Knesset, and Knesset seats (sometimes called "mandates") are awarded to individuals on the lists, based on the percentage of the vote for party lists getting more than 2% of the popular vote, as will be explained in more detail below. The Executive Branch (called "the government") is formed by the leader of a Knesset faction who can assemble a Coalition and a Cabinet that can be confirmed by majority Knesset vote. The electoral lists are generally supplied by individual political parties, so they may be called “party lists,” but various factions can unite to form a common list, or secede from parties to form their own list and so forth.

Actually, in some cases Israelis are in effect voting for individuals. For example, in the current election, Tzippi Livni established her own personal list, and attracted a number of prominent figures to join her. Perhaps the most famous example of this was Sammy Flatto-Sharon, who sought parliamentary immunity to avoid extradition in 1977, and won enough votes to be elected.

Most important though, voters may be voting for the individual in the top slot on the lists of the major parties—the party’s candidate for Prime Minister. In early stages of the 2009 election, three individuals had emerged as likely candidates to become Prime Minister: Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, and Tzippi Livni. At this point (December 2012), most polls show current Prime Minister Netanyahu with a substantial lead over the other candidates, but several other persons in top slots are often mentioned as possible candidates for PM. Those who vote for the smaller parties also may be voting because of the top person on the party list, too, who is most likely to get a government ministry if the party joins the government.

While it’s not likely, if enough Israelis vote for parties that could block Netanyahu’s bid to remain Prime Minister, it is possible that the leader of a list with a relatively small number of Knesset mandates could be asked to form the government.

The Knesset has 120 members; if only two lists were vying in the election and one received 60% of the votes and the other 40%, the top 72 from the one list and the top 48 from the other would be seated in the Knesset. In practice, there are usually many more lists vying for election (34 lists were presented to the Knesset by the deadline), and usually none gets more than 25%-30%. Polls for the election do not assume any party will get more than about 30 seats—25% of the Knesset—although they also assume that 60-75% of the Knesset seats will be from the top five lists.

The voter makes only one choice, a vote for one list, not the large number of candidates in US elections. At the polling place, he or she receives an envelope, goes into a private booth, selects a slip of paper with the symbol of a list and puts it in the ballot envelope. Then the voter steps out of the booth and inserts the envelope into the ballot box. If there is more than one slip of paper in the envelope, it invalidates the ballot.

Often parties will form joint lists. Quite a few such joint lists are understandable combinations of parties, but some joint lists represent smaller parties running together mainly to secure Knesset seats, because in the current Israeli system, 2% of actual votes are required in order for a list to gain representation. Thus in the 17^th Knesset, three of the smallest lists to be successful were multiparty lists, which combined for 15 seats—more than 10% of Knesset seats. Meretz and Yahad were similar politically, and their combined list vote tally in 2006 was 118,000—which meant the first 5 on their combined list were seated in the Knesset. But the 2% cutoff was 62,000 votes, so if Meretz and Yahad had run separately and each received exactly half of their joint actual total, neither would have had any representation. In the 2009 elections, the Green Party (environmentalists) and Meimad (a liberal religious party), had a joint list—perhaps an unlikely alliance—and they were not successful in their bid to earn seats in the Knesset. This alliance though is a good example of why such alliances occur. Had this party entered the Knesset, it is quite possible that they might have been part of the Government coalition regardless of who became Prime Minister, in which case the leader of Meimad might well have been a Minister and the environmental platform would been included in the coalition agreement. In the current election, the most talked about combined list is Likud/Yisrael Beitenu, in which Netanyahu and Avigdor Leiberman are joining forces, easily expected to win the largest number of mandates.

Joint lists might alternate one candidate from each faction, or if one faction is small, one candidate from the smaller faction after each three or four from the larger faction. Lists are manipulated also for electoral visibility: most Zionist parties have Arabs and especially Druze Arabs in “realistic” slots—in other words, if the list is expected to win 15-20 seats, slot 10 is fairly sure, slot 15 is realistic, slot 30 is unrealistic. So too, a party can manipulate the number of women in realistic slots. Some parties have had “primaries” to organize their lists. As in US elections, the voting patterns of party loyalists have not always been seen as producing effective results for the general election.

The President (Hebrew “Nasi”) of the State of Israel is a largely ceremonial position. The President is elected by the Knesset for a five year term. The President receives ambassadors presenting their credentials, can issue pardons, and in certain circumstances can dissolve Parliament, and can use the prestige of his office in various ways to promote peace or other Israeli interests. But his major political role is that, after the election, the President meets with the parties, and proposes as Prime Minister the Member of Knesset who, in his judgment, is most likely to succeed in forming a coalition and presenting a slate of Ministers to the Knesset. This is not always the leader of the largest party list: In the current Knesset (2009 election), it was Netanyahu, the leader of the second largest delegation. 

The Hebrew title for Prime MInister, Rosh Memshalah, actually translates to “Head of the Government,”  which may be understood as “Head of the Executive Branch.” The Prime Minister desgnate has three weeks to cement a coalition and propose a slate Ministers and Deputy Ministers, including himself or herself as Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defense, Foreign Minister, and other ministers and deputy ministers. The Prime Minister must be a Member of Knesset, most of the others usually are but do not have to be. The slate represents a coalition of various parties totaling at least one more than half the 120 members of the Knesset: the coalition needs at least 61 votes. This vote confirms the cabinet officers all at once, not individual by individual as in the US Executive branch.

Small parties often have great power here: they can exact a heavy price in coalition agreements in order to push a coalition past 60 votes. A very small party can bargain both that their leader become a Minister and that the coalition adopt certain legislation, in return for even as few as two or three seats counting towards the needed 61 votes.

In some cases, the first person asked cannot put together a coalition, or cannot put together a coalition in the amount of time allotted, in which case more time may be offered, another person might be asked to form a government, or new elections might be called.

Since the Government coalition has a majority, they should have enough votes to pass everything they propose, and to defeat everything they oppose. In practice this means that all important decisions are taken within the Government coalition—usually at the level of the Ministers, or by the parties they represent, and those outside the government or outside the coalition parties have very limited power. 

The prime minister may well attempt to put together a Government in which his or her party holds more seats than any other faction in the government, and to limit the number of ministers from outside his party to fewer than those from within his party. If the largest party has 31 or more seats, it can have a majority within the Government: 31 out of 61 mandates, the narrowest of majorities in the 120-seat Knesset. This scenario may be more likely if a party holds, say, 35 seats in a coalition of 65. The January 2013 election might make it possible for the Likud-Yisrael Beitenu combined list to do this, although not enough for the Likud faction alone to have more than 31 mandates or an absolute majority within the government. While coalitions in which one party dominated were more common in the early days of the state, this was impossible in the 18^th Knesset, for example: the largest delegation was 28.

Sometimes, however, the Prime Minister Designate will propose a broad “Unity” coalition, bringing together diverse political entities. What this means is that the PM’s party does not dominate the Government, and a minority portion of the unity coalition may more easily assemble enough votes to cripple the coalition, or to topple the government.

For several elections (1996, 1999, and 2001), there was direct election of the Prime Minister. In other words, the Israeli voter had two slips of paper, one with the symbol of a Knesset List, and one with the name of a candidate for Prime Minister. Some Israeli analysts who had called for the direct election of Prime Minister believed that this system would never work without increasing the degree of independence and power of Knesset members, for example by making some or all Knesset members directly responsible to smaller electoral districts, such as is the case in the United States, and a higher threshold for election to the Knesset. This, however, did not happen, and Israel went back to a single-vote system.

If the Government cannot muster a majority on an important issue, the Prime Minister resigns and there is an attempt to form a new government. The Prime Minister may resign for other reasons. A Member of Knesset can also propose a Vote of No Confidence in the Government. The resignation of the Prime Minister requires confirmation of a new government by the Knesset: there is no automatic succession as there is in the case of the American Presidency. The old government continues as a "caretaker" until the new government is formed. Sometimes the new government in such situations looks a lot like the previous government, with small tweaks if necessary to maintain a majority. If a new government can be formed, the Knesset is not dissolved.

The Knesset must be dissolved and stand for reelection four years after it was elected. In the current situation, the Knesset could have served four and a half years, as Israeli law provides that the term of a Knesset elected after a Knesset dissolved itself extends to the Jewish month of Heshvan (October/November) following four years from voting. But elections for a new Knesset are more often than not called before the end of the full term. In the present case, Prime Minister Netanyahu called for elections in January rather than October 2013 to seek a mandate, to avoid a protracted election cycle, and to avoid compromises or agreements that might not be forthcoming and perhaps lessen his chances at reelection.

Wikipedia usually is a good source for Israel election results, for example for the last two elections http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_legislative_election,_2006 and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_legislative_election,_2009

But the Knesset Website is the best and most authoritative source. Voting for the curent (18^th)Knesset is here: http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_res18.htm and the list of candidates submitted for election to the 19^th Knesset is here: http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections19/eng/list/ListIndex_eng.aspx (as of this writing, only the Hebrew List Index has the complete lists).

 Other systems

Above it was suggested that understanding the Israeli system will help understand other Middle Eastern systems, so before returning to the potential significance of the Israeli elections, a few notes on some other electoral systems in the Middle East. It should be noted though that whatever the electoral system, the electoral mandate is compromised or non-existent if the government does not submit to the electorate in an inevitable, timely fashion, or if the process or schedule precludes a fair contest.

The Palestinian parliamentary elections reflected some of the ideas of the Israeli reformers mentioned above: they were ½ (66 members) proportional for the entire electorate, on the Israeli model, and ½ (66 members) proportional elections in smaller districts, some electing just one representative, and some electing up to five. Some of the small-district elections had required seats for religious minorities, e.g. Christian or Samaritan. The Palestinian Authority did not adopt the direct election of the Prime Minister, but the Palestinians directly elect the President, who has much more of a political role than in the Israeli system. But in actual practice it is not constitutional roles but armaments and personal loyalty that have determined much about who does and does not exercise political power in the Palestinian areas. The winner of the Parliamentary elections in 2006, Hamas, nominated the Prime Minister, but after Hamas and Fatah fought in 2007, Mahmoud Abbas dismissed the Government and appointed a new Prime Minister. Moreover, the terms of President and Parliament expired long ago without new elections. Fatah holds power in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. Salam Fayad's government in the West Bank has made great strides, but it is clear that the political realities trump the electoral results and conpromise the emergence of desired government and civic institutions.

The Iraqis vote by lists, and there are a large number of them. In provincial elections, Iraqis could vote for an entire list, or single out members of the lists for individual votes. These lists are to set up so that 25% of the persons on them are women, and an Iraqi Supreme Court decision has further provided that the women should be seated so that after two males seated a woman is seated. The Open List system was adopted by almost all parties for the national Parliamentary elections in 2010. There have been a number of decisions that have changed important aspects of the voting. Iraq has not yet achieved a stable system, but given the situation that gave rise to its Constitution, I think it's best to emphasise the positive electoral achievements.

Iranians vote for Parliament and for the President, and have local elections, including direct election of Mayors. But, the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council vet the candidates and control the process, and the Supreme Leader's power seems to have been supported by the most recent Parliamentary results. On paper, you might say, there is at least the structure of a government responsable to the people with institutions that safeguard national values and regular voting--and indeed, the government is probably more responsive to the political will of the people than was the case under the Shah! Which is not saying much, moreover it was a much more open society in those days. Given the strife that erupted after the Ahmadinejad's reelection, there will be a lot of pressure on all sides. The next election is June 14, 2013, and will include Presidential as well as City and Village councils.

As of this writing, Egyptian debates about the political system have taken to the streets to protest the new constitution, and it remains to be seen whether the popular expression on the Egyptian street will result in broader representation in the legislature and executive. My guess is that the quick passage of the new constitution was designed to ensure the Muslim Brotherhood’s grip on the Egyptian government. and make government less responsive to responsible to minorities, to women, and to secularists. The Brotherhood may have a tighter grip on Egypt than Mubarak did. If protesters continue to press for more inclusive government, or unite and elect their candidates to Parliament, things may change--but I would not count on this in the short or intermediate term.   

Since the Ta'if agreement brought an end to years of civil war starting in 1975, Lebanon’s legislature is evenly divided between “Muslims” and “Christians” although it should be stressed that these are political and community labels, rather than religious ones. Lebanon continues to require the President to be a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister to be a Sunni Muslim. Nevertheless, the Shiite (and extremist) movement Hizbullah has enormous power, and appears to have been responsible for the selection of the current PM.

Turkey has a strong democratic tradition; even when the army has seized power, they have restored civilian, democratic process. The party currently in power, AKP, has been quite succesful though in neutralizing journalism, the army, and other potential sources of threats to its control--and in winning ever larger segments of the electorate.

What's important here? The most important consideration is not how the Parliament and President are elected, but the degree to which the election creates political power responsible to the broad electorate. The will of the People can never be seen as monolithic--so the democratic system has to institutionalize effective representation of those who do not form the governing majority--whether they are political, religious, ethnic, linguistic, gender or other groups, maintain civic institutions and promote an educated and informed electorate, and robust civil debate.Ultimately, we should ask such things as: Does the electorate control such things as the monopoly on legitimate use of force, usually considered a prerogative of government? Does the government ignore the electorate's mandate or favor majorities at the expense of minorities who then have no recourse? Elections should reflect political strength of various ideas in a society, facilitate a robust political discourse about these ideas, and allow for the exercise of power legitimately--and be prepared to face the people on schedule and to cede power to the next elected government. An interruption or cancellation of the transfer of that power within regular intervals, as a result of the expression of popular will, is inconceivable. 

Many observers of the Israeli scene assert that Israel is the "only democracy in the Middle East." Since the rise of a nascent Iraqi democracy after the fall of Saddam Hussein and especially since the "Arab Spring" (and one could even say since 1979 in Iran), the nature of democratic expression in the region is changing. But the players are not particularly committed to checks and balances, protection of minorities, peaceful change in government, inevitable reckoning by the electorate, and other cornerstones of democracy. I am not particularly hopeful for the benefits expected from the removal of tyrants and dictators in a few Arab countries in the short term. In Iran, in Egypt and elsewhere, we have seen people insist that the government serve the people and be responsible to them, rather than the other way around--but change is slow, and in this region there is every reason to suppose that new regimes arising after the Arab Spring and Syrian civil war will be no better--and perhaps worse--than the dictators they replaced. The solution is not simply replacing military dictators by elected regimes, but by the long and steady development of the institutions of a democratic, civil society, and succesful resistance when these institutions or the Press are being compromised. Also needed: development of open, responsible but robust discussion in political debate and journalism; an educated electorate; solving the question of inclusion of minority communities; and governments committed to general economic and social advancement of the governed more than their own political, ideological, religious or personal advancement (and, I should add, popular movements strong enough to demand this when governments do not live up to this expectation, as we are seeing these days in the Middle East). All these things take time: there is no "magic bullet" shortcut to end corruption, create civic infrastructure, and end illiteracy. 

In the MIddle East, we should probably add also that it will take time and popular will to reverse and eradicate the poison of antisemitism (clothed in "Antizionism"), the results of religious coercion and the youth bubble, and the long history of disenfranchisement (or lagging enfranchisement)--of Palestinian Arabs, of women, of minority religions or nationalities, and other diversity groups throughout the region. And, that versions of many of the problems I've outlined exist in Israeli society, albeit within a robust, effective democratic system.  

But let's return to Israel.

On the Israeli elections, 2013.

Netanyahu’s “Likud” and Avigdor Lieberman’s “Yisrael Beitenu” are strongly allied. Reviewing all the polls, this list seems slated to gain the largest number of seats in the Knesset, although not enough to make it impossible to block them from forming a government. In Israeli politics, elections generally have to do with attitudes towards security and peace. Issues stressed tend to be how much can be offered for peace with Palestinian Arabs, and whether or not, or exactly how, a Palestinian state should come about.

In this election though, social and economic issues may play a larger role than usual. A generation ago, Israel was a much less stratified economy and the gap between poor and rich was not as large as today. Labor, especially under the leadership of Shelly Yachimovich, is identified with social issues. Leadership also may be an issue. Tzippi Livni created a “movement” (tnu’ah) around herself; whatever else can be said for it, her ability to attract major names to her list may well indicate dissatisfaction with many of the others vying for leadership roles in Israeli governance. Nevertheless, Benjamin Netanyahu will most likely form the government. It will probably be fairly “narrow,” but that could easily change with the specifics of the election.

While most of the analysis is going to be about Likud-Yisrael Beteinu, Labor, Kadima and Livni, in addition there are several other types of parties. An important segment of the political debate has to do with religious parties, representing very different sectors of the Jewish religious community. Some are "National Religious"--fully engaged in the Israeli civic stream--sending their children to government religious schools, serving in the army and involved in all sectors of society. Others reflect "Haredi" (often translated "Ultra-Orthodox") streams, many of whom segregate themselves from Israeli society in various ways--an independent school system, no Army service, even maintaining separate transportation and busses in some cases. The question of Haredi national service is one of the issues that led to early elections. Arab representation is another such issue: Many Zionist parties have Arab and Druze participation, and there will probably be some 6-12 Arabs and Druzes elected on "Zionist" lists, as well as Members of Knesset elected from Arab or Arab-Jewish “non-Zionist” parties—although recent reports suggest that Israeli Arab participation in Israeli elections is declining. The next Government of Israel will most likely include a party or parties representing National Religious and/or Haredi. Some commentators have suggested that if the Arab parties participate in a succesful effort to block a Likud-led government, they will demand representation in the Government as a reward.  

Although many Israeli jurists feel the 2% threshold is not enough to prevent small, one-issue groups from winning Knesset representation, such groups have won in the past, and sometimes won big: the 17^th Knesset had 7 members from a party formed to support Pensioners’ rights, more than enough to have surpassed most plans for a higher threshhold. One-issue parties are represented in the current election, for example, the list called “The Pirates” which calls for protection for pirated software. As in the United States, small contingents with strong commitments to single issues can have immense political clout. So far, attempts to raise the threshold do not have much support in the Knesset.

The likely electoral results suggest that the Prime Minister designate will appeal to sectors of the Religious parties that can be attracted to belong to his or her coalition, as his pretty much always been the case. Internet chatter talks about some of the Arab parties not only being part of the group able to “block” Netanyahu, but demanding a place in the coalition if successful. These and other parties with a small number of highly defined goals will shape the policies of the new coalition, and in some cases be credited or blamed as the reason why the Government is not proceeding on some of the goals of the larger parties.

Significance

What kinds of things should students of the Modern Middle East watch for in this process?

In 2009, the recent operation against Hamas – Oferet Yetzuka usually translated “Cast Lead,” shaped the entire electoral process and its results were judged in its light. It’s not yet clear to me whether Amud Anan will similarly reshape the current process. Hamas’ victory celebrations are not surprising, of course: celebrating even the most ineffective attack on Israel as a victory is typical Middle Eastern practice, and celebrations can go on even when militarily the result was defeat or destruction of Arab military resources. In 1973, for example, Israeli forces were surprised by Egypt and Syria, but came back quickly to encircle the Egyptian army, and threatened Damascus and Cairo. The 1973 conflict made it possible for Sadat to come to Jerusalem seeking peace. If only the military results and diplomatic change-around would be taken into account, this might be called “losing the conflict to defeat Israel and suing for peace”—but Arab countries see 1973 as a victory and Israel sees it as a disappointment.

I do not think Amud Anan will be considered enough of a disappointment to endanger Likud; in fact it may strengthen Netanyahu. But, I do not think Israelis will vote solely on the basis of relations with Hamas and Fatah, and social and economic issues will have at least some hearing. It seems to me that Israel’s security long term will be most secure when Palestinian Arabs view the extremists in their midst not as brave freedom fighters who stood up to Israel, but as misguided militants whose promises were empty and whose resistance led only to massive death and destruction. In this sense, as for example, strikingly in 1996 (Netanyahu’s first term as Prime Minister), Fatah and Hamas may still be the most important factors in Israeli elections.

Seth Ward

Lecturer in Islam and Judaism (Assoc. Acad. Prof.)

Religious Studies Program, University of Wyoming

http://uwyo.edu/sward

http://uwyo.edu/sward/blog

Jewish Identity and Crypto-Judaism: The emergence of a community

Seth Ward, University of Wyoming

Leslie and Gloria Mound Library

Netanya Academic College, Netanya Israel, May 23, 2012

Introduction from library talk

I am happy indeed to honor my friend Gloria Mound and to honor the creation of the Leslie and Gloria Mound library. For the past few years I have brought a student study-abroad delegation (havaya yisraelit limudit) from the University of Wyoming in May or June. Last year I made intense efforts to adjust my schedule to speak at the opening; in the end this proved impossible. I regretted not being able to attend the opening ceremony and conference, and thank the Netanya Academic College for this opportunity to celebrate the opening of this important resource. I am also grateful for this opportunity to recall the late Leslie Mound, z”l. I brought students to Gan Yavneh a few times; as much as they recalled the resources and enthusiasm that Gloria Mound brought to this study, they recalled the graciousness of Leslie Mound, whose kind manner and warmth was so highly appreciated by my students and colleagues at receptions made at the Mound’s home after Gloria’s presentation. He is deeply missed.

I beg indulgence of my students—this is not a part of my career that is often reflected in their classes.

In April, I spoke at an event honoring Dr. Stan Hordes, a man whose long career has had many achievements, not all of them related to crypto-Jews or Jewish history; and, as a state Historian and expert on water and other rights descending from Spanish colonial times in that area, not even to Jewish studies at all. This past May I spoke at the Leslie and Gloria Mound library in Netanya Israel, a collection of books and materials that opened last year and is part of a new program in Sephardic studies with special reference to Crypto-Jews. These occasions provided a reference point to take stock of the changes and growth over the past few decades.

Put very simply, the past three decades or so have seen radical changes in the expression and study of what I shall call “crypto-Judaism,” in the way Crypto-Judaism is understood, in the emergence of a community, and its relationship with Judaism. Moreover, this period has seen sharp changes in ways that Jewish identity is articulated, and today I hope to address themes about community and identity that may be of particular interest to today’s audience.

For this audience today (In the University of Shanghai) I should start with a definition: In many places around the world, there are individuals who see themselves as descendants of Jews who were living in Spain over 500 years ago. Even in the 13^th century, Jews (and Muslims) were under pressure to join the dominant society by adopting Christianity, and many did so. All of them observed Christianity in public, adopting Christian names, attending Christian worship services and otherwise living Christian lives. However, some of them continued to view themselves as Jews—some only in an ethnic sense, taking pride in the fact that they Christians who were of the same race as Jesus himself—but some in a religious sense, observing Judaism in secret and passing down their heritage to their families. The pace of conversion to Christianity hastened in 1391, after riots in many cities. In the 1400s, Ferdinand of Aragon married Isabella  of Castille, uniting the two largest Kingdoms in what is today Spain—and in essence forming Spain as we know it today. They drove out the last vestige of Muslim rule in January of 1492, and in March, they decreed that all Jews had to leave Spain by the summer. But this did not affect Christians of Jewish heritage, and Jews who became Christians could stay in Spain.

My own feeling is that some converts were loyal to Judaism, others were convinced of the truth of Christianity; the situation was somewhat different in neighboring Portugal, where the entire Jewish community, including many Jews who had left Spain, were baptized and declared to be Christians in 1497. In the past 30 years in the USA—earlier in some places—a number of individuals of largely Spanish heritage have begun to assert a Jewish identity, based on their understanding that they had Jewish ancestors, and in some cases based on assumptions that their immediate ancestors had inherited some Jewish practices or beliefs—although they kept them hidden from their Christian neighbors.

-------------

The World Over was a publication of the New York Board of Jewish Education distributed to young American Jews at Hebrew schools around the country in the 1950s and 1960s—and, I have found, fondly remembered by all those familiar with it from those days.  Their pieces about the Inquisition, especially the superb graphic-novel style histories by Morris Epstein on the back cover, highlighted the romance of Jewish survival against all odds—a theme that resonated well in this newsletter addressed to the youth of a highly assimilating community. As I remember it, the World Over never quite answered the question of what became of the descendants of the conversos who retained loyalty to Judaism. Back on those days, there were few indicators of any survival; if there were, I wonder how attractive they would have been to the World Over or to American Jews as a whole. As romantic as 16^th and early 17^th century perseverance of Jewish identity in a Christian world may have seemed, in the 20^th century North American context, converso descendants had indeed committed the arch-crime: they did not maintain Jewish identity, willfully assimilating into their environment. Indeed, the late father of the current PM, Ben-Tzion Netanyahu emphasized the degree to which many converso descendants had identified strongly as Christians and identified Spanish attitudes towards Limpieza de Sangre “purity of blood” with the beginnings of an approach to Jewish heritage in which hatred and oppression was based not on the religious orientation or even on self-identification but on determination of Jewish identity made by governments and the Church, and based more on what we would call racial heritage—the beginnings of antisemitism. Netanyahu’s conclusions are controversial to be sure, but, suggest that some of those who identified with the Law of Moses did so only because of antisemitism—a finding that is highly problematic for a community dedicated to ending antisemitism and promoting Jewish identity.

Indeed, a generation ago there was little scholarship at all that suggested any survival whatsoever of Jewish identity among the descendants of Conversos. Cecil Roth’s history of the Marranos had little; indeed, Roth was editor of the Encyclopedia Judaica and there is little in the 1972-4 publication to suggest the great flowering of interest and research that have ensured in the past 40 years. Raphael Patai had visited the village of Venta Prieta and dismissed its Judaic practices—a view he was later to emend. There were a few references to persons who believed they had some Jewish ancestry—although sometimes connected with personages such as the Carvajal family; one famous historian of 17^th century New Spain traced his own ancestry back to the Carvajal family with multiple strands—while insisting he had no connection with any Jewish ancestry at all. J.R. Marcus, the dean of American Jewish Historians, served the Jews of Trinidad, Colorado for the High Holy days for many years. He is quoted as suggesting that there were as some 2000 New Christians in New Mexico in the 16^th century—yet it is not clear to me that he believed the Spanish speakers in the area preserved Jewish practices or identity into the 20^th century. There was little popular awareness either. Dan Ross published a wonderful book called Acts of Faith (my first published article was a short review of this book) with accounts of his travels to Venta Prieta, of the Xuetas and other communities which preserved Jewish identity—in 1982—and had nothing to say about the New Mexico phenomenon.

The Six Day War—in which the old city of Jerusalem came into Israeli control and Israel avoided disaster, and attitudes toward Israel and Judaism began to change—the growth of a more denominational approach to Jewish education, and the spirit of multiculturalism changed American Jewish life. Slowly there came to be more awareness of broader diversity in Judaism. America as a whole changed too, and so did the Spanish-ancestry community. Urbanization and mobility brought many Hispanos into contact with Jews; Suburbanization and economic growth brought them together as well, as did education and shared experiences stretching back to World War II.  America had become a melting Pot, but in the aftermath of the 1960s, greater valorization of diversity and a radical drop in Antisemitism also played a role. (Charles Silberman argued that American Antisemitism ended in the 1970s when a major family corporation that had had a history of excluding Jews appointed a Jewish president and no one really made a fuss over it), and in any case, according to an important AJC study, anti-Jewish feelings among persons of hispano ancestry born in America was very low, as compared to the high rate of antisemitism among those born outside the US. The conditions were set for a reconsideration of Jewish heritage among converso descendants.

Stan Hordes’ often-repeated account of how people began to express a sense of Jewish identity to him refers to quiet, nearly-clandestine approaches by individuals who had heard him speak about practices reported by the Spanish Inquisition as “Judaizing,” such as lighting candles or having larger meals on Friday evenings, avoiding pork, or eating flat breads around Easter time. These twentieth-century informants told him that they had always wondered about their own, similar family traditions and that his accounts of crypto-Jewish practices from several hundred years ago explained them. In other cases, as reported to me and to others, persons of Spanish heritage who came into contact with Jewish families as domestics, college roommates or army buddies remarked on similarities of practice. At least in such cases, the quest for Jewish identity was initiated by the people themselves as the result of contact with Jews, to be sure, but not by some folklorist or journalist probing them for details, a practice which usually is seen as tainting the research.

Slowly, a consistent picture emerged, usually described as the survival of Jewish practices and some sense of a special identity. Hordes’ historical research work provided a sound basis for interpreting modern practices, and his familiarity with genealogical records enabled him to track the ancestry of some of the families with practices that fit the pattern—often enough finding known Jewish Iberian ancestors. At the very least, there is a sound basis for understanding some of the reported practices as evidence of survival either of Jewish ritual or converso responses to external fear of Judaism, in other words, modern testimony among the descendants of Spanish colonials to converso heritage. But it also made him keenly aware of the limitations of the sources, of the need for sensitivity and respect for privacy, and care to report findings but not over-interpret. For example, certain objects with potential Jewish significance, or the prevalence of certain names have often been adduced as evidence of a hidden Jewish heritage; he and others have shown that these arguments are of limited utility. In any case, the publication and dissemination of these research findings in the form of scholarly articles, documentaries, exhibits and more greatly facilitated the emergence of a community of individuals of largely Hispanic ancestry who identify in some way with the Jewish people

Claims of preserved Jewish heritage have often been controversial, in the US as well as in Israel. A fundamental difference, of course, is that in Israel, there are a number of governmental considerations such as the Law of Return, population registry, state-religious schools and many more that have official stakes in status determination; no such government institutions exist in the U.S. situation. Thus in Israel, deliberations about whether Ethiopian Beta Israel or Falas Mura, Xuetas, Bnai Menashe may be considered Jewish involve governmental bodies. In America, there is no such government involvement of course, and for the most part, no mainstream rabbinic guidance is sought. Some converso descendants have adopted a fully Jewish identity, working with Rabbis trained by some of the main Ranbbinic seminaries—I mean here the large rabbinic schools that furnish Rabbis for all of the main Jewish communities all across the American spectrum from more to less observant—but in my experience, many parts of this community are drawn to work with self-proclaimed Rabbis with no smichut or diploma at all, or whose training is from small programs with little standing in the general Jewish community.

To return to the history of the emergence of this community in America: Whereas there had been reports about Jewish identity among indigenous Mexican people (i.e. Indians) with Venta Prieta, the first inklings of a change in the notion of a “crypto-Jewish identity” in the USA began to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1970s and 80s there were references to contemporary Hispanic families who identified as Jews. Carlos Llaralde did a PhD on members of his own family in the Brownsville are in Texas, near the Mexican border; Some talked about Tejano (Texan)– Jewish identity in places such as San Antonio, and I learned of a number of memoires that were written in those days, but not published, perhaps out of fear of rejection in the largely-Catholic worlds in which the writers lived. This began to change radically in the mid-1980s. There were a few publications around 1985, Hordes and Tomas Atencio published a detailed prospectus in 1987; and a number of histories of New Mexico mentioned some telling details. Hordes was a standard bearer for this change: he interviewed with the American Public Broadcasting Service and was featured in some documentaries, wrote articles in professional journals and newspapers, founded two professional historical societies, and worked with the Smithsonian Institution on an exhibition. A further impetus to this development in the late 1980s was the 500^th anniversary of the Expulsion from Spain. I had just moved from Haifa to Denver Colorado in 1991, and well remember interest expressed to me in such issues as whether Spain would use the occasion to welcome the Jews back to Spain—and what this would mean to people of Spanish ancestry.

Back in 1996, I suggested that Crypto-Judaism could be studied and discussed under the rubrics of the question of genealogy, the canon of evidence, and the expression of identity. The “canon of evidence included what I call “argument from names” -- rigorous research has shown that in fact during the 19^th century this argument holds up—using a set of nine families that exhibit crypto-Jewish features, it has been shown that for a generation or two in the 19^th century there were in fact a statistically significant subset of names that were used by their ancestors; otherwise however the evidence is not convincing. A second set of evidence is artifacts—people talked about items used as mezuzot, or holy books or other items supposedly associated with Jewish practice. Again, research has shown that the description of the artifact by those associated with it is more determinative than the artifact itself—most of the artifacts cited as evidence are unconvincing when taken alone. Another part of the canon of evidence is a tradition in a family that somos judaeos “we are Jews” or accusations that these people were Jews. Again, this is not as convincing as you might think: accusations of Judaism may simply reflect an anti-Semitic slur more than actual Jewish heritage.

Patient genealogical work demonstrated Jewish ancestry but a “genetic essentialism” so often plagues popular treatments of this phenomenon; as DNA evidence began to be available professional, critical analysis and serious critiques to flawed arguments are even more necessary. Conclusions drawn from DNA evidence often do not stand up under scrutiny, or are irrelevant to the point being made. For example, the famous “Cohen Modal Haplotype” – a Y chromosome pattern occurring with striking frequency among men who claim to be Kohanim – occurs often enough among people with no such claim, so often, indeed, that in general, Jewish males with traditions of being Kohanim are only a small subset of males with this haplotype—put differently, a Kohen has a strikingly high probability of having this haplotype, but a person with the haplotype still has a very low probability of being Jewish or having Jewish ancestors. (This type of analysis is important even when addressed to those who are impervious to logic and, unwilling to accept the fact that often proffered evidence does not stand up under scrutiny.  I wrote these lines about some of the genetics presentations in various conference I have attended, but it applies equally well to those such as Judith Neulander or various journalists who wrote critically in general of work identifying the phenomenon of Crypto-Judaism) To my mind, the most important decision in the area of genetic genealogy was to devote much effort and energy to the medical sphere: one may quibble about the interpretation of this or that allele or group of Y-chromosome genes, but the identification of diseases and disorders worth testing among a given subset of the population saves lives.

---------------------- 

The most important component is the study of the expression of identity. Prof. Kunin’s book on the subject is Juggling Identities. This book has a fascinating analysis of a session offered by some Messianic Christians on how they constructed their sense of a Jewish heritage and Jewish identity—based on a conference presentation which might not have come about except for Stan’s patient insistence to program committee members and society board that giving them a space to articulate their approach was a crucial component in understanding all aspects of Crypto-Jewish identity.

So, what are the components of this community? In my teaching, I often use the typology of “believing, behaving and belonging” to organize descriptions of what is important in describing religious movements. Among the Crypto-Jews of the U.S. Southwest, there is little unanimity of belief in the traditional religious sense: some fervently believe in God and some don’t, some express beliefs that would be familiar to anyone in the normative Jewish community; most do not. Underlying this, I conclude, is an important belief: the belief in the value of continuity of their Jewish identity, at least in a hidden form, and the value of their type of identity. To rephrase this: they believe it is important to affirm that they and their ancestors have always been Jewish in at least some sense, rather than to assert that they have some Jewish ancestors or heritage and they have chosen to identify as Jews. 

Behavior is easier to discuss, as is the sense of belonging. Indeed, in observing this community and participating in some of their events, it seems to me that the believing and belonging components are expressed in a readily identifiable pattern.

1.      1.  Rituals and places. Rabbis, Conference, Purim/Esther

Some people in this community follow very traditional Jewish rituals, but most do not. Most talk about rituals and practices they believe their ancestors followed: lighting candles on Friday nights –similar to the Jewish practice—but in a hidden area in the house, or baking pan de Semita at Easter time—but few follow these rituals either. Research has shown that the Jewish festival of Purim was highly meaningful to Crypto Jews several centuries ago, especially the story of Esther, who kept her Jewish identity secret even when brought into the royal palace and married to the King—but while they talk of Esther with pride, relatively few participate in normative Purim activities.

Many, though, participate in various groups and forums, conferences and travel. They seek DNA confirmation of their heritage—it seems to me that this should be considered a kind of ritual. They consult Rabbis and cheer various organizations and rabbis who speak to their beliefs about the continuity of their Jewish identity—regardless of the training and standing of these leaders. Just as “Jewish continuity” seems to be a major unifying belief (rather than belief in God)—as is true for many Jews in the Mainstream Jewish world—who do not have strong religious beliefs regarding the Divine--this style of “Jewish practice” mirrors that of the general Jewish community, whose practice has only a small religious content, but often centers around leaders whose opinions are cherished, and non-religious community institutions.

Thus, “belonging” is the most important component—but here we see that belonging to the Crypto-Jewish community or to a Sephardic subset of Judaism—appears to be the most important component of this equation.

2.      2.  Minority attitudes-Crypto Jews /African American parallels 1960-1980s.

An interesting area for further research is a comparison between Hispanic Crypto-Jews and African American Muslims. Both groups share a narrative asserting a unique heritage:  “Our ancestors included Jews or Muslims” (that is not or not merely Christian Blacks or Spaniards), and a conscious choice to adopt this heritage, including the notion that some small trace was preserved – even if it was hidden or nearly destroyed. Moreover, these communities have not simply folded into the religious mainstream, both due to some of the choices they have made, and due to a feeling in the respective mainstream communities that these groups may represent historic returns – but are also marginal and have practices and beliefs that may not be “mainstream” enough.  

3.      3. Complex attitude towards mainstream, classic communities, multiple identities, reshaping self-image

The Crypto-Jews remind us that adopting a religious heritage can be very complex, and part of a multiple set of identities. There is no single pattern; if anything, the Crypto-Jews seem to behave more like American secular Jews than traditional Jews. Despite the protestations of Crypto-Jews that they are maintaining a religious tradition, often it is the racial component that is most important to them. DNA do not have religion—but often that is just how this is expressed in this community.

4.      4. Important roles of researchers/standard bearers/ creation of institutions and publications.

Finally, I must offer a few words about “Standard Bearers,” institutions and publications in the formation of identity.  I mentioned various processes and changes such as the Six Day War, integration into urban and especially suburban areas with large Jewish populations, shared experiences in World War II, the decline of antisemitism—and I do think these were necessary for and partially the cause for openness to or indeed desire to express a Jewish identity among hispanos. But I do not think they were sufficient: people like Stan Hordes and Gloria Mound worked to help give this phenomenon a voice, and (this is also important) combined commitment to spreading the voice with research and critical thinking. Although Stan, for example, has often been called a “booster” he is more of a “standard bearer”—both in the since of carrying the flag (i.e. the ‘standard’) but also of maintain standards. The leaders and institutions created have made it possible for hispanos interested in exploring Jewish identity to do so, and made it easy to be part of the “Crypto-Jewish Community” – and on the whole these institutions have not insisted on a traditional approach to belonging to the Jewish mainstream. It seems to me to be inevitable that this be so, and the institutions pretty much have to adopt a broad, inclusive and secular approach, in which the religious component is similar to that of secular Jewish institutions.

It is also inevitable that some individuals, movements and institutions are entirely committed to integrating descendants of Crypto-Jews into the contemporary Jewish community and providing them a traditional Jewish identity. Had organizations or Rabbis emphasizing traditional religious training and practice (and not emphasizing research and an inclusive approach) been more active in the US, for example, the shape of the Crypto-Judaism “community” would have been quite different.

POSTSCRIPT

Here in China, Jewish identity is not much of an issue, although it might be that individuals who believe they have ancestry from Kai Feng or for that matter from Jews of Shanghai or Tientsin of a century or more ago might come forward and assert that they hid  their Jewish identity from public view for various reasons. However, many Chinese people are wrestling with questions of preserving ethnic and – yes—religious or belief-oriented practice—and the comparison with the issues raised by Crypto-Judaism may well be instructive. 

Jewish Identity and Crypto-Judaism: The emergence of a community

Seth Ward, University of Wyoming

Stan Hordes, the leading researcher about contemporary Crypto-Judaism in the Southwestern U.S., often recounts how people came to him quietly after lectures about Spanish Inquisition records of 16^th--17^th -century “Judaizing” practices such as lighting candles, large meals on Friday evenings, and avoiding pork. They told him this was their own story too--the practices described matched unusual family practices they had always wondered about.

In the US, Hispanics wondered about Judaism and remarked on perceived similarities as they heard lectures, or came in contact with Jewish families as domestics, college roommates or army buddies, Especially from the 1980s, anti-Semitism was falling among Hispanics born in the United States, and many quested to understand and appreciate a Jewish component to their heritage. 

Slowly, a consistent picture emerged, and many Hispanics identified in various ways as Jews or “Crypto-Jews.” Hordes’ historical research work provided a sound basis for interpreting family practices sometimes associated with crypto-Judaism, and familiarity with genealogical records sometimes enabled him to find that such families had known Jewish ancestors. He and others worked to understand whether reported practices are explicable either as evidence of survival of Jewish rituals, or converso responses to fear of accusation of Judaizing.

Yet he also emphasized critical research standards, the need for sensitivity and privacy, and the pitfalls of over-interpretation, for example, proving that the prevalence of certain names in this population is significant only for some names and some decades, otherwise having no correlation to Jewish heritage, and arguing that artifacts purported to evidence hidden Jewish heritage attest to the way people interpret them, not necessarily to the actual history of the object, and have limited utility in “proving” Jewish ancestry.

Hordes’ most important role was the publication and dissemination of research in scholarly articles, documentaries, exhibits and more, greatly facilitating the emergence of a community of Hispanic ancestry who identify in some way as Crypto-Jews.  Journalistic reports and academic research have a more direct influence in the USA than in Israel. Without the Law of Return, Israel population registry, state-religious schools, and the Chief Rabbinate, there is no government and little mainstream Rabbinic involvement in determining Jewish identity. Some converso descendants have joined the Jewish mainstream, but many chose no affiliation (in this way resembling a large portion of American Jews), or are drawn to groups or Rabbis outside the Jewish mainstream. As a result, the work of scholars (such as Hordes) and journalists, reporting real or imagined research, and of supposed validation via names, genetics or artifacts, plays a more crucial role than any formal authority.

The first inklings of the development of an American Crypto-Jewish identity began to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s (well after reports began to emerge in Mexico and elsewhere), with references to contemporary Hispanic families who identified as Jews. Carlos Llaralde’s PhD dissertation studied members of his own family in the Brownsville area in Texas, near the Mexican border, and there was talk about Tejano (Texan)-Jewish identity in places such as San Antonio. Memoires were written in those days, but not published, perhaps out of fear of rejection in the largely-Catholic worlds in which the writers lived. This began to change radically in the mid-1980s. There were a few publications around 1985, and Hordes and Tomas Atencio published a detailed prospectus in 1987. A number of histories of New Mexico written in the late 1980s mentioned some telling details. Hordes was a standard-bearer for this change: he was interviewed by the American Public Broadcasting Service  and was featured in documentaries, wrote articles in professional journals and newspapers, co-founded professional historical societies for Crypto-Jewish Studies and New Mexico Jewish history, and worked with the Smithsonian Institution on an exhibition. Some of the impetus to this development in the late 1980s was the 500^th anniversary of the Expulsion from Spain. I well remember interest expressed to me in the mainstream Jewish community about such issues as whether Spain would use the occasion to welcome the Jews back to Spain—and what this would mean to people of Spanish ancestry who had lost this part of their heritage.

I’ve argued that discussion of Crypto-Judaism should focus on three rubrics: the canon of evidence, the question of genealogy, and the expression of identity.

The “canon of evidence” has many problematic elements, such as the argument from names and artifacts mentioned above. Hordes’ genealogical research into a group of families showed that this argument holds up for a generation or two in the 19^th century, otherwise is unconvincing. Regarding artifacts—items supposedly used as mezuzot, holy books, etc., or symbols held to be Jewish--research demonstrated that artifact or symbol descriptions often reflect the value assigned them by the describer rather than the artifact’s original purpose. Yet these descriptions themselves give important testimony to how such items are understood today.

Another type of evidence is family tradition, for example, a tradition handed down that somos judaeos “we are Jews,” or that some other family was Jewish. Again, this is not as convincing as some think: for example, accusations of Judaism might reflect anti-Semitic slurs applied to people with no actual Jewish ancestry, perhaps even adopted by them as a point of pride.

While critical analysis may question individual items in the canon of evidence, a strong pattern of practices, artifacts and traditions recur often among American Crypto-Jews and help define their identity.

The “question of genealogy” is likewise problematic in many ways. In a general sense, all American hispanos are likely to have some Jews among their ancestors: even low estimates of medieval Iberian demography, intermarriage and migration suggest it’s statistically unlikely that any American Hispanos today lack any Jewish ancestors. Specific Jewish ancestry can only be demonstrated by patient genealogical work (Hordes has been a leader in this area), not shortcuts based on personal names, places or spellings. “Genetic essentialism” often plagues popular treatments of this phenomenon. Conclusions drawn from DNA evidence often do not stand up under scrutiny, or are irrelevant to the point being made. For example, while there is a higher than expected probability that Jews identifying as Kohanim have the “Cohen Modal Haplotype” Y chromosome pattern, a random person with the haplotype has a low probability of being Jewish, and no genetic pattern implies preservation of Jewish beliefs, practice or identity. (For example, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s four grandparents were all Jews, yet she is not considered Jewish).  Unfortunately, many popular discussions, conference presentations and individual crypto-Jews assert such flawed genetic essentialism—here too, often testifying to the way these data are understood by those who cite them and use them to understand their own identity.

To my mind, the best use of genetic genealogy relates to the medical sphere: one may quibble about the interpretation of an allele or gene, but the identification of diseases and disorders worth testing among a given subset of the population saves lives. Hordes has been active in promoting medical population genetics, and a more critical approach to the whole issue.

----------------------

To my mind, the most important component is the expression of identity. Prof. Kunin’s book Juggling Identities is based on numerous interviews in the area, leading to understand the expression of crypto-Jewish identities. Indeed, as I have argued above, the evidence and genealogy adduced are best understood in the context of identity. Indeed, the most striking aspect is not the evidence and genealogy, but the way attitudes towards Judaism have changed in this community.

An informal community of American Hispanos claiming their ancestors were forced to become Catholics has emerged in the past three decades, largely but not entirely with roots in the Southwestern U.S. What are the components of this community? I like to use categories of “believing, behaving and belonging” to discuss religious phenomena, and they shape the discussion here.

As with mainstream American Jews, there is little uniformity of traditional religious belief among U.S. Crypto-Jews: some fervently believe in God and some don’t, some express beliefs that would be familiar to anyone in the mainstream Jewish community; most do not. But most believe in the value of the continuity of their Jewish identity, at least in a hidden form: a belief that they and their ancestors have always been Jewish in at least some sense (rather than just having some Jewish ancestors or choosing to identify as Jews). 

As for “behaving:” Some people in this community follow very traditional Jewish rituals, but most do not. Most talk about rituals and practices they believe their ancestors followed: lighting candles on Friday nights –similar to the Jewish practice, but in a hidden area in the house, or baking pan de Semita at Easter time—but few follow these rituals either. They assert that Purim is highly meaningful to Crypto-Jews and talk of Esther with pride for maintaining Jewish identity in secret while married to the King and living in the royal palace —but few participate in normative Purim activities.

Practice is more likely to involve participation in various groups and forums, conferences and travel. They seek DNA confirmation of their heritage (perhaps this is a kind of ritual). They consult rabbis and cheer various organizations that validate their beliefs about the continuity of their Jewish identity and the nature of that identity, while wary of total identification with Jewish mainstream—a cause of the complexity of their relation with it). “Belonging” to a Crypto-Jewish or Sephardic community (often not the mainstream Jewish community!) is more important than traditional beliefs and behaviors.

As we saw with belief in “Jewish continuity” (rather than God), this style of “Jewish practice” in which there is often only a small religious content, emphasizing non-religious community institutions and ethnic practices, also mirrors a large portion of the American Jewish mainstream.  

It may be instructive to compare American Hispanic Crypto-Jews and African American Muslims. Both groups share a foundation narrative asserting a unique heritage, including the survival of a small trace even if completely hidden or nearly destroyed. Neither community has simply folded into its religious mainstream, maintaining a complex relationship with their “former identities” and often marginalized by many who question whether these groups are authentic enough or meet religious standards.

The Crypto-Jews remind us that adopting a religious heritage can be very complex, and part of a multiple set of identities. There is no single pattern; if anything, the Crypto-Jews seem to behave more like American secular Jews than traditional Jews. Crypto-Jews assert they are maintaining a religious tradition but often it is the essentialist genetic (i.e. racial) component that is most important to them. It’s often difficult for them to relate to mainstream Jewish community concerns such as Israel, educating the next generation, and deepening Jewish identification among a population that considers Judaism elective. Yet if the way they handle genealogy, evidence and identity is unique, and their relationship with the Jewish mainstream complex, their patterns and priorities of believing, behaving and belonging  fit into an American pattern, and underscore the importance of national models in understanding crypto-Judaic phenomena around the world.

Finally, a word about “Standard Bearers.” Integration into urban and especially suburban areas with large Jewish populations, shared experiences in World War II, the decline of anti-Semitism all were necessary for hispano openness and desire to express a Jewish identity.  But I do not think they were sufficient: people like Stan Hordes worked to help give this phenomenon a voice.  Although Hordes for example, has often been called a “booster” he is more of a “standard bearer”—both as in carrying the flag (i.e. the ‘standard’) but also of setting the standard: combining commitment to this community with research and critical thinking. The leadership of committed individuals such as Stan Hordes with solid research credentials is crucial to the emergence and stability of this community.